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Abstract 
Pension funds, the funds held in trust to support occupational pension plans,. 
represent significant funds of capital. Together with other institutional investors such as 
mutual funds and hedge funds they have become important actors in financial markets -
nationally and internationally. They have significant holdings in national and 
transnational corporations. They are also deeply implicated in the financial instability of 
global financial markets, and free market globalization. 
In the past decade some members of the labour movement have sought to have 
more active involvement in pension fund investment decision-making. They have seen 
this involvement as a strategy for influencing corporate management and practice, and for 
encouraging productivity, local and regional development and long-term. growth and 
sustainability. More radically, they have seen it as a means to create new conceptions of 
''value" that include factors other than monetary return, and to transform capital by 
gaining greater social and democratic control over it. They have pursued strategies such 
as advocating for greater representation on pension plan boards of trustees or investment 
advisory committees,. shareholder activism including proxy voting, investment screening 
and economically targeted or community investing. 
This thesis assesses these strategies within the Canadian context and looks at their 
transformative potential in light of pension law and corporate law principles and practice. 
It argues that the current strategies of pension fund activists, even if extended to other 
types of investors - individuals and institutional - are not likely to lead to more 
democratic and social systems of corporate regulation. It also suggests that pension fund 
activists have not fully explored the possibilities created by the fact that pension funds 
have many ''owners" and "beneficiaries" - legal or otherwise. Nor have their strategies 
adequately considered the suggestion that the uncertainties of corporate law make 
completing the separation of the corporation from the shareholder, and creating 
democratic and social systems of corporate regulation, a more appropriate and meaningful 
political project. In short, they have not challenged the limitations of pension law and 
corporate law with strategies that recognize the corporation and markets as social 
institutions that should be democratically and socially regulated. One avenue for doing 
this appears to be through utilizing the public pension system, particularly by expanding a 
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Ensuring adequate levels of retirement savings for an ageing population and for 
ourselves in retirement bas become a significant public issue in recent years. In Can.ad~ 
most people rely on a combination of public and private pensions and/or income from 
their retirement savings plans to support themselves in retirement. Recent government 
and media attention on the public pension system bas focused on a pending "crisis" in the 
ability of the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, the public pension system,l to support the 
ageing population.2 In response, many have advocated various forms of privatization of 
the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), from allowing individuals to opt out, to replacing it with 
individual savings plans.3 Although the reforms that were ultimately implemented in 
1997 did not privatize the CPP, one of the reforms was the establishment of an 
investment fund managed by private financial institutions which can be invested in the 
stock market, and "it could be argued that the •.. move to partial funding of the CPP is 
· the first step along the road to privatization.'"' 
1 The Canada/Quebec Pension Plan is funded by the contnl>utions of employers and employees. lf an 
individual's CPP/QPP benefit falls below a minimum level, it is supplemented by the federal government's 
Old Age Security program which includes the Guaranteed fncome Supplement and the Allowance for 
spouses and partners, and is funded from general revenue. 
2 See e.g. Association of Canadian Pension Management. Dependence or Self-reliance: Which way for 
Canada s Retirement Income System? (Toronto: Association of Canadian Pension Management. 2000); 
Government of Cana~ An Information Paper for Consultations on the Canada Pension Plan (Ottawa:: 
Department ofFinance, 1996). 
3 For a review and critique of these proposals see generally M. Condon, .. Gendering the Pension Promise fu 
Canada: Risk, Financial Markets and Neohl>eralism" (200 l) lO Social & Legal Studies 83; M. Townson, 
Pensions Under Attack: What s behind the push to privatize public pensions (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives & James Lorimer, 200 l) [hereinafter Pensions Under Attack] • 
.i Pensions Under Attack, ibid. at 32. 
l 
In the private system, attention has focused on the cost and the risk to employers 
of providing occupational pension plans.5 Occupational pension plans are either defined 
contribution or defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans guarantee a level of pension 
benefit based on a formula set out in the plan. Employer contributions must be such that, 
together with any employee contribution and the plan's investment returns, the promised 
pension can be provided. Defined contribution plans on the other hand, do not guarantee 
a specific level of pension benefit. The pension benefit is instead provided from the 
accumulated contributions of the employer, and in some cases the employee. 
fucreasingly, new occupational pension plans are defined contribution plans.6 These 
plans, in addition to reducing the financial risk to the employer while increasing 
individual employees' market risk, also eliminate the income redistnbution that occurs 
within a defined benefit pension plan system. 
In addition to the shift from defined benefit to defined contnbution as the 
favoured type of plan, many employers simply do not offer pension plans for their 
employees, or they contribute to an employee's individual registered retirement savings 
plan (RRSP). fudividual plans and contnbutions to them are on the increase. The federal 
government's 2001 tax expenditure estimates for example, show the tax expenditures for 
5 These are also referred to as employer-sponsored or employer-based pension plans and include registered 
pension plans. deferred profit sharing plans and group registered retirement savings plans. 
6 
.. Survey of Pensions" The Economist 362:8260 (16 February 2002) 3 at4-5, 15-21; M. Townson. 
Reducing Poverty among Older Women: The Potential of Retirement Income Policies (Ottawa: Status of 
Women Canada,. 2000) at 33; Statistics Canada. Pension Plans in Canada. January I. 2000. Catalogue no. 
74-401-XPB (Ottawa: MiniStry oflndustry,. 200 l) at 6 & 37-38 [hereinafter Pension Plans in Canada}. 
2 
individual RRSP contributions at $9,035 million in 1996 with a projected increase to 
$12,005 million in 2002.7 
Commentators have noted that the changes to the private and public pension 
systems as well as the refonn proposals are reflective of a political and economic 
environment characterized by increased globalization, economic restructuring, rapid 
technological change and the increasing influence of a neoliberal political agenda.8 This 
agenda emphasizes limited state intervention in the market, economic liberalization, 
particularly the removal of barriers to trade and investment, and reductions in state-
provided social benefits and services in favour of increased reliance on the market to 
provide for human needs. 
It offers a vision of society in which individuals provide for themselves through 
the market~ rather than one of social citizenship whereby individuals provide for one 
another through state redistributive mechanisms.9 In the context of Canadian pension 
7 This represents the tax expenditures for both the tax deductions for RRSP contnbutions and the non-
taxation ofRRSP investment income. When the taxation ofRRSP withdrawals is factored in, the net tax 
expenditures are estimated at $6,845 million in l996 and projected to be $8,530 million in 2002. 
Government of Canada, "Table One-Personal Income Tax. Expenditures" in Ta.r Expenditures and 
Evaluations 200 I (Ottawa: Department ofFinance, 2001) [hereinafter Ta.r Expenditures and Evaluations 
200 I]. It is also interesting to note that RPP assets grew 138% between 1988 and l998, while RRSP assets 
increased by 200% during the same period. Statistics Canada, Trusteed Pension Funds: Financial Statistics 
1998, Catalogue no. 74-201-XPB (Ottawa: Ministeroflndustry, 2000) at S [hereinafter Trusteed Pension 
Funds}. 
& See generally Condon, supra note 3; Pensions Under Attack, supra note 3; B. Waine, "Workers as 
Owners: The Ideology and Practice of Personal Pensions'' (1992) 2l(l) Economy & Society 27. 
9 For example, Anthony Giddens, one of the architects of''New Labour" in the United Kingdom, argues that 
.. social democrats have to shift the relationship between risk and security involved in the welfare state, to 
develop a society of 'responstble risk takers' in the sphere of government, business enterprise and labour 
markets." The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Malden: Polity Press, 1998) at 100. For 
commentary about this shift see J. Fudge & B. Cossman,. "Introduction: Pri".atization, Law and the 
Challenge to Feminism" (Paper prepared for the Conference: Feminist Political Economy: Revitalizing the 
Debate, Institute for Feminist Legal Studies., Osgoode Hall Law School, 24 March 2001) online: 
<http1/www.yorku.ca/iflslprivateconf/lintro 7.htm> at 11-14., I 8-20; Pensions Uncfer Attack, ibid. at 40. 
3 
policy, Monica Townson argues that ••the direction ... is clearly to transfer more of the 
risk and responsibility for providing for retirement onto individuals. Reducing the role of 
public pensions in the retirement income system is part of that trend." 10 
The rapid globalization of the last three decades has seen significant increases in 
both the number of transnational corporations (TNCs) and in the international movement 
of capital, and has resulted in a decline in state regulation and monitoring of corporate 
activity in a number of spheres including labour, human rights and the environment. 
Widespread exploitation oflabour, the abuse oflabour and human rights, and the 
degradation of the environment have been Linked to pressures from globalization and the 
effects of neolloeral policies. 
While globalization and the pervasiveness of neollberal ideology have clearly 
influenced recent changes to pension policy in Canada and many other countries, 11 
pension funds, the funds held in trust to support occupational pension plans, 12 are not 
merely passive actors on the global scene. Pensions and other institutional investors such 
as mutual funds and hedge funds hold and invest increasingly large pools of capital. In 
Canada, trusteed pension funds represent a significant pool of investment capital. They 
are the second largest pool of in.vestment capital in Canada, after financial institutions.u 
They are also relatively recent arrivals to the institutional in.vestment arena, having 
10 Pensions Under Attack. ibid at 32. 
u See generally Ibid.; R. Blackb~ "The New Collectivism: PensionRefoan. GreyCapitalismand 
Complex: Socialism~ (1999) 233 New Left Rev. 3 [hereinafter .. New Collectivism'1; R. Minns, "The Social 
Ownership of Capital" (1996) 219 New Left Rev. 42. 
12 These funds would be made up of a combination of employer contnl>utions, and/or employee 
contnl>utions and investment income. although the actual percentages of each would depend on the 
individual plan. 
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experienced phenomenal growth since the mid-1960s.14 This makes pension funds very 
powerful investors with "increasingly deep roots in many private and public capital 
markets, and a vital force in Canada's ability to convert national savings into productive 
investment."15 
The exponential growth of pension funds and their effect on capital markets has 
not been limited to Canada. By 1994 the value of pension funds globally was $10 
trillion.16 As Robin Blackburn comments,. pension funds have assets "equivalent to the 
total value of shares on the world's three leading exchanges."17 As a result, pension funds 
have become increasingly important actors in financial markets, and have significant 
effects on local,. national and global economies. It would appear that they also have 
significant influence, or the potential to influence corporate governance and policy. 
Pension funds also provide retirement income to workers who are generally 
unionized members of the labour movement, a movement that has a history of working to 
limit many of the excesses of capitalist accumulation through both collective bargaining 
with individual employers, and participation in the political process to promote a broad 
range of state regulatory programs including worker health and safety, unemployment 
insurance, tax reform,. and universal public pension and childcare programs. Indeed the 
labour movement has been an active force in the emerging global political society 
13 Trusteed Pension:. Funds, supra note 7 at L 
14 Pension funds are approximately seventy-five times larger than theywere in the mid-1960s. 
K. Falconer, Prudence. Patience and Jobs: Pension lnvestment in:. a Changing Canadian Economy: 
Summary Report (Ottawa: Canadian.Labour Market and Productivity Centre, 1999) at 3. 
IS Ibid. 
16 
.. New Collectivism\ supra note 11 at 5. 
lT /bid. 
5 
composed of a variety of actors - state and private - who are working in coalition to re-
orient or temper the effects of global capitalism and neoliberalism.18 
The significance of the size of the funds that provide their retirement pensions and 
their implication in some of the problems associated with global financial markets and 
neoliberalism has not gone unnoticed by the labour movement. Members have watched 
as these funds have been invested in corporations that use non-union labour, or have poor 
labour-management relations, violate environmental, labour or human rights, lay off 
unionized labour, or move production to another region or country. At the same time 
they found they had little or no ability to affect these decisions, or to advocate for 
investment decisions with collateral benefits such as job creation or the provision of 
social services or other economic benefits. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the last decade has also seen a renewed interest on the 
part of the labour movement in participation in occupation pension fund investment 
management and decision-making as a strategy for influencing corporate management 
and practice, and encouraging productivity, local and regional development and long-term 
growth and sustainability, and more radically as a means to transform capital by gaining 
greater social control over it. One strategy that labour movement pension fund activists 
have advocated is for greater representation on pension plan boards of trustees through 
either joint or sole trusteeship, or they have worked to create advisory bodies to these 
18 See generally R.. O'Brien, ''NGOs, Global Civil Society and Global Economic Regulation" in 
S. Picciotto & R.. Mayne, eds., Regufating International Business: Beyond Libera/iZation (London: 
Macmillan in association with Oxfam,. 1999) 257. 
6 
boards.19 In terms of investment practices, pension fund activists have focused on three in 
particular: shareholder activism including proxy voting, investment screening and 
economically targeted or community investing. 
Pension fund activists have sought to use these practices to influence individual 
corporate decisions, to encourage particular corporate practices such as adherence to 
labour or social standards, and to encourage investments that are sustainable, create jobs, 
or address social or economic needs that are not being adequately addressed by regular 
market allocations. Although not always stated, some pension fund activists have hoped 
to create new conceptions of''value" through this work. These conceptions of value 
would include factors other than monetary return, such as for example job creation, and 
social and environmental benefits. 
This thesis assesses these strategies within the Canadian context and looks at the 
limitations existing regulatory systems place on the effectiveness of these strategies and 
their transformative potential. The first chapter provides the background for this inquiry 
and examines the role that pension funds play in supporting global capitalism and 
neoliberalism, with a particular focus on the distinction between investment practices that 
create productive return and those that do not: ''financial investments in paper'' versus 
19 Most pension funds are held in pension trusts of which many are exclusively controlled and managed by 
employers. A minority are controlled by unions. Others are jointly-trusteecl.- with input from both labour 
and management into the plan's administratfo~ often including pension fund investment decisions. fn 
Canada, approximately one-third. of total pension assets are managed under .. some versionofjointly-
trusteed administration." Falconer, supra note 14 at 7. It is mainly the pension plans of public sector unions 
thatarejointly-trusteed. 
7 
"real investments" that create jobs.20 Pension funds and their investment practices have 
been linked to a number of problems associated with global capitalism and financial 
markets: an emphasis by institutional investors on maximizing share returns over the 
short-term; the "herd mentality" of investment managers associated with the 
concentration of pension funds management; and the failure of market investment 
activities to generate productive activities in terms of job creation and capital investment. 
The second chapter traces the development of pension plans and the politicization 
of the labour movement regarding pension funds. It provides an overview of some of the 
current work being undertaken by the labour movement in Canada with respect to pension 
fund management and investment, and outlines the main investment strategies that labour 
movement pension fund activists have pursued: shareholder activism including proxy 
voting, screening and economically targeted or community investing. 
The third and fourth chapters apply pension law and corporate law to some of the 
assumptions that underpin the strategies pursued by pension fund activists. They look at 
the theoretical and practical limitations that these legal regimes create for the 
transformative potential of these investment strategies. Chapter three applies pension law 
to two arguments put forward bypension fund activists: first, that pension funds are 
workers' deferred wages which belong to them, and they should therefore have more 
control over how their pension funds are invested; and second, that if workers' or their 
representatives had more say about how "their'' funds were invested, they would and 
20 J_ Stanfor~ Paper Boom: Why Real Prosperity Requires a New Approach to Canada's- Economy 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and James Lorimer; 1999) [hereinafter Paper Boom}. 
8 
could consider criteria other than or in addition to monetary rate of return in making 
investment decisions. 
The fourth chapter looks at the uncertainty in corporate law about the legal nature 
of the share, which mediates the relationship between the shareholder and the 
corporation, and the contradictions that exist within modem corporate law between 
separate corporate personality doctrine on the one hand and shareholder ownership 
"rights" on the other. It examines the implications of these uncertainties for pension fund 
activists' strategies and suggests that the more appropriate project for pension fund 
activists may be to focus on creating more democratic and social systems for regulating 
corporations and capital accumulation and investment. 
The final chapter considers whether these pension fund activist strategies, taken 
together and in the absence of government regulatory changes, result in anything more 
than moderate reforms. Is pension fund activism the most effective strategy to create real 
productivity, long-term sustainability and transform corporate management and practice? 
It also considers the directions that government regulatory reform should take in this area. 
It appears that the current strategies of pension fund activists, even if extended to 
other types of investors - individuals and institutional - are not likely to lead to more 
democratic and social systems of corporate regulation. The final section of the last 
chapter considers some reform proposals that attempt to do this. Of particular importance 
to the labour movement is the emphasis that many of these strategies place on expanding 
or utilizing public pension systems, one of the original focuses oflabour movement 
pension activism in Canada. 
9 
CHAPTER ONE: 
PENSION FUND INVESTMENT PRACTICES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Introduction 
Many analysts blame the increasing influence of international organizations such 
as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
regulate international trade and finance, or the failure of nation-states to intervene in the 
market through measures to increase employment or provide an adequate social safety 
net, for the increasing exploitation of workers around the globe, the abuse oflabour 
rights, and the decline of state-provided social benefits and services.2·1 Others argue that 
these actors are not the only or primary ones responsible for the current state of the global 
economy because institutional investors have also helped shape it through their 
tremendous influence on both international and state level activities.22 
This chapter examines the role that pension funds play in supporting global 
capitalism and neoliberalism. The first part looks at capital investment generally, with a 
21 See e.g. H.W.Anhurs, "TbeCollectiveLabourLawofaGlobal Economy'' in C. Engles& 
M. Weiss, eds., Labour Law and Industrial Relations at the Turn of the Century: liber Amico rum in 
Honour of Roger Blanpain (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) 143; S. Gill, "Globalization, market civilization, 
and disciplinary neohberalism" (1995) 24:3 Millenium 399; R.. Mayne, "Regulating TNCs: the Role of 
Voluntary and Governmental Approaches" in Picciotto & Mayne, eds, supra note 18, 235; United Nations, 
Press Release SG/SM/6881/Rev.l, "Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, 
Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos'' (l February 1999); International 
Labour Organization, World Employment Report £998-99 (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 
1998). 
22 See e.g. M. Aglietta, "Capitalism at the Tum of the Century: Regulation and the Challenge of Social 
Change" (1998) 232 New Left Review 41 [hereinafter "Capitalism at the Tum of the Century'1; A. Harmes, 
.. Institutional investors and the rq>roducti~nofneohberalism' .. (1998) 5:1 Rev. oflnt'l. Pol'L Economy92 
[hereinafter"'Tnstitutional investors'1; A. Harmes, Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the 
Political and Economic Wealth of Nations (Toronto: Stoddard, 200 l) [hereinafter Unseen Power]; P. 
freland, "Stalceholding in the Global Casino: A Reply to David Campbell" (1997) 24 J_ L. & Soc. 276 
[hereinafter .. Stalceholding in the Global Casino"]; Minns, supra note l l; ''New Collectivism", supra note 
11; Paper Boom, supra note 20_ 
10 
focus on the distinction between direct investment and investment in the financial or 
secondary markets. The second part looks at the ways that the investment practices of 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and hedge funds have been 
linked to a number of problems associated with global capitalism and financial markets, 
particularly the failure of market investment activities to generate socially productive 
outcomes such as job creation and capital investment. 
Financial Investments and their Relationship to Real Investment 
the signals emitted by the stock market are either irrelevant or harmful to 
real economic activity, and •.• the stock market itself counts for little or 
nothing as a source of finance.23 
In thinking about investment it is helpful to use the distinction that Jim Stanford 
and others make between the "real" economy and "real" investment and the "financial" 
economy and "financial" (or paper) investment. The real economy includes "non-
financial companies, private households, and government."24 It includes investments in 
concrete or tangible capital items such as machinery, computers, construction equipment, 
factories, offices and other equipment that are used to produce the material products and 
services bought and sold in the real economy constitute real investments. These products 
and services include: 
••• the things that Canadians consume in their homes and communities (such as 
food, clothing, transportation, entertainment) ••. [T]he products and services that 
Canadian governments or public institutions generate .•. (such as health care 
services and supplies, schools and textbooks, road construction). And ••• the raw 
23 D. Henwood. Wall Street: How It Works and for Wliom (London: Verso. 1997) at292. 
24 Paper Boom. supra note 20 at 65. 
ll 
materials, spare parts, and machinery that Canadian companies must purchase in 
order to maintain and grow their businesses.25 
The financial economy, comprised of the financial services sector, creates, buys 
and sells paper assets - stocks, bonds, derivatives and other securities. A significant 
portion of pension funds and institutional investment generally is invested in equities 
(shares) and debt (bonds) that are sold on stock markets. For example approximately 40 
percent of the total value oftrusteed pension funds in Canada is in stocks and 37 percent 
is in bonds.26 
The discussion in this chapter and, in fact in much of this document, focuses on 
the importance of real investment rather than financial investment to job creation and 
economic growth. It should not be forgotten however that investments in other forms of 
capital such as human capital (an individual's education, training and experience)27 and 
social capital (investments in services which facilitate economic and social activities such 
as health care and education)28 also have important effects on job creation, economic 
growth and improved standards of living.29 I am focusing on real investment in contrast 
to financial investment for two reasons. The first is in order to highlight the effects of the 
investment practices of institutional investors such as pension funds on the relationship 
25 Ibid. at 23. 
26 Statistics Canada, Quarterly Estimates ofTrusteed Pension Funds. Second Quarter 200 I, Catalogue 74-
001-XIB Quarterly (Ottawa: Statistics Canada fncome Statistics Divisio~ 2002) at 2 &. 7 [hereinafter 
Quarterly Estimates]. 
27 D. Rutherfor~ Routledge Dictionary of Economics, (London: Routledge, 1995) s.v. "human capital". 
:zir Ibid., s. v. "infrastructure" and ''social capitar'. The term social capital can also include the real 
investment in capital items to facilitate these services. In this context I am referring to the service element 
of social capital. 
29 Stanford argues that investments inhuman and social capital tend to be linked to real investmen~ and that 
real investment is the best indicator of job creation and economic growth.. Paper Boom. supra note 20 at 
97. 
12 
between the financial markets and the real economy. And the second is that as Teresa 
Ghilarducci points out, "pension funds have two sources: the "real" economy and the 
''finance" economy."30 These include: pension contnoutions on behalf of workers 
employed in the real economy, coupled with the return on the investment of these 
contributions in the real economy and the financial economy. 
Theoretically at least, financial markets exist to serve an intermediary function by 
moving ''capital from savings to investment"3 t - linking those with money to invest with 
those who need the money to develop or expand their businesses or to build the 
infrastructure to support or encourage economic growth. Investors reward successful, 
efficient enterprises by buying their shares and driving share prices up. This success in 
tum makes it easier for the enterprises to raise capital for real investment through the 
issue of new equity(shares). 
Yet for reasons that will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, investments 
in the financial sector often have little relationship to, or in fact undermine, real 
investment. In the 1990s, despite the astronomical growth in the financial services 
sector, 32 there has been no corresponding increase in real savings and real investment that 
30 T. Gbilarducci, .. Small Benefits, Big Pension Funds, and How Governance Reforms Can Close the Gap" 
in A. Fung, T. Hebb & J. Rogers, eds., Working Capital: The Power of Labors Pensions (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001) 158at161-62 [hereinafter .. SmallBenefits"]. 
3 t Canada. Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector: Change. 
Challenge and Opportunity (Ottawa: Department ofFinance, 1998) at 39. 
32 For-example, Stanford points out that by 1998 there were more than 2,000 Canadian mutual funds. In 
contras~ there were a little over l,300 companies listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). Paper 
Boom, supra note 20 at 53. 
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would be expected if these financial institutions were properly performing their 
intermediary function. 33 
Before turning to a discussion of the investment practices ofinstitutional 
investors, it is important to note that most purchases on the stock market, particularly in 
equities, do not provide new capital for real investment for the company since the vast 
majority of stocks bought and sold on stock exchanges around the world are not newly 
issued stock. Instead, existing stocks are bought and sold between investors, and the 
corporations themselves do not receive any additional capital to invest from these 
exchanges. For-example, between 1990 and 1998, new stock issues by TSE-traded 
companies "accounted for just 5% of the value of all shares bought and sold on the 
TSE."34 
Moreover new equity issues do not always create capital for new real investment. 
Private companies going public often use the capital raised by a share issue to buy out the 
company's original owner. In Canada during the 1990s, the creation of new financial 
instruments such as ''income trusts," which provide shares in future income produced by 
an existing asset such as a pipeline or mine, accounted for a significant proportion of new 
equity issues. In addition, many finance and holding companies (mutual funds, hedge 
funds, etc.) issued their own equity, thus raising new capital for financial intermediaries 
rather than for real investment •. Privatization of many Crown corporations and other non-
profit companies was another significant cause of new equity issues. The capital raised 
33 See generally Ibid.. at c. 2 & 3. 
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by these issues generally goes to the government vendor, rather than to real investment by 
the firm itsel.£35 Thus Stanford calculates that between 1995 and 1997 for example, ''just 
over one-half of the gross funds raised through new issues was collected by private 
companies active in the real economy."36 This in turn amounted to less than 10 percent of 
real investment spending by Canadian companies.37 
In fact, companies fund the majority of their investment projects from the income 
they generate.38 In Canada, this accounts for approximately 95 percent of business gross 
fixed investment expenditure.39 Ironically, this also means that when there is insufficient 
internal income to permit companies to purchase equipment that would allow production 
expansion and increased jobs, for example, it is difficult for them to raise funds from the 
fmancial sector: uonce a company turns to the external market for money the value of the 
f11111 is discounted because lenders suspect that a firm wants to borrow because it is in 
trouble, despite the financial statements or actual condition of the firm.'"'0 This difficulty 
is exacerbated when coupled with the competing pressures on the company to increase 
shareholder value through layoffs and downsizing. 
The next section looks at the ways that the investment practices of institutional 
investors such as pension funds have helped exacerbate pressures on corporations to 
34 Ibid.. at46-47; See also R.M. Unger, Democracy Realized: Tiie Progressive Alternative(London: Verso, 
1998) at 153-54. 
35 Paper Boom, ibid. at47-49. 
36 Ibid. at SL Calculations based on Ffuancial Post Datagroup, Record of New fssues. 
37 /bid.. 
3s Unger, supra note 34 at 153. 
39 Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 51. 
40 T. Gbilarducci, labors Capital: Tiie Economics and Politics of Private Pensions (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992) at 92 [hereinafter Labors Capital}. 
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downsize, layoff workers and reduce capital expenditures. In addition to concerns that 
investment activities are increasingly focused on the financial sector rather than on 
promoting real or productive investment (the difference between paper and real 
investment), there is also concern that the increasing influence oflarge institutional 
investors such as pension funds has contributed to some of the problems associated with 
global capitalism and financial markets, particularly the failure of market investment 
activities to generate productive outcomes such as job creation and capital investment. 
Pension Funds' Implication in Global Capitalism 
..• it has been the rapid development of capital markets in recent years that has 
been principally responsible for the tightening of the constraints under which 
corporations now operate. The increasing mobility of capital, and of money 
capital in particular, has installed capital markets, financiers, and fund managers 
as major agents of corporate (and other) discipline:n 
..• pension funds help to constitute a new pattern of political economy which is 
deeply implicated in current economic woes. The doctrines and policies of 
neoliberalism certainly bear heavy responsibility for market turmoil. but the roots 
of the latter lie in the innermost structures of the financial complex to which the 
funds belong."2 
Until recently, banks and individual investors comprised the main parties who 
owned and allocated capital.43 Today, corporate ownership has shifted from individual to 
institutional investors, and it is these institutional investors who increasingly dominate 
capital allocation.'" In Canada for example, the size of pension funds in Canada alone has 
grown seventy-five times since the 1960s. The market value of trusteed pension funds in 
"
1 
.. Stakeholding in the Global Casino""~supra note 22 at279. 
"
2
•"NewCollectivism'\supra note ll at4. 
"
3 
••Institutional investors••, supra note 22 at l l5. 
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Canada was $568.6 billion at the end of the second quarter of 200 l.''5 Robin Blackburn 
argues that we are currently experiencing a new form of capitalism, one which he cleverly 
terms 'grey capitalism': "a new financial regime of accumulation based on the salience of 
pension funds in Britain and the United States, a model now spreading to many other 
countries."46 
Blackburn and others argue that the rise of institutional investors such as pension 
and mutual funds has created three significant problems associated with grey capitalism."7 
These problems are: the concentration of pension fund management; an inappropriate 
investment focus on short-term growth; and a regulatory framework that is unable to deal 
with the changes to the capitalist system that institutional investors have helped create. 
a. Concentration o(Management and the Collective Allocation of Capital 
Clearly pension funds have become major, if not dominant, players in the 
Canadian economy. And while the media and government focus on the 
celebrity corporate elite, .•. the nondescript pension fund managers are 
probably the most powerful arbiters ofbusiness.48 
Despite the growing value and number of pension funds, pension fund investment 
management is highly concentrated. Globally, the vast majority of pension funds are 
managed by a small group of American, British and Swiss banks and insurance 
44 Ibid.; R.. Deato~ The Political Economy of Pensions: Power. Politics and Social Change in Canada. 
Britain ancl the United States (Vancouver: University ofBritish Columbia Press, 1989) at 191; Unseen 
Power, supra note 22 at 31-32. 
45 Quarterly Estimates, supra note 26 at 1 & 4. 
46 
.. New Collectivism", supra note 11 at 5. 
47 See e.g. lbicL; .. Capitalism at the Tum of the Century", supra note 22; T. Ghilarducci. "U.S. Pension 
In.vestment Policy and Perfect Capital Market Theory" Challenge (July-August 1994) 4 [hereinafter ''U.S. 
Pension In.vestment Policy'1; ''Institutional investors'', supra note 22. 
48 B. Tie~ .. Labour and the pension fund giant"' National Post (15 March 1999) at CS. 
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companies.49 Added to this is the fact that other pension fund trustees rely on the 
investment advice of a small group of consultants. For example, a study in the United 
Kingdom found that 65 percent of pension fund transfers were undertaken on the advice 
offourconsultants.50 A 1995 IMF report concluded that: "the investor base in securities 
markets in industrialized countries, and increasingly in developing countries is dominated 
by a relatively small number oflarge institutional investors."s1 
Subject to the legal requirement that pension funds be invested in the best 
interests of the policyholders, generally interpreted to mean their best financial interest, 
pension fund managers have significant discretion regarding the investments. Thus it is 
they, rather than individual pension policyholders, who control pension fund investments. 
This concentration of management also means that it is managers rather than individual 
investors who are the ''arbiters of company take-overs, privatization flotations, corporate 
policies, as well as, internationally, the purchase of government debt with ... effects for 
national exchange rate and interest rate policies."52 
Adam Harmes argues that the centralization of investment decision-making 
created by the concentration of fund management means that "capital is now being 
allocated collectively in an extremely direct fashion."9 In addition to the concentration of 
management, institutional investors tend to use similar investment criteria and to follow 
49 Minns,. supra note 11 at48. 
so ''NewCollectiviSm",.supra note 11 at6. 
n International Monetary Fund. International Capital Markets: Developments. Prospects. and Policy Issues 
(Washington:IntemationalMonetaryFun~ 1995) at 165. 
52 Minns,. supra note 11 at 48. 
9 
"Institutional investors",. supra note 22 at l 02. 
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the investment behaviour of other institutional investors.54 They also tend to focus their 
investments on large, publicly traded companies because they are better known and it is 
easier to obtain information about them, than it is to get information about smaller or 
medium sized businesses.ss 
The concentration of fund management and the increasing size of institutional 
investment funds have had profound effects on the system of market finance. The 
tremendous increase in savings in institutional investment funds such as pension and 
mutual funds has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in savings deposited with 
banks.s6 This has led to a shift in the system of market finance from one administered by 
banking concerns to one dominated by institutional investors. And, as institutional 
investors have become the dominant shareholders of corporate enterprises, corporate 
management strategy has had to change to meet their demands. 
b. Short-termism 
Mutual funds and pension funds have long-tenn. horizons, but the men and women 
who manage them do not.57 
[The] dramatic change in corporate ownership from individuals to institutions 
currently works against the ability of companies to manage for the long tenn.. 
Where once we had patient investors interested in our long-tenn. growth and 
development, today we are under constant pressure from institutional investors to 
s.c Ibid. at l04. 
ss '"New Collectivism", supra note U at9-l0. 
s6 "Capitalism at the Tum of the Century''. supra note 22 at 69. This decline in bank savings also has 
important implications for real in.vestment activities because the creation of credit through loans to 
individuals and businesses is "the source of most new money in the economy." Paper Boom, supra note 20 
at6l, 61-65. 
57 Unseen Power, supra note 22 at 16. 
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boost the price of our company's stock and 'provide immediate value to 
shareholders. •ss 
Under the system of finance dominated by banking concerns, emphasis was 
placed on the long-term rate of return on the banks' investments and on stability of 
ownership.s9 Institutional investors, who have become dominant corporate shareholders, 
however, tend to emphasize maximizing returns over the short-term. Ghilarducci argues 
that despite the fact that pension funds are generally thought of as "patient capital" -
interested in the long-term value of their investments - they do not actually "invest" in 
any real sense. Instead, they speculate, and these short-term speculative trading practices 
create price volatility with no productive return: "trading and investing are not the same 
activity; investment adds to productive capacity; speculating does not.''60 In support of 
their argument that pension funds trade rather than invest, Ghilarducci and Randy Barber 
point out that in 1960 stocks were held for an average of seven years, while in 1993 they 
were held for less than two years.6 t 
Short-termism is word coined in 1986 by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel 
Lawson, to characterize the thinking ofmanyinvestors.62 Harmes argues that short-term 
investment criteria are products of the characteristics of institutional investors 
ss A.. Sigler, former Chairman and CEO of Champion International Corporation, Testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Banking,. Housing and Urban Affairs, The Impact of Institutional Investors on 
Corporate Governance. Takeovers. and the Capital Markets, Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10 lst Congress,. lst. Session (3 October 1999) cited in. !bid.. at 179. 
s9 "Capitalism at the Tum of the Century",. supra note 22 at 69. 
60 
.. U.S. Pension Investment Policy' .. ,. supra note 47 at 8. See also T. Hebb, ''Introduction: The Challenge of 
Labor's Capital Strategy" in Fung, Hebb & Rogett,. eds.,. supra note 30, l at4. 
61 R. Barber & T. Ghilarducci, "Pension Funds,. Capital Markets,. and the Economic Future" in G.A. 
Dyms~ G. Epstein & R. Pollin. eds., Transforming the U.S.. Financial System: Equity and Efficiency for 
the 21sr Century, Economic Policy Institute Series (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993) 287 at 296. 
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themselves: their vulnerability to individual investor flight at a "moment's notice;•'63 their 
bonus and pay structures that emphasize an investment manager's return rather than real 
performance (the risk adjusted return), coupled with the fact that evaluations occur on an 
annual or quarterly basis; their evaluation of investment managers in relation to the 
performance of their peers rather than "absolute performance; their reliance on computer 
programs that automatically sell shares when their price drops below a certain price; their 
extensive use ofleveraging with borrowed funds on which they must pay per period fees 
that can become prohibitive over the long-term; and their membership in a larger 
investment community in which the culture and investment discourse limits the ability to 
see beyond the short-term.64 
Anthropologists William O'Barr and John Conley's study of those involved in 
pension fund investment management decision-making highlights the effects of the 
investment management culture and its values of conformity both socially and in terms of 
investment practices, and "the extent to which cultural rather than economic factors drive 
decisions in the financial world." 65 In particular, they point out that because investment 
discourse tends to revolve around the short-term it ''may limit the ability of U.S. pension 
62 At the time Lawson was referring to the attitudes of industrialists and financiers. Rutberfor~ supra note 
27,_ s.v • .. short-termism". 
63 
"Institutional investors". supra note 22 at 105. While pension funds as institutional investors are not as 
vulnerable as mutual funds and hedge funds to individual investor- flight. many pension funds invest in 
mutual funds and hedge funds. fn fa~ according to a World Bank report. ''over 50 percent of pension fund 
investments are undertaken through the purchase of shares in mutual funds,_ so the distinction between 
mutual fund and pension funds is,_ in practice, more blurred.'' World B~ Private Capital Flows to 
Developing Countries: Tire Road to Financial lntegration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 129, 
cited in Unseen Power, supra note 22 at 38. 
~"Institutional investors'•, supra note 22at105-106. 
65 W .M. O'Barr & J.M. Conley, Fortune and Folly: Tire Wealth and Power of lnstitutional In.vesting 
(Homewood: Business One~ 1992) at9. 
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executives to invest for the long term ... [as] short-term rhetoric has crowded out 
alternatives.''66 
To attract investment in the present system of market fmance, corporate 
management strategies must focus on increasing the equity value of the enterprise, and 
therefore the share prices, through measures which often include wage cuts and 
downsizing.67 The pressures from institutional investors for short-term profits mean that 
there is little room for management to focus on the long-term corporate development: 
''the big funds are notorious for their short-term investment practices, spurring 
unproductive and costly take-over battles, and prioritizing short-term dividend payments 
at the expense of broader economic and welfare considerations.'763 
Indeed, in an August 2001 editorial commenting on findings by various bodies 
that, despite the fact that Canadian governments have reduced taxes, deficits, interest 
rates and inflation, Canada ranks low among other Group of Seven countries in measures 
ofbusiness competitiveness, the conservative Globe and Mail argued that Canadian 
corporations bear some responsibility for this state of affairs.69 While suggesting that the 
government can help improve the situation through increased post-secondary education 
spending with a focus on technology, and management skills needed to compete in the 
global economy, it also suggested that even with increased government spending, the 
corporate sector must also ·~step forward to take responsibility for its own weaknesses." 
66 W. O'Barr &. I. Conley. "Managing Relationships: The Culture oflnstitutional Investing" Financial 
Analysts Journal 48:5{September/October1992) 21 at25. 
67 
"Capitalism at the Tum of the Century"'. supra note 22 at 80; ''U.S. Pension Investment Policy", supra 
note 47 at 7; '1ilstitutional investors••, supra note 22 at 107. 
68 Minns.supranote11 at43. 
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Changes suggested included industry education programs. and increased investment in 
technology and research to increase productivity. Despite the fact that the Globe and 
Mail recognized the need for corporate managers and Boards of Directors to take a long-
term focus on their operations, there was no discussion or recognition of the role that 
short-termism on the part of investors, including institutional investors, has played in 
limiting the ability of corporations to take just such an approach.70 
The influence of this short-termism on corporate management is both passive -
through the buying and selling of shares - and active. Harmes reviews a number of 
instances where institutional investors, intent on increasing their short-term share values, 
have directly intervened to influence corporate behaviour.71 He argues that it is "no 
coincidence that the rise of institutional share ownership has corresponded to a drop in 
Fortune 500 employment rolls from 16 million in 1980 to 12 million in 1990."72 
This influence is not limited to corporate behaviour. Harmes and others argue that 
institutional investors and their focus on short-term returns have influenced neoltberal 
restructuring in both developing and advanced industrialized countries by, for example, 
demanding economic restructuring measures as a condition for investment in developing 
countries, or lobbying for reduced state-provided benefits, such as retirement benefits, in 
industrialized nations. 73 
69 
"Corporation, fix thyself." The Globe anti Mail (6 August 2001) ALO. 
70 Ibid. 
n ''Institutional investors". supra note 22 at 107; Unseen Power, supra note 22 at 191-93. 
72 
"Institutional investors". ibitl. 
n Ibid. at 108; M. Naim, "Mexico's Larger Story'' in S. Edwards & M. N~ eds .• Mexico 1994: Anatomy 
of an Emerging Market Crash, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1997) 305 cited 
in Unseen Power, supra note 22 at 103. 
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In Unseen Power: How Mutual Funds Threaten the Political and Economic 
Wealth of Nations, Harmes argues that the rise of institutional investors with their 
concentrated management, herd mentality and focus on the short-term "has increased the 
potential for market over-reaction and price overshooting"7" and that institutional 
investors, along with capital mobility and policies of fixed exchange rates, played a key 
role in the 1990s currency crises in Europe, Mexico and Asia. Initially, by investing 
heavily in the country/regions institutional investors caused asset prices to overshoot their 
"truen value, in that the prices of the financial assets were not underpinned by real 
assets,75 creating a speculative bubble. With all the investment flowing into the 
country/regions, individual investors, corporations and governments made real economic 
decisions based on the paper value of the assets, saving less, and spending and borrowing 
more, often in foreign currencies. 
When markets experienced a negative shock, 76 and investors began to pull their 
investments out of the countries, those governments that had fixed exchange rates (or 
those that sought to defend a floating rate within a certain range) were forced to defend 
them by raising interest rates. Raising interest rates generally slows down the real 
7
" Unseen Power, ibicl at 76. 
15 The book value of the companies was significantly less than the paper value attached to them in the 
markets, even after factoring in market premiums that attach to intangil>le factors such as good management 
and consumer recognition. Another way to think about this is in terms of inflation i.e. that financial assets 
increased "from a process of asset price inflation rather than from growth in the inherent value of the ••• 
companies." Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 27, 28-29. 
16 Negative shocks to a market are inevitable, particularly in a global economy where the effect of economic 
events in one country can influence those in another. For example, if a country raises interest rates, 
investors may move their money there. Or political events such as protests, assassinations or wars may 
make investors nervous and theymove their funds to a "safer" country. When a country experiences a 
negative shock,. there will be downward pressure on its currency. In the currency crises the negative shocks 
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economy, increasing unemployment or reducing wages. It also increases government 
debt. Eventually, government efforts to defend the currency through high interest rates 
became politically unsustainable for the governments in question because of the negative 
impact on individual citizens in terms of unemployment and reduced wages, and the 
exchange rates collapsed along with asset prices. 
Institutional investors quickly moved their capital out of the countries/region, 
causing currencies to drop even further, creating a cycle of further foreign currency debt 
and more capital outflow and, in the process, doing significant damage to the real 
economy of the country/regions as businesses collapsed, private and public debt 
increased, production fell and unemployment rose. Harmes argues that the overreaction 
of foreign institutional investors when both entering and exiting the markets and the sheer 
size of their investments in these regions/countries meant that governments were simply 
unable to defend their currencies or adjust them in a more systematic manner to soften 
their impact on the real economy. 
The concentration of management and the short-term focus of institutional 
investors, along with their increasing investment power, have significantly influenced 
both corporate and state behaviour, and the direction of global capitalism generally. At 
the same time, existing regulatory frameworks are unable to address problems in the 
global capitalist system, a system and problems that institutional investors helped create. 
all resulted in reduced investor confidence in the ability of the country/regions to defend their fixed 
exchange rate, and they pulled their fim<k out of them. Unseen Power, supra note 22 at 62-63, 80-8 L 
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c. Regulation 
Capitalism is engaging entire societies, and the individuals who live in them,. in 
competition without any longer being subject to the constraints that formerly 
channelled the quest for capital accumulation in the direction of social progress.77 
In "Capitalism at the Tum of the Century: Regulation and the Challenge of Social 
Change,"78 regulation theorist Michel Aglietta surveys the major changes to the capitalist 
system in the last twenty years and,. like Blackbum, argues that a new capitalist 
accumulation system has been created, one that emphasizes competition, institutional 
investor control of corporations, and gives primacy to profit and market value.79 He also 
outlines the current regulatory chaHenges that the changes have created. 
By regulation, Aglietta refers to the process by which various social, political and 
financial mechanisms mediate the accumulation of capital and ensure that the 
"distortions•>Bo that capitalist accumulation create are constrained to an extent that ensures 
continued social cohesion and social progress: "since it is intrinsically a creator and a 
destroyer, capitalism can only achieve progress for society if sets of mediation 
mechanisms, forming a mode of regulation, establish coherence among the imbalances 
inherent in the capitalist system.'"L For example, in the labour relations field, a 
"distortion" or "imbalance" is the potential for capitalist management, in its limitless 
accumulative quest, to abuse its labour force. In response, various regulatory 
77 
"Capitalism at the Tum of the Century'~. supra note 22 at 67. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. at 79. 
80 Ibid. at 44. 
st Ibid. at 54. 
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mechanisms have developed such as unions and collective bargaining, legislation 
regulating hours of work, and health and safety standards.82 
It is also important to understand that these systems of regulation are only 
legitimate "to the extent that they permit social progress!'83 As Lawrence Tshuma points 
out "a particular system of accumulation can exist because its schema of reproduction is 
coherent. The problem is how to bring the behaviours of political and economic agents 
into some kind of configuration that will keep the regime of accumulation functioning."" 
Aglietta argues that the regulatory mechanisms existing under the Fordist 
regime,85 which ensured that productivity increases were linked to real wage growth and 
equitable income distribution,86 have been unable to deal with the significant changes to 
the capitalist system over the last twenty-five years: "the extension of waged society as 
capitalism spreads across the world, financial globalization,'' the revolution in technology 
and a renewed social preoccupation with individualism.87 This was due in part to the fact 
that the strength of regulatory mechanisms often lies in their stability or rigidity. This 
allows little room however, for these regulatory organizations and institutions to adapt to 
82 Ibid. at44, 49-50. 
83 Ibid. at 54. 
84 L. Tsbuma, "Hierarchies and Government versus Networks and Governance: Competing Regulatory 
Paradigms in Global Economic Regulation,. (2000) l Law, Social Justice and Global Development, online: 
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/globairtssue/2000-I/tshuma.html> at 4. 
85 A system of capitalist production .. founded on mass-production-for-mass-consumption'L and a "mode of 
regulation founded on the Keynesian welfare state.'' L Bruege[, OM. Figart & E. Mutari, .. Whose full 
employment'? A feminist perspective on work redistnbution'' in I. Wheelock & L Vail, eds., Work and 
Idleness: The Political Economy of Full Employment (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1998) 69 at 73. See also 
Rutherford, supra note 27, s. v. "Fordism.''. 
86 
.. Capitalism at the Tum of the Century". supra note 22 at 57. 
ST /bid. at 62. 
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changes in capitalist accumulative systems.88 Regulatory mechanisms tend also to 
develop as a response to changes in the capitalist regime of accumulation rather than in 
tandem with them, since capitalist accumulation is not self-regulating.89 Like Harmes and 
Blackburn, Aglietta identifies institutional investors as deeply implicated in the new 
regime of accumulation, supporting the instability of global markets and generally acting 
as .. agents of market discipline.''90 
In short, the rapid pace of trade ltberalization, capital mobility, and global capital 
market integration that have characterized globalization in the last three decades, and the 
rise of neoliberalism and its emphasis on limited state intervention in markets that has 
accompanied and facilitated it, have created financial regulatory systems, both national 
and global, that are ill-equipped or unwilling to deal with the financial instability created 
by institutional investors and the short-term investment practices descnbed earlier.91 
Critics of the current systems of financial regulation have targeted a number of 
areas for reform at the national and international level. The reforms suggested generally 
aim to encourage longer-term real investment while discouraging short-term speculative 
investment, and to provide greater transparency and accuracy of information. They 
include: restricting capital mobility through international and national measures, 
SS Ibid.. 
89 Ibid. at 64. 
90 Ibid. at 80. 
91 See generally Ibid., J .W. Dean, "A Role for Canada in Global Financial Refonn'" in.B.K.. MacLean, ed.,. 
Out of Control: Canada in an Unstable Financial World (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
&. James Lorimer, 1999) 131; R. Culpeper,. .. Financial Fragility,. Capital Controls and Economic Polic~ in 
MacLean, ibid.., 111; J. Loxley,. "Financial Fragility,. Global Capital Markets and Global Governance" in 
MacLean, ibid., 91; B.K.. MacLean, "The Transformation of International Economic Policy Debate,. 1997-
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instituting an international tax on short-term foreign exchange transactions (the Tobin 
tax),92 developing regulations to discourage short term lending and capital flight,93 
developing national and international measures to monitor cross-border investments, peer 
inspection and supervision of national financial institutions, 94 and imposing longer time 
horizons for measuring profit on institutional investors and the investment management 
industry .95 
In addition to these regulatory reforms, others suggest that there is potential for 
pension funds to become a mediative mechanism themselves, one that ultimately leads to 
a capitalism in which corporate ownership is socialized.96 Aglietta for example, argues 
that trade unions have a critical role to play here for if they ••are to regain the power to 
influence the distribution of income, they must realize that the battle to be fought and 
won is the battle for control of company shareholdings."97 Indeed Blackbum and others 
have criticized the labour movement for failing to advocate for, or take a larger role in 
pension fund management, particularly as a condition of government concessions such as 
tax deductions that are given to employers providing occupational pensions.98 The next 
chapter looks at the history of the labour movement's relation to pension plans and the 
98" in MacLean, ibid.,. 67; I. Stanford.. "Waiting for •Jt': The Mechanics of Financial Boom and Bust" in 
MacLean, ibid.,. 43. 
92 See e.g. A.C. Micbalos,. "In Defence ofTobin. Taxes" in.MacLean, ibid., 145. 
93 Dean, supra note91 atl35. 
94 Ibid. at 138. 
95 M. Aglie~ "Shareholder value and corporate governance: some tricky questions•• (2000) 29 Economy & 
Society 146 at 158-59 [hereinafter"Sbareholder value and corporate govemance'1. 
96 
"Capitalism at the Tum of the Century'', supra note 22 at 80. 
97 Ibid. 
98 
''New Collectivism",. supra note ll. 
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movement's politicization regarding participation in pension fund management and 
decision making as a means to control capital~ 
30 
CHAPTER TWO: 
PENSION FUND ACTIVISM: THE IDSTORICAL CONTEXT 
... [T]he introduction of employer-sponsored welfare benefits served a series of 
interrelated ideological,. organizational and labour market functions for the 
corporate sector.99 
... [P]rivate pensions can better be seen as a compromise to the state rather than 
as a victory over capital,. because labour did not struggle for private pensions. It 
fought long and hard for public pensions but was forced to turn to private 
pensions as the result of machinations of the state and capital.100 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the development of pension plans and the politicization of the 
labour movement regarding participation in pension fund management and decision 
making as a means to control capital. It provides an overview of the development of 
private and public pensions and places this development in the context of the struggle 
between labour and capital forthe control of the industrialized workplace beginning in 
the late nineteenth century. It argues that the renewed interest by members of the labour 
movement in control of pension fund investment can be seen as a continuation of this 
struggle. 
Employer-based pension plans initially developed as part of a strategy of 
corporate welfare provision designed to control and fragment the labour force. As the 
number of private pensions grew in Canada and elsewhere~ the exponential growth of the 
funds created a new tool for the corporate sector to support its own accumulation process 
and that of the market generally. The Canadian labour movement had historically been 
99 Oeato~ supra note 44 at 119. 
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opposed to employer-based pensions because of their use by corporate employers to 
control workers and fragment the labour movemenL Instead it lobbied for the creation of 
a universal public pension scheme, only becoming politicized about control of private 
pension funds after conceding defeat in the struggle for universal public pensions. This 
history helps to explain some of the limitations of the investment strategies pursued by 
labour movement pension fund activists that will be discussed in the third and fourth 
chapters. At the same time, it also sets the stage for the possibility of more 
transformative pension fund strategies which will be discussed in the final chapter. 
The Development of Pension Plans 
Both occupational and state-provided pensions are relatively recent phenomena, 
associated largely with the development of capitalism in advanced industrialized 
countries. Prior to industrialization, the extended family provided support to individuals 
throughout the life cycle.101 Today, as Richard Deaton notes, "[i]n advanced 
industrialized countries, as a result of complex historical and institutional processes, 
financial responsibility for the non-working or dependent elderly generally tends to fall on 
the state and the actively employed labour force." 102 
The expansion of occupational pension plans in Canada mirrored the development 
of industrial capitalism in the country. While there were few plans in the early 1900s, the 
number of plans more than doubled between 1910 and 1929. This increase coincided 
100 J. Staffor~ ''Tbeaass Struggle and The Rise of Private Pensions, 1900-1950 .. (1987) 20 Labour/Le 
Travail 147 at 158 [hereinafter"Class Struggle'1. 
iot There were some exceptions to this. Some military veterans received pensions, and there were artists 
who were fortunate enough to have a patron willing to support them in their old age. Medieval manors also 
supported those without an extended family by providing them with material goods. /bid_ at 155. 
32 
''with early American corporate penetration of the Canadian market,"103 and the unilateral 
introduction of corporate welfare programmes such as employer provided pension plans, 
was one of the strategies used by American corporations to promote employee loyalty, 
control workers, and undermine the power of unions.104 
As a number oflabour scholars have pointed out, the introduction of corporate 
welfare programs such as employer-provided pensions, health care, education, insurance, 
profit-sharing, housing and recreation facilities, was a strategy utilized by corporations in 
their struggle with workers over control of the industrialized, mechanized workplace. 
They find the roots of corporate welfare programmes in the changes in production 
processes between l880-l920 brought about by industrialization and the introduction of 
scientific management theories into the workplace.1°5 These changes meant that workers 
exercised little autonomy over the production process, performing instead a small task 
within a larger production process: "( s ]kills and trades which were previously required 
became less and less necessary; former teams and work groups were being destroyed by 
detailed division of tasks and functions; mechanization was rapidly altering daily work 
experience."106 
102 Deato~ supra note 44 at 50-51. 
103 IbicL at 79. 
1°" Ibid.; 1. Rifkin & R. Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pensions. Politics and Power in the 1980s 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) at 85; N. Tudiver,. ''Forestalling the Welfare State: The Establishment of 
Programmes of Corporate Welfare'' in A. Moscovitch & L Albert, eds., The Benevolent State: The Growth 
of Welfare in Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press,. 1987) 186 at 188; See generally M. E. McCallum,. 
"Corporate Welfarism in Canada. 1919-39" (1990) 71:1 Canadian Historical Review46. 
105 McCallum, ibid.; K.. Stone, "The Origins ofJob Structures in The Steel Industry" (1974) 6 Rev. of 
Radical Political Economics 61; Tudiver, ibid.. at 186-87. 
106 Tudiver,. ibid. at 187. See generally H. Braverman.- Labor and Monopoly Capital (New. York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1974) particularly c. 3 &4. 
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While these changes increased productivity and gave management control over 
the production process, the mechanization of the process led to problems of worker 
dissatisfaction and motivation, a high turnover of workers, and increased unionization.107 
Employers responded with corporate welfare programmes designed to attract workers and 
then to bind them to the company by creating a dependency on the employer provided 
benefits.108 
Employers chose the type of programmes that would be available to workers and 
defined the terms of eligibility. Many programmes, including pension plans, were 
contingent on the worker remaining with the company for a particular length of time. For 
example, a 1928 survey by the Ontario Department of Labour found that the majority of 
companies that provided regular pension plans to employees, or pension assistance to 
favoured workers, required them to have worked between twenty to twenty-five years to 
qualify.10'.J In addition, the terms of many plans allowed companies to terminate the 
pension of an employee who joined a union or went on strike.110 In other cases, programs 
were limited to employees who showed uproper interest" in the company, a term which 
did not include support for union activities either within the company or elsewhere.111 For 
some employees, the employer's disciplinarypowerextended into retirement as many 
107 Tudiver, ibid. 187-88. 
108 Ibid. at 188-89; McCall~ supra note 104 at 48; McCallum's article provides detail about the extent to 
which the employer controlled company towns in resource industries such as mining and forestry: 
"[w]hetherresource towns were run by the company or given a separate corporate existence with an elected 
town council, the main employer was often responsible for providing essential services such as water, 
power, and sewers. [n many towns, the company also built the schools and the churche~ (at 49). 
109 Ontario DepartmentofLabour, Surveyoflndustrial Welfare in Ontario (Toronto, 1929) 26-27 cited in 
McCallum,. ibid. at 53. 
110 
"Class Struggle'', supra note 100 at 156. 
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plans allowed termination of pension payments if a retiree's behaviour met with company 
disapproval.112 
As corporate welfare programmes were introduced or expanded, industrial 
councils, 113 composed of both management-appointed and worker-elected representatives, 
were established in many Canadian workplaces. u" These councils were mandated to 
provide recommendations to the employer about a wide range of issues including health 
and safety, wages, hours of work, recreation and education. However, workers' 
recommendations, particularly those related to hours of work and wages, generally met 
with limited success. Workers on Massey-Ferguson's industrial council, for example, 
were successful in advocating for health and safety measures such as ''the hiring of a plant 
doctor ... ; installation of drinking fountains and wash basins ••• ; and the placing of 
guards on exposed machinery,"115 but unsuccessful in efforts to reverse wage cuts or 
establish a paid vacation entitlement after five years of employment.u6 
Although acknowledging that employers who provided corporate welfare and 
employee representation programmes ndeserve some credit"m for providing employees 
more than ''the lowest wage they could get awaywith,"ua Margaret McCallum and other 
labour historians point out that it is important to recognize that these measures were also 
m Tudiver, supra note 104 at 188. 
112 McCallum, supra note 104 at 52. 
i u They were also referred to as "'Work councils''. 
114 McCallum, supra note 104 at 58-61. By 1920 .. somewhere between 40 and 54 percent of unionized 
workers were covered by industrial councils. Tudiver, supra note 104 at 190. 
115 Tudiver, ibid.. 
u6 Ibid. at 191. 
117 McCallum, supra note 104 at 50. 
llS Ibid. 
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designed to "overcome worker resistance, improve worker motivation ..• undermine 
workers' collective action"119 and enhance a corporation's public image.120 Moreover, 
despite the fact that the majority of Canadian employees did not receive corporate welfare 
benefits, their existence helped reduce public pressure on governments to provide 
legislation recognizing workers' rights and to create universal social security programs.121 
The business community strongly resisted efforts to create such universal programs and 
pointed to their own programmes as evidence that they were not necessary.122 As 
McCallum comments, "[i]n providing employee benefits or creating industrial councils, 
employers wanted to forestall ..• legislation compelling payment of a minimum wage, 
employer contributions to wage-replacement plans during periods of sickness or 
unemployment, the eight-hour day, or union recognition."123 
Given the effects of corporate welfare programmes and industrial councils, it is 
not surprising that the union movement was suspicious of these measures, and 
strenuously opposed their introduction. Instead it focused its efforts on lobbying 
governments for the introduction of universal programmes such as pensions, and 
unemployment, sickness and disability insurance.124 
With respect to pensions, the struggle for a universal public pension program had 
been waged by the North American labour movement since the beginning of the twentieth 
u9 Tudivet» supra note 104 at 193. 
120 J. Stafford,. .. Retirement Pensions: Reinforced Exploitation" in J. Dickinson & B. Russell,. eds., Family~ 
Economy and State: The Social Reprocfuction Process Under Capitalism (London: Croom He~ 1986) 285 
at 297 [hereinafter''R.einforced Exploitation'1. 
121 Mccallum, supra note 104 at 74. 
122 lfJid. at 73; Tudiver, supra note 104 at 193. 
123 Mccallum, ibid. at 50. 
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century when public pensions were introduced in European countries, Australia and New 
Zealand. Labour organizations in both Canada and the United States pressed 
governments to introduce a universal and comprehensive public pension program. In 
fact, there is no record of private pensions being discussed at meetings oflarge unions 
until a 1935 resolution passed unanimously by the American Federation of Labour 
opposing private pension plans.'25 
The Canadian government's response to organized labour's pressure was limited. 
In 1908 it began to sell government annuities with generous terms to those individuals 
who were able to save privately. However, as with present-day RRSPs it was mainly the 
middle class who were able to take advantage of these annuities. In addition, the 
insurance industry, which correctly saw these annuities as unfair competition,. vigorously 
opposed them. Over the next 30 years it won reductions in the maximum amount, the 
interest rates and mortality assumptions. They were eventually terminated in 1967 •126 
Although the labour movement continued to lobby for a universal state sponsored 
pension program, its success was initially limited to the creation of a federal, means-
tested pension plan of$20 a month for needy Canadians over the age of70.127 The labour 
movement pressed for improvements to this plan, but the means test for those over 70 
was not dropped until 1951 when a means-tested pension plan was created for people 
12
" Tudiver, supra note 104 at 19L 
125 
••aass Struggle'', supra note 100 at 160. 
126 Ibid.. at 159. 
127 The Ola Age Pension Act. 1927, 17 Geo V, c. 35. This plan was a concession to the small Labour Party 
and other leftists in the House of Commons in exchange for their support of the minority Lt"beral 
government under MacKenzie King. /bid..; Tudiver, supra note 104 at 19 L Under the plan, the federal 
government provided the pensions on a cost-sharing basis with participating provinces. 
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ages 65 to 70.128 By the time the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was introduced in 1964,129 it 
was understood to be a supplement to private pensions. 
It was during World War II and the post-war period that the most significant 
expansion of private pension plans occurred with the establishment of approximately 
two-thirds of Canadian occupational pension plans.130 This happened despite the fact that 
the collapse of the mainly pay-as-you-go131 corporate pension plans and other corporate 
welfare programmes, and the widespread unemployment and low wages during the 
Depression had shown that the corporate world could not keep the promise implied by its 
welfare programs - namely that corporations, not the state, could take care of workers 
throughout their lives.132 This expansion also occurred despite the fact that the 
Depression had created a more militant labour movement in Canada, one which had 
historically opposed private pension plans and other forms of corporate welfare.133 As 
unemployment increased and wages declined, workers, unable to address these issues 
through industrial councils, increasingly joined trade unions. ll4 
128 The Old Age Security Act, 15-16 Geo VI, (2:°.r Sess.). c. 18 removed the means test for those over 70, and 
replaced The Old Age Pension Act. 1927. The Ola Age Assistance Act, 15 Geo VI. c. 55 provided a means-
tested pension for those between 65-70. "Class Struggle'', ibid. at 160. Barbara Murphy points out that at 
this time, business, particularly the industrial sector, supported the OAS as a means to both placate the 
labour movement and to relieve some-of the burden of private pension costs. B. Murphy. Corporate Capital 
and the Welfare State: Canadian Business and Public Pension Policy in Canada Since World War ll (M.A. 
Thesis, Carleton University, 1982) [unpublished} at 16 and 91-93. 
129 Canada Pension Plan. 13-14 Elizabeth. ll, c. 51. 
130 Deaton, supra note 44 at 79. 
m Underpay-as-you-go systems, the contributions by or for current workers are used to fund current 
pension benefits. 
132 McCallum, s11pra note 104 at 73; "Reinforced Exploitation'\ supra. note 120 at 293-94. 
133 Tudiver,. supra note 104 at 194-95; "Class Struggle'', supra note 100 at 154. 
IJ.l. Tudiver,. ibid. at 194. 
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Deaton sets out three principal reasons for the expansion of private pension plans 
during this period: first, pension benefits were exempt from wage control measures 
instituted during the war, and governments encouraged employers and workers to 
establish pension plans instead of salary increases because pensions were seen as non-
inflationary;135 this was coupled with the fact that income tax regulations were clarified to 
provide tax exemptions for income that an employer or employee contributed to a pension 
plan;136 and third, unions began to seriously negotiate for pension plans.137 
The decision to actively bargain for corporate welfare benefits represented a 
recognition by the union movement that its battle for universal social programs such as 
pension plans had been largely unsuccessful. As one trade unionist commented, 
"[ u ]nions decided that they would attempt through bargaining to win for their members 
what they were unable to convince government to provide for all its citizens." 13s In the 
135 Deaton, supra note 44 at 79. 
136 In1919, s. 2(7) of An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act. 19£7, 9-10 George V. c. 55. provided that 
employees could deduct pension contnbutions from their income. 1928 amendments permitted 
corporations to elect to exempt pension fund income from taxation. An Act to amend the Income War Tax 
Act. £9 £7, 18-19 Geo. V. c. 12, s. 6(h). Further amendments a decade later permitted corporations to 
deduct "irrevocable" contnbutions to occupational pension plans. This exemption was made retroactive to 
1928. An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act~ £9 £7, 2 Geo. VI c. 48, s. 5(m). Tudiver, supra note 104 
at 162; see also "Class Struggle", supra note 100 at 161-63. 
137 Deaton, supra note 44 at 79. 
13s Ibid. at 121 quoting P. Henle, Assistant Dirctor ofResearc~ AFL-CIO, quoted in D. Allen, Fringe 
Benefits: Wages or Social Obligations? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1969) at 255. It is important to 
note that although the labour movement gave up its staunch opposition to private pensions. it has not been 
blind to the ways in which the private pension system, which covers a limited percentage of the Canadian 
work force (41 percent of Canadian workers in 1999, down from 45 percent in 1991) privileges certain 
workers and in tum fragments the labour movement. It has continued to lobby for improvements to the 
public pension system in Canada. Pension Plans in Canada,. supra note 6 at 5; "Class Struggle". supra note 
100at171; I. Myles, "DemographyorDemocracy'l The"Crisis" of Old-Age Securi~ in J. Curtis, E. 
Grabb & N. Guppy,. eds., Social Inequality in Canada: Patterns. Problems. Policies, 2ru1 ed_ (Scarborough: 
Prentice-Hall Canada, 1993) 416 at423; M. Townson. ••0verviewofRetirement lncome System: Women's 
Perspective" in Roundtable on Canada s Aging Society and Retirement lncome System (Ottawa: Caledon 
Institute of Social Policy,. 1996) 27 at 29; see generally Murphy, supra note 128- Examples of recent 
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United States, the National Labour Relations Board had ruled that pensions and other 
welfare benefits, which it deemed to be wages, were a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.139 During the postwar period, unions such as the United Auto Workers and 
the United Steelworkers of America began campaigns to negotiate these welfare benefits. 
While the decision to actively negotiate for corporate welfare benefits such as pensions 
represented a significant concession on the part of the labour movement, it should not be 
forgotten that the ability of unions to negotiate good benefit packages provided material 
benefits to their members and generally served as good public relations for the union 
movement.140 
These American developments influenced Canadian labour unions' approach to 
the issue, particularly as a number were actually part of American-based "international" 
unions.141 In 1948 the Canadian Congress ofLabour passed a resolution recommending 
that collective bargaining efforts include negotiating adequate private pension plans.142 In 
1952 the American Federation of Labor published a pamphlet designed to help union 
executives with the technical issues involved in setting up and operating private company 
Canadian Labour Congress documents include B. Baldwin, Comments on "Gentler Implications to the 
Canada Pension Plan" Prepared for the House of Commons Stan cling Committee on Finance (Ottawa: 
Canadian Labour Congress, 1997); Canadian Labour Congress, Proposed Changes to the Canada Pension 
Plan: Bold Steps. No Progress (Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance 
Concerning Bill C-2, An Act to Create the Canada Pension Plan fnvestment Board) (Ottawa: Canadian 
LabourCongress, 1997). 
139 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F .2d 247 (711L Cir. 1948) cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) [hereinafter 
Inland Steel}. 
140 Deaton, supra note 44 at 127-28. Deaton argues that unions now have a '"vested interest" in negotiating 
for, and expanding employee benefit and pension plans. 
141 Ibid. at 120. 
142 The Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress merged in 1956 to form the 
Canadian Labour Congress. 
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pension plans.143 Interestingly, the provision of employer-sponsored pension plans was 
actually of greater importance to Canadian workers than to their American counterparts as 
the CPP was introduced almost 30 years after the Social Security Act of 1935 in the 
United States created a compulsory pension plan based on payroll deductions.144 
In the post-war period, the significance of private pensions to capital shifted from 
their use as a means to control the labour force, to their direct use as a means of capitalist 
accumulation.145 Most plans, even those that were contributory, were administered by the 
employer, and investments were managed in-house or by outside investment managers 
such as an insurance or trust company.146 Companies often used pension funds for self-
investment purposes, either through the purchase of company stocks and bonds, or direct 
loans to the company.1"7 More generally, as discussed in the previous chapter, pension 
funds were invested in capital markets through the purchase of stocks, bonds and real 
estate.148 
During this period the state also took on an increased regulatory role over pension 
plans and their investment practices. Income tax regulations stipulated that pension plans 
143 
"Class Struggle ... supra note 100 at 160. 
144 McCall~ supra note 104 at fu 4 I, p. 65. Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat 620 
(codified as subcbapter II(§ 401 et seq~) of c. 7 ofTitle 42, The Public Health and Welfare). 
145 
"Reinforced Exploitation'', supra note 120 at 295; see generally Deaton, supra note 44 at c. 6. It should 
not be forgotten that private pensions do still function as a means to control and fragment the labour force 
although in a perhaps less obvious fashion. 
146 
··aass Struggle .. , supra note 100 at 161-62; "Reinforced Exploitation''. ihicL at 303; Tudiver. supra note 
104at 198. 
147 Lahors Capital, supra note 40 at 92. 
148 The significance of private pension funds to the accumulation of capital can be seen in the fact that one 
of the issues in the debate surrounding the introduction of the CPP and subsequent amendments to the Plan, 
was a concern by the business community that in moving funds from private to public pension plans, a 
major source of investment capital would be removed from the control of the private sector. Deaton, supra 
note 44 at 185-86; Murphy, supra note 128 at c. 2; Myles,. supra note 138 at 423-24. 
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that qualified for income tax exemptions had to have a funding mechanism that would 
ensure the pension promise could be delivered.149 This was to ensure that the plans would 
not collapse in economic hard times as many of the pay-as-you-go plans had during the 
Depression. Investments were also regulated through income tax regulations. Before 
1956, investments were regulated by the Canadian and British Insurance Companies 
Act150 and restricted to particular countries, government bonds, certain corporate bonds 
and equity shares that met certain requirements. Up to 15 percent of a pension fund could 
be invested in shares.151 The restrictions on equity shares were removed in 1965.152 These 
changes, coupled with the 1955 changes to trust company practices which permitted them 
to pool small pension plan reserves for investment, led to the growth of pension plans as 
significant pools of investment capital.153 
The increase in the number of plans and their anticipated growth brought concern 
from the state, the corporate sector and eventually from labour, about the effect of 
pension funds and their expected growth on ownership and control of productive 
property. In the United States, for-example, in 1959, reports prepared for two hoeral 
think-tanks looked at the question of whether-pension funds could control corporations, 
although from radically different perspectives. In Pension Funds and Economic 
Freedom, 154 a report prepared for the Fund for- the Republic, Robert Tilove looked at the 
149 E. Gillese, .. Pension Plans and the Law of Trusts'' (1996) 75 Can. Bar. Rev. 221 at 227 [hereinafter 
.. PensionPlansj. 
tso 22-23 Geo. V.c.46,consolidatedin.R.S.C.1952,c.3L 
ist ''Class struggle'', supra note 100 at 163. 
152 Ibid. at 164. 
153 Ibid. at 165. 
154 (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1959). 
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question of whether occupational pension plans restricted economic freedoms by 
concentrating economic power in the hands of the small financial elite that invested and 
managed pension fund investments. He concluded that there was no evidence of this 
problem, although he recommended that this question be revisited on a regular basis to 
determine ''whether concentration of economic power or the use of pension funds to that 
end has or has not developed." 155 
He also touched on the question of whether unions had made any use of the 
potential power to influence corporate behaviour or concentrate economic power. Tilove 
noted that although there was potential for unions to use their pension funds to purchase 
the control of corporations, and to vote their stock in an influential manner, he 
commented that "the magnitude of this potential is, however, matched by labor's current 
disinterest in its use."156 
The second report, Pension Funds and Economic Power, 157 prepared for the 
Twentieth Century Fund by Paul Harbrecht, looked more generally at the impact of 
pension trusts on the institution of private property. Harbrecht was interested in whether 
the growth of pension funds meant that worker beneficiaries were becoming the owners 
of the means of production, and if in turn, this meant that economic decision-making was 
becoming more open and democratic. His conclusion was that this was not the case. 
155 Ibid. at 86. 
156 Ibid. at69. 
157 Pension Funds and Economic Power (New York: The Twentieth Century Fun~ 1959). 
43 
Instead he observed, "property rights of the pensioner in one of these funds are .•. 
reduced to an absolute minimum."15s 
Unlike Tilove, who had determined that pension fund accumulations had not 
concentrated economic power in a financial elite such that it created a "significant public 
problem, "159 Harbrecht argued that those who invested pension funds held considerable 
economic power: 
financial authority is almost wholly turned over to a relatively small group of 
banks. . .. It is a point of pride made by many managements that they in no sense 
control the investment of pension funds, the voting of stock or the placement of 
debt capital which the trustees manage. The net result is a large gain in economic 
power of the financial community.160 
He did recognize that successfully bargaining for employer-funded pensions could 
become a new source of power for labour, and he noted that organized labour was 
beginning to demand increased involvement in decision-making about pension fund 
investment.161 
With respect to the impact of pension funds on the institution of private property, 
Harbrecht argued that pension trusts challenged traditional understandings of property 
since they could not be said to be "owned" by anyone: "[s ]uch a phenomenon in a 
capitalist society,. which has traditionally considered the distinction between public and 
private ownership to be adequate and complete, challenges us to find a rational 
l5S /bid. at 284. 
159 Tilove. supra note 154 at 86. 
160 Harbrecht,. supra note 157 at 284. 
161 Ibid. at91-100. 
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framework to accommodate it."162 This question of ownership has continued to underpin 
much of the thinking and debate about the progressive power of pension fund investment. 
More than a decade later Peter Drucker published The Unseen Revolution. How 
Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, 163 in which he made the provocative claim that 
the United States was the world's first socialist country, since workers, through their 
pension funds, owned more 25 percent of the equity capital of American business, with 
"the largest employee pension funds •.. control[ling] practically every single one of the 
1,000 largest industrial corporations in America."164 However, Drucker failed to address 
the point that Harbrecht bad made earlier, that the workers who were the pension plan 
beneficiaries did not control or direct the corporations in which their pension funds were 
invested. 
Later that decade, Barber and Jeremy Rifkin politicized the pension plan issue in 
The North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s, 165 which looked at 
the economic decline in the northern industrial states in the United States. They 
highlighted the fact that the beneficiaries, employees and their unions had very little, if 
any control of their pension funds. Instead they were controlled by a small group of 
financial institutions which often invested the funds in other regions, in non-union 
companies or in companies that violated labour rights. 
162 Ibid. at l L 
163 (NewYork:.Harper&Row, 1976). 
164 Ibid. at 2. 
165 Supra note 104. 
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Like Harbrecht, Rifkin and Barber saw pension funds as a new form of private 
property with ownership falling "somewhere in the middle of private and public,"166 
characterizing it as "social capital..'' They argued that control of pension funds could be 
another source of power for organized labour as well as a means to preserve jobs in the 
northern industrial corridor. They reviewed some of the early labour involvement in 
pension fund investment decisions167 and issued a call to the labour movement to take 
control of their social capital: 
When companies engage in unfair labour practices, or ship their operations South 
or abroad to avoid union shops, it is not just some phantom abstraction called ''the 
owners" who are making those decisions. The owners, in part, are unions and 
unionists, and when companies engage in a systematic campaign to break the 
trade-union movement in this country, .•. they are able to succeed in large 
measure because the unions have given over their control of pension-fund capital 
to the private banking sector to use against them.168 
Canadian Labour Movement Pension Fund Activism 
In Canada, unions began to recognize the power of pension funds in the early 
1970s. During that decade the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the Canadian Union of 
Public Employees (CUPE) and the United Steelworkers (Canadian region) all endorsed 
policy positions advocating the joint administration of pension plans, including the 
management of fund investments.169 
Efforts to increase labour participation did not seem to yield the increased 
decision-making role advocated by labour. Since the early 1990s,. however, there has 
166 lbicL at 83. 
167 lbi<L ate. l7. 
168 lbitl. at 169. 
169 Deato~ supra note 44 at 157. 
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been renewed interest on the part of the Canadian labour movement and trade unionists in 
other countries in pension plan governance, including the management of pension fund 
investment, with many unions expressing "concern about limited labour participation in 
governance structures, despite the growing incidence of joint trusteeship and [advisory] 
... bodies since the 1980s."170 
This renewed interest has arisen in part because of the recognition of the role that 
institutional investors play in many of the financial problems associated with global 
capitalism outlined in the previous chapter, and in part because the labour movement has 
watched as the deferred wages in their pension funds were invested in corporations that 
utilized non-union labour, violated environmental, labour or human rights, laid off 
unionized labour, or moved production to another region or country, and found that they 
had little or no ability to affect these decisions, or to advocate for investment that would 
have collateral benefits such as the creation of jobs or the provision of services such as 
child care or housing. 
Internationally, the labour movement bas taken a number of steps to gain more 
control over their pension fund investments. In Canada, these steps have ranged from 
aggressively advocating for joint trusteeship of pension plans, including for pension 
investment decision-making, m to pursuing particular investment practices or programs. 
Since 1990, the CLC has issued a number of policy statements advocating a stronger role 
for union members in investment decision-making. It has also held workshops on 
17° Falconer, supra note 14 at 6. 
171 Deaton.supra note 44at 150-59;/bid. at7. 
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pension fund issues at its conferences. At a February 1998 workshop on pension fund 
investment at the CLC's Jobs and the Economy Conference, participants recommended 
that there be increased examination of"capital market investment alternatives for pension 
funds," 172 more pension fund investment tracking, and enhanced education and training 
opportunities for pension trustees and members.m 
As well, the National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) has 
passed a number of resolutions advocating the joint control of pension funds, and for the 
creation of education programs for union members about pension fund management and 
investment practices.174 It has also produced a number of research papers about pension 
fund control and trusteeship.m Other unions such as CUPE have developed education 
programs for their members who are trustees and bargaining committee members. 
Although there are some private sectorpension plans, most notably in the 
construction trades, in which union members have joint or sole trusteeship, t76 the labour 
movement has tended to be most successful in its efforts to secure joint trusteeship with 
multi-employer and some public sector funds, as well as with some union staff plans. 
Based on a 1998 survey conducted by the Ontario Public Service Employees' Union 
m L Carmichael, Survey of Union Pension Trustees (Canadian Labour Market Productivity Centre & the 
Ontario Public Services Employees' Union, 1998) at 4 [hereinafter Survey of Trustees}. 
m Ibid. 
l14 lbid. 
175 It ·s Our Money: What Workers: Need to Know About Pension Governance and Control (Nepean: 
National Union of Public and General Employees) [hereinafter It"s Our Money}; What did the Kirby report 
really say about the appointment of pension plan trustees? (Nepean: National Union of Public and General 
Employees, 2000). 
176 The unions that have sole trusteeship tend to be those that umlaterally established the fund in the absence 
of employer suppo~ L Carmichael, Union Pension Funds. Worfcer Control and Social Investment in 
Canada: Implications for Labour Education (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ontario Iilstitute for the Study of 
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(OPSEU) and the Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre (CLMPC) that 
looked at the extent to which union members and unions have control over investment 
decision-making, 177 the CLMPC estimates that approximately one-third of pension assets 
are under some form of joint trusteeship.178 These forms of joint trusteeship range from a 
board of trustees composed of equal numbers of employer and union trustees with each 
party selecting its representatives, or making recommendations to the government 
regarding appointments, to advisory committees with equal employer and union 
representations which make recommendations to a trustee or board of trustees.179 
The most significant developments in Canada have been in Quebec, where 
provincial pension legislation requires that a pension committee which is separate from 
the employer administer the plan.180 This committee must include at least one member 
elected by plan participants, one elected byretirees and former plan members, and an 
independent member.181 Unions may negotiate additional representation in the form of 
joint or sole trusteeship through collective bargaining. In addition, the committee must 
have an annual general meeting to present its annual report, provide additional 
information and elect representatives to the committee.182 
In terms of the investment practices and programs pursued, union initiatives have 
included shareholder activism initiatives including greater attention to proxy voting, 
Educatio~ University ofToronto, 2000) [unpublished} at 85 [hereinafter Worker Control and Social 
Investment}. 
Lrr Survey of Trustees, supra note 172. 
in Falconer, supra note 14 at 7. 
179 SurveyofTn1Stees,supranote172at 11-12. 
180 Supplemental Pension Plans Act, S.Q. 2001,_ c. R-15.L 
181 /bid..,.s.147. 
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investment screening and various forms of economically targeted or community 
development investments. Shareholder activism encompasses a number of activities that 
can be undertaken by pension funds as shareholders in particular corporations. The more 
well-known initiatives are shareholder resolutions put forward at a corporation•s annual 
general meeting. These can range from proposals relating to executive compensation to 
proposals directed at operational practices. Recent examples of shareholder proposals 
supported by Canadian pension plans include a motion put forward by a Quebec-based 
shareholder rights group to place limits on the Royal Bank of Canada's executive stock 
option plans,183 and resolutions asking Sears Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company to 
improve their codes of conduct and purchase contracts to include the International Labour 
Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1114 and 
to establish an independent monitoring process to evaluate compliance.185 
Another lower-profile form of shareholder activism is what is sometimes referred 
to as ''corporate dialogue" or ''corporate engagement." This involves raising concerns 
with the corporation through letters and meetings with corporate management or 
directors. Falconer suggests that high profile shareholder activism in Canada masks this 
"Made-in-Canada" approach to shareholder activism - an "even greater incidence of 
formal and informal consultation and negotiation on corporate governance matters behind 
182 lbid.., s. 166. 
183 K. Howlett,. ''Teachers opposes Royars stock bylaw" The Globe and Mail (20 February 200 l) 83. 
184 ILO General Conference, 861h Sess .. (1998). online:: <&ttp1fwww.ilo.orgfpublidenglish/l0ilc/ilc86fcom-
dtxt.htm>. 
185 Shareholder Association for Research and Education. .. Labour Investors Gather Broad Support in.Anti.-
Sweatshop Vote" (2001) 1 Prospectus4 [herefnafter .. Labour In.vestorsj; Shareholder Association for 
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closed doors." 186 This form of shareholder activism is particularly important for 
institutional investors in a small capital market like Canada's since the size of the market 
combined with institutional investors' large holdings make it difficult for investors to 
simply sell their shares if they disagree with corporation management practices because 
such sales oflarge blocks of shares often drive the share price down.'87 Canada's small 
capital market also make it difficult for institutional investors to find a comparable 
replacement investment. As part of their work to become more active shareholders, some 
pension plans are paying greater attention to the ways that their proxies are voted and are 
developing labour friendly guidelines to direct their investment managers, proxy voting 
services or in-house managers. 
A number of pension plans in Canada also screen their investments in various 
ways. Some use exclusionary or negative criteria to probtoit investment in corporations 
that derive revenue from for example, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, nuclear power, or 
military arms. Others screen investments using positive screening criteria such as 
community involvement, employee relations, human rights practices. Aspects of these 
criteria are given positive and negative ratings and investment is limited to those · 
corporations that receive a certain combined rating.181 Still others use a ''Best-of:.Sector'' 
approach which evaluates companies in comparison to their industry counterparts and 
Research and Educatio~ .. Proxy Vote at Sears Canada and Hudson•s Bay Co: Shareholder ProposalS on 
Labour Standards and Reporting" Trustee Alert {5 April 2001) [hereinafter ''Proxy Vote at Sears Canada"]. 
186 Falconer,. supra note l4at2l. 
187 Worker Control and Social Investment, supra note 176 at 52-54. 
188 T. Moore,. Presentation as part ofPanel: "Ethical Screening of Workplace Pensions: Some Union 
Experience•• {Canadian Labour Congress National Pension Conference,. 5 February 2001) [hereinafter 
"Some Union Experience'1· 
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invests in the corporation within the sector that best meets its screening objectives. This 
allows pension plans to keep their investments adequately diversified.189 
The labour movement has also been involved in creating screened investment 
products which can be purchased by institutional investors such as pension plans. For 
example, Working Enterprises Ltd., which provides services for unions and their 
members through its group of companies, has created two ethically screened index funds. 
The Canadian one tracks the TSE 300, and the American one tracks a Standard & Poor' s 
index. They are passive investment products that invest in those companies on the index 
that meet the fund's screening criteria.190 Some private firms, such as Real Assets 
Management, also provide similar services to institutional investors. 
Economically targeted investment practices include investments designed to 
support job creation, community economic development or the provision of social needs 
such as affordable housing. 191 They are investments that ''obtain both market-grade 
returns192 and economic or social benefits by addressing perceived financing gaps and 
under-investment."193 In British Columbia, Concert Properties, 194 a non-profit real estate 
company created with the investments of several building trades unions' pension funds, 
189 Some pension plans that use one or more of these screening methods are the OPSEU Staff Pension PI~ 
the Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff PI~ and the United Church of Canada Pension Plan. 
190 P. Chapman, Presentation as part of Panel: .. Ethical Screening of Workplace Pensions: Some Union 
Experience" (Canadian Labour Congress National Pension Conference, 5 February 2001). 
191 Some of the literature separates economically targeted investment and comnmnity economic 
development. In this paper, the term ''economically targeted investment" includes both forms of 
investment. 
192 Returns that match the returns for similar types of investments that do not necessarily provide the 
additional economic or social benefits. 
19; Falconer, supra note 14 at 32. 
194 Formerly Greystone Properties. 
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employs unionized labour to build non-profit housing in Vancouver.195 In Quebec, a 
number of pension plans pool their funds through the Caisse de Depot et Placement du 
Quebec (the "Caisse") which has an explicit mandate to promote provincial economic 
development.196 The Caisse has a number of investment subsidiaries with investment 
programmes aimed at supporting small and medium-sized companies in the province. 
Recently, some of the umbrella organizations in the Canadian labour movement 
have undertaken initiatives to assist union pension trustees with the practical initiatives 
outlined above. In February 2001 the CLC held its first National Pension Conference 
with workshops on a wide range of issues from ethical investment and shareholder 
campaigns, to the relationship of union trustees to their members. The CLC has indicated 
a commitment to providing more ''union-centred" training to union pension trustees and 
other members. 
In British Columbia. Working Enterprises Ltd. has recently established SHARE, 
the Shareholder Association for Research and Education. SHARE' s mandate is to "help 
support the labour movement's increasing involvement in all aspects of pension 
investment."197 Specifically SHARE will provide training to pension trustees and 
administrators; research on legal issues related to socially responsible institutional 
investment; and assistance with proxy voting policies and procedures. Its Director of 
Law and Policy has recently drafted a paper reviewing the law with respect to the 
195 See generally Worker Control anti Social Investment, supra note 176 at c. l 0. 
196 Deaton. supra note 44- at 225, 318-22. The Caisse was created in 1965 by the provincial government to 
manage the Quebec Pension Plan. Quebec's CPP equivalent.. 
197 P. Chapman. .. New Labour Shareholder Organization Launched at B.C. Federation Convention" (200 l) 
l Canadian Labour Congress Pension News 8 at 8 [hereinafter .. New Labour Shareholder Organizationj. 
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relationship between pension trustees' fiduciary duties and socially responsible 
investment, arguing that pension plan trustees are not proh.tbited from investing funds in a 
socially responsible manner and arguing further that ''there is significant legal and 
empirical support for viewing socially responsible investment practices as a requisite 
element of prudent and loyal trusteeship."198 It has recently published a guide to assist 
trustees interested in developing a pension plan Statement of Investment Policy and 
Procedures that permits socially responsible investment practices.199 
While there is increasing interest and work on the part of the Canadian labour 
movement, particularly from public sector unions, to exert more control over their 
pension fund management and investment practices, it is important to note that the labour 
movement is not united in its support for strategies which focus on controlling pension 
management and investment in the capitalist economy. The Canadian Auto Workers, for 
example, takes the view that these strategies ultimately fail to address the real problem -
the structure of the capitalist economy.200 They also object to co-management of pension 
funds as blurring the udivision of responsibility implicit in the traditional understanding 
of occupational pensions."201 These concerns will be discussed in more detail in the next 
two chapters. 
198 G. Yaron,. ''The Socially RespoDSible Pension Trustee" (2001) 20 Est. Tr. & Pens. J. 305 at 308. 
199 Shareholder Association for Research and Education,. A Guide to Incorporating Active Trustee Practices 
into Statements of Investment Policies and Procedures (Vancouver: Shareholder Association for Research 
and Education,. 2002) Executive Summary Available Online: <www.share.ca/resource/publications.htm>. 
200 S. Gindin,. .. Putting the Con Back in the Economy'' Tliis Magazine 25:8 (May 1992) 17; See also Worker 
Control and Social fnvestment,..supranote 176at17,.. 85-90. 
2Dl PaperBoom.supranote20 at374. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to place the development of occupational pensions in their 
historical context and to highlight their role in the ongoing struggle between capital and 
labour for control of the production process and over the distribution ofincome. 
Occupational pensions were initially a cost-effective mechanism for management to 
promote worker loyalty and undermine union power. Over time as the size of the pension 
funds increased, their role as a source of investment capital took on greater importance. 
The labour movement has challenged these developments. first by resisting the creation 
of occupational pensions and lobbying instead for a universal pension program, and later 
by advocating for a greater role in pension fund management and investment decision-
making, along with promoting investment practices which aim to influence corporate 
management and practice, promote long-term productivity, sustainability and ultimately 
help regulate financial markets. However it is important to note that the labour 
movement is not united in its support for the latter approach. 
The next two chapters look at the theoretical and practical limitations of these 
strategies created by pension law and corporate law. Chapter three applies pension law 
theory and practice to some of the assumptions that underpin pension fund activists' 
strategies. In particular, it examines two arguments that they put forward. These are first, 
that pension funds are workers' deferred wages which belong to them, and they should 
therefore have more control over how their pension funds are invested,. and second, that if 
workers' or their representatives had more say about how ·~eir'' funds were invested, 
they would and could consider criteria other than or in addition to monetary rate of return 
55 
in making investment decisions. The fourth chapter examines corporate law theory and 
practice with a focus on the uncertainty in corporate law about the legal nature of the 
share, which mediates the relationship between the shareholder and the corporation., and 
the contradictions that exist within modem corporate law between separate corporate 
personality doctrine on the one band and shareholder ownership "rights" on the other. It 
examines the implications of these uncertainties for pension fund activists' strategies. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS: PENSION FUND ACTIVISTS MEET 
PENSION LAW 
Introduction 
The sheer size of pension funds, their influence on national and global capital 
markets and the various negative ways in which pension fund investments have affected 
workers make strategies of pension fund activism appear particularly attractive as means 
to affect both ''capitalism and its corporations" •20:?. In putting forward these strategies, 
pension fund activists explicitlyodmplicitlyadvance two general arguments to support 
them. First, they argue that pension funds represent workers' capital in the form of 
deferred wages, and workers or their representatives should have more control over how 
they are invested. Secondly, they suggest that if workers or their representatives had a 
greater influence oyer how ''their" funds were invested, they would consider more than 
short-term and monetary rates of return criteria in making investment decisions. These 
arguments rely on a number of assumptions about ownership of pension funds. Upon 
closer examination, however, these assumptions are not clearly supported by existing 
pension law theory or practice. This chapter looks at the ways in which basic pension law 
doctrine conflicts with these arguments, or limits them to rhetoric rather than reality. 
Just Whose Money Is It? The Ownership Question 
One of the labour movemenes basic justifications for pension fund activism is 
that pension funds are created from money that would otherwise be given directly to 
20
:?. P. Ireland,. .. Corporations and Citizenship>? (1997) 49 Monthly Review lO at 26 [hereinafter 
.. Citizenship'1. 
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to organize. This perspective also understands pensions to be deferred wages in that the 
contributions would otherwise be going to increase workers' wages. 
Collective bargaining regimes also recognize pension contnbutions as a form of 
deferred wages. Pension contnbutions are usually negotiated as part of the total wage 
package.205 In the United States, a 1949 ruling of the National Labour Relations Board 
held that pensions and other welfare benefits, which it deemed to be wages, were a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.206 As Deaton comments, this decision also 
affected Canadian collective bargaining because many Canadian workers belonged to 
Canadian locals of American-based "international'' unions.207 
And yet the pension law system which governs questions of pension fund 
ownership and investment is unclear about whether pensions are deferred wages, and just 
who "owns" the money placed in trust and when they own it. Indeed, in ''Pension Plans 
and the Law of Trusts," in which she sought to initiate the development of an analytical 
framework for pension law, Eileen Gillese argues that the deferred wages question is one 
that must be resolved.208 
205 Deaton, supra note 44 at 122-23; P. Longhurst, ''Why Employee Benefits" in R.. Koskie et al., eds., 
Employee Benefits in Canada, 3nl ed. (Brookfield: International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, 
2001) 1 at3. 
206 Inland Steel, supra note 139. 
207 Deaton, supra note 44 at 120. American labour law divides collective bargaining subject-matter into 
mandatory and permissive areas. In Canada, the duty to bargain.has been interpreted broadly to include 
''those matters the parties could consent to have included in an agreement." G.W. Adams, Canadian 
Labour law, 2nd ed., looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1993) at para. 10.1470. 
208 
'<pension Plans'•, supra note 149 at250. 
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Pension law incorporates aspects of a number of fields oflaw including trust, 
corporate, labour, contract and tax law. Pensions plans are usually created using two 
documents, a pension plan text, and a trust agreement: 
When the decision is made to create a pension plan, a plan text is drafted. The 
plan text is a contract and it contains a variety of promises ...• [T]he employer 
determines how to ensure that there are funds available to provide the promised 
benefits. Often, the employer chooses to use a trust to ensure the security of 
funds.209 
The documents are usually separated so that the plan text can be modified without 
amending the trust agreement.210 Legislation sets out minimum standards for the 
information that must be included in both documents.211 The plan text sets out eligibility 
requirements, provides information about vesting and the formula for determining the 
benefits available under the plan, and explains how surplus funds will be used during the 
lifetime of the plan and when it is wound-up.212 The trust agreement contains provisions 
found in standard trust agreements including provisions that set out how funds will be 
received, invested and disbursed; the mechanisms for the appointment, resignation, or 
removal of trustees; the trustees' investment and management powers; the fees related to 
the plan, such as trustee or legal fees, that can be paid out of the fund; reporting, record 
keeping and accounting requirements; and trust amendment or termination conditions and 
procedures.213 
209 E. Gillese, "Contn'bution Holidays'' (1995) 15 Est.. & Tr. L 136 at 163-64 [hereinafter"Contn'bution 
Holidays1 
21
° Koskie et al., supra note 205 at 500. 
211 See e.g. s. 10 of the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P .8, s. 10 [hereinafter Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act}. 
212 
•"Pension Plans", supra note 149 at 229-30. 
213 lbic/. at 230; Koskie et al., supra note 205 at 503. 
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The two documents are governed by different systems oflaw: the plan text by 
contract law; the trust agreement by trust law. As Gillese points out. this creates 
uncertainty about which system oflaw will govem when there are disputes. This is 
particularly so when changes to one document affect the other. She suggests that a 
central barrier to the development of a consistent legal approach to pension law is that 
"the nature of a pension trust has not been settled."214 Two pension fund ownership issues 
that have been the subject of many disputes, the ownership of surplus when a pension 
fund is wound-up, and the right of employers to take contribution holidays while the 
pension is on-going, illustrate the problem. 
Pension plan surpluses can arise in two circumstances. During a plan's lifetime 
an actuarial surplus can exist when the plan is fully funded and actuarial calculations 
determine that the plan's assets exceed its liabilities. In this case, employers and/or 
employees may take contribution holidays - ''using actuarial surplus to fund current 
service costs in place of contnbutions."215 When a pension is wound-up a surplus exists if 
there are assets remaining after those that must be used to provide the promised pensions 
are deducted. Not surprisingly, disputes frequently arise over the ownership of both types 
of surplus. 
Employees, relying on trust principles, argue that all the money contnbuted to the 
fund represents deferred wages. The wages and benefits they bargain for together 
constitute the employer's total compensation package. The money contnbuted to pension 
214 
"Pension Plans'~,.. ibid. at236. 
215 Koskie et al.~ supra note 205 at 492. 
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funds would otherwise have been given to them as wages. The fact that the contnoutions 
are put in a segregated trust fund to benefit the employees indicates that it is money that 
no longer belongs to the employer. The money and the investment income it generates 
belongs to employees and they are entitled to any surplus. This argument is further 
supported by the fact that pension legislation contains implicit assumptions that pensions 
are deferred wages, that employers' pension plan contributions are given tax exemptions 
and the growth of the funds accumulated in pension trusts is not taxed.216 "The reason for 
those tax concessions is to encourage the setting aside of pension funds .•. and to enable 
those funds to grow to a level at which they can provide adequate retirement income 
security for the beneficiaries. The object is not to enable employers to accumulate assets 
for their own use."217 
Employers on the other hand rely on contract principles to argue that a pension 
plan is a contract to deliver pensions to workers based on fixed formulas set out in the 
plan text. The employer puts aside money to ensure that the promises will be delivered 
and once these have been paid out, any excess belongs to the employer.211 This approach 
gives paramountcy to the plan text over the pension trust which is understood simply to 
be a mechanism for delivering the pensions promised in the plan text. The fact that in 
defined benefit plans the employer must make up any shortfalls in the trust fund if the 
contnoutions combined with investment income are not sufficient to deliver the promised 
216 B. Adell. ••Pension Plan Surpluses and the Law: Finding a Path for Reform'' in Task Force on Inflation 
Protection for Employment Pension Plans, Research Studies. Volume 2 (Toronto: Queen•s Printer for 
Ontario, 1988) 209 at 238-39; ••Pension Plans''", supra note 149 at 237. 
217 Adell. ibid. at 239. 
218 
"Pension Plans'\ supra note 149 at230-3L 
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pensions adds weight to this approach. It is further reinforced by the fact that in the early 
1940s when pensions began to come under greater regulatory scrutiny and a funding 
mechanism to deliver the pension promise became a legal requirement under the Income 
Tax Act, insurance contracts between the employer and a third party insurer were initially 
the predominant funding vehicle.219 
As Gillese comments "[i]t is this tension between competing equities which 
makes it impossible to simply say that where trust and contract conflict, trust law and 
principles are to prevail."220 The courts have adopted a case-by-case analysis in disputes 
over surplus in which they have tended to base their decisions on close examination of 
virtually all plan-related documentation including the current plan text and trust 
documents, previous versions of these documents including those of predecessor plans, 
and communications to employees, rather than ruling on the larger and more general 
surplus ownership arguments put forward by the employer and employees.221 
An example of this is Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. m. the leading 
Supreme Court of Canada pension law case, which looked at the question of the 
ownership of pension plan surplus in a pension plan that was amergeroftwo earlier 
plans. Gillese suggests that Schmidt illustrates the beginnings of the analytical 
framework for pension law which she is seeking to develop in her article.223 This is one 
in which trust law and equity principles provide the framework for pension law, and the 
219 Ibid. at227 &236. 
220 Ibid. at 231. 
m M. Zigler & A.N. Kaplan. .. Pension Plan Surpluses" in Koskie et al~ supra note 205. 222 at 224. 
222 [1994] 2S.C.1L6ll [bereinafterSc/imidt]. 
ru "Pension Plans'•. supra note I 49 at 236. 
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principles and approaches of the other intersecting fields oflaw providing guidance when 
conflicts develop;224 
Air Products Canada Ltd. ("Air Products'') was a company founded in 1983 
through the merger of Stearns-Roger Canada Ltd. ("Stearns") and Catalytic Enterprises 
Ltd. ("Catalytic"). Both companies had defined benefit pension plans which had been 
converted from defined contnbution plans. At the time of the merger both plans were in 
surplus positions. The plans and their funds were merged into two identical plans, one 
for the Construction Division employees, and one for senior management. The merged 
plans were also contributory defined benefit plans with terms that gave Air Products the 
right to decide how to spend any surplus on termination. In 1988 the pension plan was 
terminated after most of Air Products' assets were sold. The plan had a surplus of more 
than $9 million.225 
Air Products sought a declaration from the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench that it 
owned the surplus. The employees of the Construction Division disputed this claim. 
They also sought an order that Air Products repay the contnbution holidays it had taken 
from 1985 to 1988 -close to $1.S million-to the fund.226 
The Supreme Court of Canada, after reviewing all the plan related documents, 
held that Air Products owned the surplus derived from the Steams plan. The majority 
22
" lbicL at 250. 
225 Schmidt. supra note 222 at 626-27. 
226 lbicL at 627. Although the case related only to the Construction Division employees• pension plan. the 
results also affected senior management's plan. Ibid. at 626. 
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held that the former Catalytic employees owned the Catalytic plan surplus.227 On the 
issue of the contnbution holidays, the Court held that Air Products had been entitled to 
take them even where the actuarial surplus used arose from the Catalytic plan.228 
Gillese argues that the apparent contradictions in the results can be reconciled by 
an approach which fully acknowledges that a pension plan using a trust as the funding 
mechanism is subject to both contract and trust law. Under this approach, while the plan 
is on-going, contract law has paramountcy and the plan text (the contract) is used to 
resolve disputes ''which relate to the pension plan when it is ongoing.''229 When the plan 
terminates,. trust law has paramountcy and trust law principles govern disputes over 
ownership of the trust fund surplus.230 
This approach is further supported by the collective bargaining practice in which 
unions often negotiate changes to the pension plan, such as improved benefits or early 
retirement for certain plan members, which are paid out of the actuarial surplus. When 
unions negotiate changes to the pension plan they generally do so only on behalf of 
current workers. Yet plan changes that are negotiated under the collective agreement may 
affect pension trust assets and the interests of retirees and deferred vested employee?1 
whose contnbutions to the trust were made well before the existing collective agreement 
was negotiated. As Gillese points out "[i]f the funds were subject to trust principles, the 
ri..T On this issue alone McLachlin J. and Sopinka J. each wrote dissenting judgements holding that.Air 
Products owned the Catalytic plan surplus. 





use of the funds to increase benefit levels for active plan members but not for retirees 
would be a breach of trusL"23z. 
When these issues have arisen, the courts have again taken a flexible approach to 
the problem. They have not rigidly applied trust law to prevent changes to a pension plan 
from affecting pension trust assets, yet they have indicated that those involved in the 
collective bargaining process must consider the interests of all the stakeholders in the 
plan. In Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society233 for example, Adams J. 
held that where assets have been irrevocably committed to retired members, a union 
cannot negotiate changes to the plan for current members out of this surplus. However he 
also held that in negotiating changes to the pension plan that affect the surplus or other 
elements of the trust, a balance must be achieved between the interests of current and 
former employees: 
Trust law responds to the long gestation of pension arrangements and 
accommodates the welfare of former employees who often lack any other 
effective means to protect their interests. . .• Trust law in this modem context, 
must accommodate and be responsive to key differences between the traditional 
settling of a trust and the ongoing administration of a pension plan in a changing 
economic environment. But employers, trade unions and trustees must also 
appreciate the central importance of pension arrangements to all employees and be 
vigilant of the dependent interests engrained in these plans.m 
Gillese suggests that there is also a compelling social policy reason to favour this 
blended contract/trust law approach to questions of pension fund ownership as it 
23 t These employees have a right to a pension the amount of which was determined when they left their 
employment or when the pension plan was wound-up, but it is not payable until a later date. Koskie et al., 
supra note 205 at 493. 
nz. "Contribution Holidays", supra note 209 at 164. 
:m (I992) l l OR (3d) 449 (G.D.) aff'd (1994) 16 OR (3d) 76[ (C.A.), application for leave to appeal 
dismissed (1994) 19 OR (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Bathgate]. 
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encourages employers to create pension plans, especially defined benefit plans, which 
provide more secure retirement income than no plan, or employer contributions to an 
individual or group RRSP. This makes the ability of employers to take contribution 
holidays during the life of the plan an important incentive for them to create and continue 
pension plans.235 
It might be argued that since legislation now requires new plans to provide for the 
distnbution of surplus on tennination,236 and, in some cases, sets out processes for 
determining surplus distribution, this issue has now been resolved. The legislative 
schemes, however, have not done this. Generally they require that employers and current 
and former employees negotiate an agreement about the distribution of surplus before the 
provincial regulator-will authorize its release.237 Thus as MarkZiglerandAri Kaplan 
write "[ d]espite numerous studies, task forces and extensive academic commentary, the 
issue [of pension surplus ownership] has not been resolved conclusively by either the 
legislature or the courts, possibly, as noted by one judge, 4because of the uncertain impact 
of an unqualified acceptance of either view. "'238 
The flexible and case-by-case approach of the judiciary, the fact that the pension 
legislation "provides little or no guidance on the broad issues and questions .•. such as 
234 Ibid. at 511. 
235 
"Contn'bution Holidays'~. supra note 209 at 166. It is important to note that pension plan texts do not 
automatically permit employers to take contn'bution holidays. In Schmidt the Court held that "whether or 
not a contn'bution holiday is permisstble must be decided on the basis of the applicable plan provisions:• 
Supra note 222 at 653. 
236 See e.g. Ontario Pension Benefits Act,. supra note 211, s.L 
237 Zigler & Kaplan, supra note 221 at 222. 
ns Ibid. quoting Adams J. in Bathgate,. supra note 233 at497. 
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entitlement to surplus, [and] the right to take contn'bution holidays"239 and the fact that 
there are potentially many "owners" of pension funds - unions, current workers, retirees, 
the employer- suggest thatjustifying involvement in pension plan administration and 
fund investment decision-making based on claims of fund ''ownership" may have limited 
legal value.240 As Ghilarducci points out ''the ambiguity of pension-fund-ownership 
designation weakens unions' legal claims to pension-fund controL"24 t Moreover, in the 
case of defined benefit plans, whether contn'butory or non-contributory, asserting 
ownership "rights" may result in the imposition of unwanted liabilities on unions and 
their members to make up any short falls in the pension fund.242 
The point here is not to suggest that workers or their representatives should have 
no involvement in pension fund administration and investment decision-making. Indeed 
as Ghilarducci has found, jointly managed plans generally supply better benefits to plan 
members regardless of whether the plan is a defined benefit or defined contribution 
plan.243 But concerns need to be raised about the legal and political consequences of the 
arguments put forward by pension fund activists in support oftheir"right" to have 
ucontrol" of pension plan administration and investment decision-making. 
239 
"Pension Plans'', supra note 149 at 228. 
240 Ownership rights may not be as uncertain in the case of defined contnbution plans because the 
employees are entitled to the income from the investment of the defined contnbutions_ However,. the fact 
that the employees individually bear the pension fund performance risk means that the prospects for 
investments based on criteria other than market rates of return are limited_ Also, it is worth noting that 
questions of pension fund ownership can arise in mixed defined benefit-defined contnbution plans such as 
was the case in Bathgate where the defined contnbutions were used to purchase annuities which provided a 
pension at a defined benefit rate- The surplus ownership issues arose in Bathgate because assets remained 
after the purchase of the annuities. Supra note 233. 
241 Labor'S Capital, supra note 40 at 115. 
242 Its Our Money. supra note 175 at 7; Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 374. 
243 See generally ··small Benefits'', supra note 30. 
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This concern goes beyond the fact that justifying involvement on the basis of 
arguments about pension fund ownership is inaccurate and may have unintended 
consequences for workers and their representatives, to a more fundamental theoretical 
concern. As Ghilarducci points out, arguing about who .. owns" pension funds tends to 
obscure the real issue, namely that pension fund activists want to change the way pension 
funds are invested. ''The source of the funds can be traced to workers, but fighting over 
ownership rights avoids the real contest over just how pension funds should be used." 244 
It also means that proponents of pension fund activism continue to work with, and think 
about, pension funds as private property that must be "owned" by someone instead of 
exploring the theoretical and political possibilities that flow from the fact that pension 
funds have many "owners" and ''beneficiaries''" - legal or otherwise. In many ways it is 
precisely this fact that makes pension funds attractive to those interested in using 
investment practices to try to control or moderate the behaviour of capital. 
A second consequence of utilizing private property ownership arguments to just:ify 
pension fund activism is that it limits the claim made by proponents that with greater 
worker or union involvement in investment decisions, consideration can be given to 
investment criteria other than market rates of return. Although the courts and the 
legislatures have taken a flexible case-by-case approach to questions of surplus 
ownership, one area where pension law has been applied quite strictly is in relation to the 
duties and responsibilities that attach to trustees' pension fund investment practices. The 
244 Labors Capital, supra note 40 at 13 L 
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next section looks at the ways in which fiduciary duty principles affect the aspirations of 
pension fund activists. 
Rate of Return Criteria and Fiduciary Duties 
Pension trustees' fiduciary duties to plan members have traditionally been 
understood by trustees, and to a large extent by the courts, to limit trustees' investment 
decision criteria to ones which focus on market rates of return. There are two issues that 
arise out of this focus. The first is simply the tension between long-term and short-term 
investment strategies. As discussed in the first chapter, despite the fact that pension funds 
are generally thought of as "patient capital," their investment practices have tended to 
focus on maximizing returns over the short-term. This in tum has helped create many of 
the problems in global financial markets discussed earlier, not the least of which are the 
ways that these practices create price volatility without productive return.245 The second 
issue relates to the larger issue of how to appropriately calculate the."rate of return." 
Should it be conceptualized simply in monetary terms,. or are there other factors such as 
environmental and community sustainability,. and labour and human rights standards that 
should be included? 
The first part of this section provides an overview of trustees' statutory and 
common law fiduciary duties when investing trust assets, with particular attention to the 
effect of these duties on the criteria used to make investment decisions. It then looks at 
the effect of these fiduciary duties on the three pension fund investment practices being 
pursued by labour movement pension fund activists set out in the previous chapter-
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shareholder activism initiatives including greater attention to proxy voting, investment 
screening, and various forms of economically targeted or community development 
investments. In all three cases, the "socially transformative" impact of these strategies is 
limited by fiduciary duty constraints. The fmal part of this section provides an overview 
of a number of other approaches to rate of return criteria that arguably provide a more 
accurate picture of true rates of return- both market and social. 
Fiduciary Duties 
Given that the purpose of a pension fund is to provide retirement income, the 
obligation of trustees is first and foremost to maximize investment returns.246 
If ethical choices do not lower investment returns, the practical (and legal) reality 
is that trustees are unlikely to face judicial interdiction, regardless of their 
motivation. If investment returns are lowered, trustees are in trouble.247 
In Canada, pension plan trustees are subject to both common law and statutory 
standards of prudence when investing pension fund assets. The common law standard of 
care, the minimum standard for all pension fund trustees in Canada, is that "which an 
ordinary prudent business person would exercise in conducting his or her own affairs."248 
Many Canadian pension fund trustees are also subject to a higher standard of care 
set out in pension legislation. The federal Pensions Benefits Standards Act (PBSA)249 
governs all federally registered plans as well as plans in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. 
245 
"U.S. Pension Invesbnent Policy", supra note 47 at 8. 
246 R.. Tomassini, ''Pension Funds and Socially Responsible Investing'' in Koskie et al., supra note 205, 316 
at318. 
247 E. Waitzer, "Pension Fund Trustees as Shareholders" (Paper presented at Conierence on Strategies for 
RespoDSl'ble Share Ownership, University of Toronto, 7 December 1990) at 8 cited in J. Quarter, Canada s 
Social Economy (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1992) at 148. 
248 Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co., [1977} 2 S.C.R.. 302. M. Mazzuca & R.. Tomassini, "Pension 
Fund Investments: Legal Aspects" in Koskie et al., supra note 205, 272 at 276. 
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They are the dominant investment rules in Canad~ as pension legislation in many 
provinces adopts the PBSA's investment rules by reference.250 The PBSA, along with a 
number of provinces, requires that trustees and plan administrators ''exercise the care, 
diligence and skill ... in the investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person."251 This standard 
is also applied to agents such as investment managers. 
This higher standard, which requires trustees to be more cautious in making 
investment decisions on behalf of others than they would be in making investment 
decisions for themselves, is also found in the common law. In Re Whiteley, Whiteley v. 
Learoyd, Lord Justice Lindley stated that "[t ]he duty of a trustee is not to take such care 
only as a prudent man would take if he had only himself to consider, the duty rather is to 
take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to make an 
investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide."252 
In addition the legislation places a higher prudence standard on trustees who, because of 
249 R.S.C. 1985 c. 32 (2°d Supp.l> as am. [hereinafter PBSA]. 
250 Some provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia) combine the PDSA rules 
with their own.. Others (Prince Edward Islan~ the North.west Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut) do not 
have any investment rules. Pension plans registered in Ontario used to be subject to specific investment 
standards found in the Pension Benefits Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909, but recent regulations now 
require tha~ as of l January 200 l, plans must comply with the PDSA investment rules. They must dispose 
ofanyin.vestmentsthatdo not comply by no later than l January2005. Regulation to amend Reg. 909 of 
R.R.O. 1990, 0. Reg. 144/00. 
251 PBSA, supra note 249, s. 8 (4); Pension Benefits Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 340, s. 29(1); Ontario Pension 
Benefits Act. supra note 211, s. 22(1), (5); The Pension Benefits Act. R.S.M. 1987, c. P32, s. 28.1 (2); 
Pension Benefits Act, S.N.B. 1987, c. P-5.l, s. 17(1); Pension Benefits Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 
352. s. 8(5); Supplemental Pension Plans Act, supra note 180, s. 151. 
252 (1886) 33 Ch.D.347at355 (C.A.). 
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their profession or skills, have a higher standard ofknowledge than the average person.253 
Trustees are also subject to common law duties ofloyalty and impartiality which require 
that they act honestly and impartially, treating all beneficiaries with an even hand. These 
duties also require that they: act in good faith in the best interests of all plan beneficiaries; 
avoid delegating ultimate decision-making authority; and ensure that they are not in 
conflict ofinterest situations with the beneficiaries.254 
In applying these standards, courts have focused on the investment decision-
making process, rather than the ultimate performance of the chosen investment. In the 
context of pension fund activist strategies, proponents have sought to include 
consideration of factors other than market rates of return into this decision-making 
process. While the law does not strictly prohibit consideration of these factors as part of 
the investment decision-making process, the trustees' duties of prudence and loyalty 
require that they must be secondary to consideration of market rates of return. There is no 
Canadian judicial authority on when an investment decision-making process that includes 
consideration of factors other than market rates of return will violate trustees' duties of 
loyalty and prudence. There are however, a number of cases in Britain and the United 
States which have considered these issues. These cases give some indication ofhow 
Canadian courts might respond to similar cases. 
253 For-example,. section 22(2) of Ontario •s Pension Benefits Act states that •"The administrator- of a pension 
plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan all relevant knowledge and skill that the 
administrator-possesses or-,. by reason of his or her profession, business or calling. ought to possess." Supra 
note 21 L British. Columbia•s legislation does not impose this higher-standard. 
254 E.E. Gillese,. The Law of Trusts (Concord: Irwin Law,. 1997) at 5,. c. 9; See generally D.W ..M. Waters. 
The Law of Trusts in Canatla, 2."d ed.,. (Toronto: Carswell,. 1984) at c. 17 - 19. 
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Cowan v. Scargill 
The leading case in the area is Cowan v. Scargi/l,255 a British case which 
considered the question of whether the union-appointed trustees of the Mineworkers' 
Pension Scheme, a jointly trusteed pension plan for industrial employees of the National 
Coal Board, had breached their fiduciary duties in refusing to approve the fund's annual 
investment plan unless the plan prohibited new foreign investments and provided for the 
timely divestment of existing foreign investments, and prohibited investments in 
industries in direct competition with the coal industry.256 Sir Robert Megarry, V.C. held 
that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties. At the time, there was little 
jurisprudence in the area. Megarry, V.C. considered three authorities in reaching his 
decision, Evans v. London Co-op Society Ltd,251 Blankenship v. Boyle,258 Withers v. 
Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York.259 
In Evans, the Court considered Rule 7, a provision in the London Co-operative 
Society's Pension Plan (LCS), established in 1927, which provided that fund assets not 
needed to pay benefits had to be loaned out to the Society at agreed upon interest rates. 
The loans were used by the Society to create employment and improve working 
conditions.260 Between 1933 and 1962, the LCS loaned the assets to the Society at below-
255 [1984] 2 All ER 750 (Ch. D.) [hereinafter Scargillj. 
256 Ibid. at 752-53. 
251 [1976] C.L.Y. 2059 (Ch.D.). The case is not officially reported... The full text appears unofficially in R.. 
Ellison, Private Occupational Pension Schemes, voL 1, App. ill. (London: Oyez,. 1979) at 356 [hereinafter 
Evans cited to Ellison]. 
258 329 F.Supp. 1089 (D.C., 1971) [hereinafter Blenkensnip ]. 
259 447 F.Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y., 1978) atrd, 595 F .2d 1210 (2d Cir., 1979) [hereinafter Withers]. 
260 Evans, supra note 257 at 361. 
74 
market interest rates, which were not subject to negotiations between the parties. Instead, 
the rate ofinterest remained the same, and appeared to be set by the Society. 
The Court held that Rule 7 permitted the Pension Committee to lend funds to the 
Society at less than market rates of interest provided both parties agreed to this.261 It held 
however, that the plan trustees were in violation of their fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiaries in not regularly negotiating the rate of retum.262 It is worth noting that the 
Court indicated that it was possible that there might be circumstances in which it would 
be in the best interests of beneficiaries for the funds to be loaned to the Society at less 
than market interest rates: 
The Pension Committee may come to the view that in all the circumstances it is 
for the advantage of their beneficiaries as a whole that the Society should be 
permitted to have the loan of pension money at a rate lower than the Society 
would have to pay to an outside lender. On the other hand I think that only in the 
most exceptional circumstances would the Pension Committee be justified in 
lending pension money to the Society indefinitely in return for a rate of interest 
significantly lower than that obtainable on a bank deposit or on deposit with a 
first-class authority.263 
Megarry, V.C. held that Evans was a decision about whether Rule 7 of the Trust 
Fund took the case outside of the general laws of trust, and that it had little application to 
the facts in Scargi/l.264 It is worth noting that subsequent commentators have noted that 
Evans supports the view that trustees can take a long-term approach to the ''best interests" 
ofbeneficiaries,. that theycanconsiderplanmembers' interests as employees,. and that 
261 lbid. at364-65. 
262 Ibid. at 366. 
263 Ibid. at365. 
264 Scargill, supra note 255 at 763. R..Megarry, ''Investing Pension Funds: The Mineworkers' Case'' in T.G. 
You~ eel, Equity~ Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 149 at 155. 
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less-than-market rates of return do not, in themselves, breach trustees' fiduciary duties, if 
they are permitted by trust documents}65 
In Blankenship, at issue were the actions of trustees for the United Mine Workers 
of America Welfare and Retirement Fund in allowing huge amounts of cash to 
accumulate in interest-free accounts at the National Bank of Washington, 266 a bank owned 
by the United Mineworkers of America, and in investing in stocks of electrical utility 
companies and transferring a substantial portion of the share proxies to a Union. This 
was done to encourage these companies to use union-mined coal.267 
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that these investment 
decisions were made primarily in the interests of the union and that the trustees had 
violated their duty of undivided loyalty to all the beneficiaries.268 As Megarry, V.C. 
stated: "The court re-affirmed the duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries that a 
trustee owes, and did not accept that regard should also be paid to the union or its 
members who generated some of the income of the fund, or to the industry as a whole."269 
Withers was a case in which the courts permitted pension plan trustees to make 
investments that provided less-than-optimal market rates of return. The U.S. District 
Court, S.D. New York upheld the decision of the trustees of the Teachers' Retirement 
System (TRS) to purchase $860 million in New York City bonds. At the time, the City 
265 Manitoba Law Reform Commissio~ Ethical Investments by Trustees (Winnipeg: Manitoba Law Reform 
Commissio~ 1993) at25; Yaro~supranote-198 at339-40. 
266 At times this cash represented nearly 30% of the Fund•s total assets. Blenkenship, supra note 258 at 
1096. 
267 Ibid.. at 1105-1106. 
268 lbicL at 1099, 1106. 
269 Scargill, supra note 255 at 764. 
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was facing bankruptcy, and the purchase was part of a plan by TRS and four other 
pension plans to purchase close to $2.53 billion in City bonds over two and a half years to 
prevent the City from going bankrupt.270 The bonds had a low rating and were virtually 
unmarketable, but the trustees had imposed a number of conditions designed to protect 
the TRS before they agreed to purchase them.271 
The Court upheld the TRS decision because the main reason for the trustees' 
decision was the fact that the City's contnoutions to the plan outweighed the income from 
existing assets and employee contributions, and upon bankruptcy these contnoutions 
would cease. 272 In preventing the City from going bankrupt, the trustees were helping 
ensure that the City could continue to contribute to the TRS.273 
As Megarry, V.C. and other commentators have noted, while the court upheld an 
investment decision that was not motivated primarily to maximize returns, the unique 
circumstances of the case give it limited value as a precedent.274 Moreover, one could 
argue that the decision was made with the best financial interests of the beneficiaries in 
mind since without the City contnoutions, the pension plan would have spent all its 
reserves within ten years.21s 
In his decision in Scargill, Megarry, V.C. set out the following principles. First, 
trustees must exercise their investment powers in the best interests of both present and 
270 Withers, supra note 259 at 1250. 
271 lbicL at 1253-1255. 
272 Ibid. at 1251-52. 
rn lbicL at 1259. 
274 Scargill. supra note 255 at 764; Tomassini,.supra note 246 at319; I D. Hutchinson & C.G. Cole .... Legal 
Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals" (1980) 128 Univ. of 
Penn. L.R. 1340at1363. 
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future beneficiaries.276 The court recognized that the investment restrictions, which were 
designed to protect the mining industry in Britain, would benefit those who were active 
employees, but found that other beneficiaries (deferred pensioners, retirees, and the 
surviving spouses and children of deceased miners) would gain little.277 Second, that in 
most cases, the best interests of the beneficiaries is their best financial interests.27s Third, 
trustees must put aside their own personal political and social views when making 
investment decisions. 279 And fourth, trustees must consider the need to adequately 
diversify fund investments.280 
There are a number of factors that should be considered when assessing the 
impact of Scargill. First, the union trustees did not investigate the financial implications 
for the fund of screening out all foreign investments and investments in entire industries. 
As Roberto Tomassini comments "[t]he court's decision might have been different if the 
trustees had proposed an investment screening policy that they could demonstrate would 
not impact negatively on the investment performance of the fund, given the availability of 
comparable competitive investments."29 t Megarry, V.C. later suggested that the case 
might have been decided differently if the trustees had sought to adopt an investment 
27s Megarry, supra note 264 at 155. 
276 Scargill, supra note 255 at 760 & 762. 
277 Ibicl. at 764. 
27& lhicl. at 760. 
279 IbiO... at 76L 
280 lbiO... at 762. 
28 l Tomassini,supranote246 at319. 
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policy which simply indicated a preference for investments which were domestic and did 
not compete with the coal industry.282 
And second, he indicated that in certain rare instances, where there were trust 
beneficiaries "with strict views on moral and social matters" it would be possible for 
trustees to decide not to invest in companies that derived revenue from, for example, 
alcohol, tobacco, or armaments, even if this meant that the fund would receive reduced 
financial returns. He commented that "the beneficiaries might well consider that it was 
far better to receive less than to receive more money from what they consider to be evil 
and tainted sources."283 However, the trustees would have to satisfy a heavy burden of 
proof that all classes ofbeneficiaries would "benefit" from such an investment policy.284 
Although the jurisprudence since Scargill has not grown significantly, there have 
been some additional trust fund cases in both Britain and the United States in which 
courts have considered the conditions under which trustees can consider factors other 
than market rates of return as part of the investment decision-making process. 
Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore 
In the Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 285 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
considered the legality of a Baltimore City ordinance requiring its employee pension 
plans to divest their South African holding over a two-year period. Under the ordinance 
282 Megarry. supra note 264 at 157-58. It is also worth noting that the union trustees were represented by a 
[ayperso~ the defendant and union presiden~ Arthur Scargill. Megarry comments that"[ o }ne cannot say 
what would have emerged had the defendant's case been presented by a Chancery~ particularly in the 
bound and rebound ofideas between Bench. and Bar" (at 152). 
283 ScargiU, supra note 255 at 761. 
2114 Ibid. at 762. 
285 562 A.2d 720 (MD.C.A., 1989) [hereinafter Baltimore}. 
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the trustees could suspend the divestment process at any time for up to 90 days if the 
fund's rate of return was substantially lower than the previous five years average, if it 
would be inconsistent with generally accepted investment standards, or if it would lead to 
financial losses for the fund.286 The trustees challenged the ordinance arguing that it 
required them to violate their duties of prudence and loyalty to the beneficiaries. They 
alleged that the ordinance would negatively affect fund performance and impair their 
investment manager's active management style. 
The ordinance was upheld at both trial and on appeal. In terms of the claim that 
the ordinance would negatively affect the funds performance, at trial, the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City found that despite being no longer able to invest in 120 of the 500 
companies on the Standard & Poor' s 500 fudex and having to invest in smaller companies 
whose stock prices tended to be more volatile, in the long run these stocks perform as 
well as or better than larger companies.287 It also held that the initial costs of the 
divestment process to the funds (a $750,000 one-time divestiture cost and an 
approximately $300,000 increase in broker's fees) and the ongoing costs ($1.2 million per 
year) were insignificant costs to the funds given their size.288 In upholding the trial 
judgment, Eldridge, J. writing for the Court of Appeal stated that 
[A] trustee's duty is not necessarily to maximize the return on investments but 
rather to secure a "just'' or "reasonable" return while avoiding undue risk •••• 
Thus, if, as in this case, social investment yields economically competitive returns 
at a comparable level of risk, the investment should not be deemed imprudent. 
286 Ibid. at 724. 
287 lhitL at 726. 
288 !hid. at 727. 
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... Moreover, given the vast power that pension trust funds exert in American 
society, it would be unwise to bar trustees from considering the social 
consequences of investment decisions in any case in which it would cost even a 
penny more to do so ..•• [I]t: ... the cost of investing in accordance with social 
consideration is de minimis, the duty of prudence is not violated.289 
In terms of the effect on the plan's money manager's active management style, the 
trial court found that this would be insignificant as replacement stocks could be found in 
every sector. It also noted that since money managers tend to invest in a small range of 
"known" stocks, the ordinance simply required them to do additional research to find 
comparable replacements. 290 
Manin v. The City of Edinburgh District Council 
This is another South African divestment case. In Manin v. The City of 
Edinburgh District CounciF91 Edinburgh City Council had instructed its investment 
advisors to report on any of its trust fund (public and charitable) investments in South 
Africa and propose alternative investments. The Court took issue, not with the policy 
itself, but with the process followed in its development. It was concerned that the trustees 
had not first determined whether it was in the best interests of the trusts and their 
beneficiaries to divest from South Africa. It held that the City Council had breached its 
fiduciary duties "in pursuing a policy of disinvesting in South Africa without considering 
expressly whether it was in the best interests of the beneficiaries and without obtaining 
professional advice on this matter."29i 
289 Ibid. at737. 
290 Ibid. at 726. 
291 Martin v. City of Edinburgh District Council,. [1988} S.CL.R.. 90 (O.H.) [hereinafter Martin J. 
29
:t Ibid. at 96. 
8[ 
Harries v. Church Commissioners for England 
At issue in Harries v _ Clzurch Commissioners for Englantf-93 were the investment 
decision-making criteria used by trustees of a charitable trust. The Bishop of Oxford and 
other members of the clergy alleged that the Church Commissioners for England Board of 
Governors, who were responsible for investing Church of England assets, had breached 
their fiduciary duties in giving financial criteria overriding importance in making 
investment decisions. They claimed that the Board had to consider the underlying 
purpose for which the trust was created, namely "the promotion of the Christian faith 
through the Church of England,"294 and argued that the Board should not invest in a 
manner that was in conflict with this purpose, even if it meant financial loss.295 
The Board had a very progressive .. ethical investment policy" which stated in part 
that .. [w]hile financial responsibilities must remain of primary importance (given our 
position as trustees), as responsible investors we continue to take proper account of 
social, ethical and environmental issues." It did not invest in alcohol, armaments, 
gambling, newspaper, or tobacco companies. Nor did it invest in South African 
companies or companies with major parts of their business there. When it invested in 
companies with small parts oftheir business in South Africa, the Board tried to make sure 
that the companies followed progressive social and employment policies. It also paid 
293 [1993} 2 All. E.R. 301 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter Harries}. 
294 Ibid. at 302. 
295 lbitl 
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attention to local community and environmental interests when looking at property 
development opportunities. 296 
In his decision, Sir Donald Nicholls, V.C. reaffirmed that trustees' decisions 
should be primarily concerned with furthering the purposes of the trust, and that these 
purposes are best served by seeking maximum return on trust assets.297 He found that the 
Board had an ethical investment policy that did not conflict with the purposes of the 
Church ofEngland.298 He noted that in some ucomparatively rare" instances the most 
prudent investment for a trust fund might be in a company engaged in a business in direct 
conflict with the purposes of the trust, such as a charity for cancer research investing in 
cigarette companies. Alternatively,. the investment might interfere with the ability of the 
charity to do its work. In such cases he stated that the trustees might be bound not to 
make the investment. In any event, they would have to weigh carefully the financial 
losses from not making the investment against the difficulties that the charity would face 
in conducting its work.299 Much has been made of this exception. However, it is 
important to remember that, as the Supreme Court of Canada con.finned in Schmidt, 
pension funds are not purpose trusts.300 Purpose trusts are those that do not have a 
beneficiary: "[f]unds are deposited in trust in order to see that a particular purpose is 
filled; people may benefit, but only indirectly."301 
296 lbicL at306-307. 
297 lbicL at304. 
298 Ibid. at 309. 
299 Ibid. at304-305. 
300 Schmidt, supra note 222 at 640-4 L 
301 Ibid. quoting Pension Commission ofOntario inArrowfreacl Metals Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (March 26, 
1992). unreported. at pp. 13-15, cited by Adams J. in Batfrgate.,. supra note 233 at 510. 
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Summary of Principles 
A number of pension fund investment principles can be distilled from these 
decisions. Trustees have an undivided loyalty to all classes of fund beneficiaries and 
must exercise their investment powers in the beneficiaries' best interests.302 However 
they may also consider the interests of the beneficiaries in other roles such as 
employees.303 Trustees must put aside their own personal political and social views, or 
those of the organizations that appointed them as trustees, when making investment 
decisions.304 
Prudence standards in the context of pension fund investment are more concerned 
with the decision-making process than with the actual results of particular investment 
decisions.305 As part of a prudent process trustees must obtain appropriate advice and 
consider the need to adequately diversify fund investments.306 They must also have 
discretion to deviate from their investment policies if it would be imprudent to continue 
to follow them. This applies regardless of whether or not the policies mandate 
consideration of investment criteria other than rates of retum.307 
302 Scargill. supra note 255; Blenkensliip. supra note 258; Baltimore. supra note 285. 
303 Evans. supra note 257. 
304 Scargill, supra note 255; Blenkensltip, supra note 258. 
305 Scargill. ibfcl..; Manin, supra note 29 L This is further supported by statements from regulatory bodies 
such as the Pension Commission of Ontario which reaffinned that it is the process "through which 
investment strategies and tactics are developed, adopted, implemented and monitored'' that is at issue when 
determining if trustees have met the appropriate standard of prudence. Pension Commission of Ontario, 
PCO Bulletin (May 1990) 1(2) at 12. 
3116 Scargill, ibicl.. at 763. 
307 Baltimore, supra note 285. 
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In most cases, the best interests of the beneficiaries are their best financial 
interests3°8 but it is not imprudent to consider factors other than rate of return so long as 
there are alternative investments available with similar risk and return profiles and the 
fund can remain appropriately diversified.309 It is also not necessarily imprudent to incur 
additional costs in implementing an investment policy that considers factors other than 
market rates of return, so long as the implementation costs are relatively insignificant in 
comparison with the size of the fund.310 In implementing an "alternative" investment 
policy, it is prudent for trustees to canvass the interests of beneficiaries. 
In short, pension fund trustees are able to consider investment criteria other than 
market rate of return, so long as market rate of return is the paramount or primary 
consideration. While trustees may consider other criteria such as a company's labour and 
environmental practices or-the human rights records of countries that a corporation 
operates in, generally they can only screen or divest their investments if alternative 
investments exist providing market rate of return and risk factors that are similar to the 
screened investment. 
Fiduciary Duty Constraints 011 Pension_ Fund Activists' I11vestment Strategies 
The '"socially transformative" impact of investment practices being pursued by 
labour movement pension activists is limited by these fiduciary duty constraints. Pension 
fund investment policies generally include provisions indicating that market rates of 
return are the paramount investment decision-making criterion, and that trustees can 
308 Scargill, supra note 255; Harries, supra note 293. 
309 Baltimore,supranote 285. 
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deviate from the investment policy if it would be (financially) imprudent to follow it. 
Practices such as shareholder activism. screening and economically targeted investing, 
often referred to collectively as socially responsible investment (SRI), can be pursued as 
long as the rate of return to the fund is not negatively affected. 
Further evidence of the concern with market rate of return is the fact that many 
commentators recommend that trustees developing investment policies which include 
SRI take some additional prudence measures to ensure they are protected from liability if 
returns are less than anticipated. These measures include obtaining the input and consent 
of plan participants, and providing on-going information to plan participants about the 
policies and investment returns.m ~us any investment practice that has the potential to 
increase the risk of reducing the pension payout must be undertaken only with the 
informed consent of plan members who are willing either to take a reduced pension, or to 
increase pension fund contnoutions to offset the loss. 
Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activists need to be concerned that their shareholder proposals will 
not negatively impact the company and share value. The proposals have to be carefully 
framed as being designed to improve shareholder value. For example, recent shareholder 
proposals coordinated by SHARE and supported by a number of shareholders including 
the Canadian Labour Congress Staff Pension Plan and the Regime Complementaire de 
310 Ibid. 
m M.O. Hylto~ "Socially Responstble Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market" 
[1992142.Am.. U.L.Rev. l at48-49;Tomassini,supranote 246at323 &325. 
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screens. In developing and implementing these screens prudence standards require tha4 
in the vast majority of cases, financial interests must be of primary concern to the 
trustees, and they must ensure that the pension funds remain appropriately diversified.316 
Thus, trustees must have discretion to deviate from their screens if their effect would be 
detrimental to the fund's rate of return or its diversification. 
This limits the ability of trustees to consistently apply the screen to all investments 
and moderates the effectiveness of screening as a means to influence corporate behaviour. 
Indeed, trustees implementing screens have acknowledged the moderate nature of the 
type of corporate reform that their screens encourage. As Terry Moore, a trustee of the 
Ontario Public Service Employees Union(OPSEU) Staff Pension Plan, stated in materials 
that were part of a presentation to the CLC National Pension Conference in February 
2001: 
We are under no allusion (sic) that the use of ethical screening will in any 
fundamental sense change the nature of capital or capitalist behaviour. But we 
believe that ethical screening can be part of a political process to educate union 
members and the public about specific aspects of corporate behavior and to help 
mobilize members against those practices.317 
Advocates ofBest-ot.Sector screening would argue that it both ensures that 
pension funds remain adequately diversified, and provides a greater incentive to 
corporations in a particular sector to improve their practices than does an investor boycott 
31S "Proxy Vote at Sears Canada", ibicl. 
316 As noted in Harries,. supra note 293 and Withers, supra note 259 there are rare instances where this is 
not the case. 
317 T. Moore,. "OPSEU Staff Pension Plan Ethical Screening Experience" Materials distn'buted to support 
presentation as part of Panel: "Ethical Screening ofW orkplace Pensions: Some Union Experience'' 
(Canadian Labour Congress National Pension Conference, 5 February 200 I) at 3. [copy on file with 
author]. 
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of the entire sector. On the other hand, the fact that prudence standards make it difficult 
for Canadian institutional investors to boycott entire sectors, means that if the standards 
that are being screened for, such as environmental or labour standards, are uniformly low 
across the sector, funds may find themselves investing to a certain extent in the "best of 
bad lot" and providing little incentive for corporations to improve their standards. 
Trustees interested in implementing screening policies often obtain member 
consent before implementing the screen. For example, trustees of the OPSEU Staff 
Pension Plan, which incorporates a "labour screen" into its investment decision-making, 
consulted members about divesting from South Africa and developing the screen. As one 
of the trustees explained, "[w]e went to the membership at an AGM; we wanted their 
consent and we got a vote on screening out investments to South African and anti-union 
companies with 95% of members in favour. Then, .•• we asked for an ongoing tracking 
of our screen to measure the economic impact on the plan."118 The OPSEU Staff Pension 
Plan's labour screen assigns positive or negative points to criteria ranging from 
unionization, diversity, investment in the community, the labour environment and 
provision of employee benefits. Aspects of these criteria are given positive and negative 
ratings and investment is limited to those corporations that receive a certain combined 
rating.319 
It is also worth noting that the institutional investors that do engage in some form 
of investment screening tend to be a small subset of the institutional investor community, 
3ut T. Moore, Trustee, OPSEU StaffUnion Pension Plan quoted in Worker Control and Social Investment.,. 
supra note 176 at 102. 
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often with religious or political interests. In its Canadian Social Investment Review 2000, 
the Social Investment Organization found that most of the funds managed by investment 
management companies that are screened in some manner are managed on behalf of 
"religious institutions, pension plans, particularly union trusteed pension plans, public 
institutions such as universities and hospitals, and foundations."320 [t is not surprising 
then that union staff plans and church staff pension plans with a relatively small number 
of highly politicized members, such as the OPSEU Staff Pension Plan, appear to be the 
most active funds in terms of investment screening. 
In 1988 the provincial legislature in Ontario stepped in to add additional 
protection to trustees who implemented screens for South African investments with the 
support of plan participants. The South African Trust Investments Act,m which was 
repealed in 1997 following the end of apartheid in South Africa, stated that trustees who 
complied with the Act would not be in breach of their fiduciary duties for divesting from 
South Africa or refusing to invest in South Africa. Section 3 of the Act provided that: 
Despite the Trustee Act or any other law, a trustee who acts in accordance with 
this Act and in a reasonably prudent manner does not commit a breach of statutory 
or other legal duty by, 
(a) disposing of a South African investment even if the value of the property for 
which the trustee is responsible decreases or fails to increase sufficiently as a 
result; or 
(b) refusing to acquire a South African investment.322 
319 
"Some Union Experience'', supra note 188. 
320 Social In.vestment Organizatio~ Canadian Social Investment Review 2000: A comprehensive survey of 
socially responsible investment in Canac/a (Toronto: Social Investment Organization, 2000) at 9 
[hereinafter Social Investment Review 2000}. 
321 R.S.O. 1990, c. S-16. Repealed by An Act to simplifY processes and to improve efficiency in the 
Ministry of the Attorney General,. S.O. 1997,. c. 23,. s. 12. 
322 lbid., s. 3. (emphasis added]. 
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The legislation required that trustees of funds with more than 100 beneficiaries 
had to determine that the majority supported these actions, with a further stipulation that 
this majority had to have a ''combined beneficial interest'' in more than half of the trust 
assets. For trusts with fewer beneficiaries, trustees had to give written notice of their 
investment plans to all of them. If they did not receive a notice of opposition within 60 
days from the majority of beneficiaries with a combined beneficial interest in more than 
50 percent of trust assets, the trustees could proceed.323 
Economically Targeted or Community Investment 
Trustees considering developing or investing in economically targeted or 
community investment proj~cts, must ensure that the primary consideration in deciding to 
do so is the rate of return to the fund, factoring in the risks associated with the 
investment. Thus consideration of collateral benefits such. as the creation of affordable 
housing or a better living environment, the creation of jobs for pension plan members or 
others, or encouraging a productive economy, must be secondary. Thls is particularly 
problematic in the context of investments that have a collateral benefit of either creating 
work for existing plan participants, or creating new jobs and consequently new plan 
members, since the potential increase in contributions to the fund is not considered as part 
of the "investment return" when considering whether to invest in the project. Prudence 
standards would appear to make it difficult for trustees to factor in contn'butions to the 
323 /bicl, SS. 4(2) & 4(3). 
91 
fund that ''depend on the employment of participants" in assessing the rate of return to the 
pension fund.324 
Thus the constraints placed on trustees by traditional trust law prudence standards 
in the context ofinvesting in economically targeted or community development projects 
reveal a larger limitation of the application of trust law standards of prudence. Namely, 
these standards were created to regulate the investment ofincome derived from an initial 
allocation of capital to a trust, while pension trusts funds receive two streams of income, 
ongoing income from contributions by employers and employees,325 and the income from 
fund investments. As Ghilarducci points out 
[R]egulators have treated pension funds like any other kind of trust whose only 
income source is investment returns •.. The fiduciary's duty ••. was to obtain risk-
adjusted maximum rates of return in capital markets regulators viewed as "free" 
and "efficient." Yet pension funds also obtain a substantial amount of income 
from contributions.326 
Rethinking Returns: Challenging Market Conceptions of Value 
Although trustees' fiduciary duties require the primary investment criterion to be 
financial - the risk-adjusted market rate of return - some commentators argue that the 
investment practices pursued by labour movement pension fund activists in fact have the 
long-term effect of increasing shareholder value and the market rate of return.327 Thus "a 
prudent financial evaluation of any particular investment or investment policy may 
324 
''U.S. Pension InvestmentPolicy'~~supra note 47at10. 
325 Unless there is a contnl>utfon holiday. 
326 
"U.S. Pension Investment Policy'·~ supra note 47 at 10. 
327 See The Just Pensions Project. Just Pensions: Socially Responsible Investment and International 
Development: A Guide for Trustees anti Funtl Managers (May 2001). online: 
<http://www.justpensions.org/'.n'!> at 5; ''New LabourSbareholderOrganizatfon-n> supra note 197 at 8; J_ 
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include, and may require, consideration of many social factors such as labour stability, 
environmental performance and other social or ethical values."328 Regardless of whether 
these practices increase shareholder value and rate of return, the fact remains that 
investment decisions are still made within a framework in which value continues to be 
measured by market rates of return. The social, political or economic benefits of 
particular investments can be considered, but an investment can only be made if these 
benefits either enhance the market rate of return, or provide a reason for preferring the 
particular investment over others with similar risk-adjusted market rate of return 
expectations. 
Many supporters of pension fund activism had higher hopes for the strategies. 
They hoped that they could be used to challenge market rates of return as the exclusive 
measurement of value and to develop criteria that provided a more accurate picture of 
investment returns - both market and social. Criteria such as job creation, environmental 
and community sustainability, and real productivity, would all be considered as part of 
such a new conception of value.329 
One of the reasons trustees have been restricted to making investment decisions 
within a framework in which value continues to be measured by market rates of return is 
connected to the most widely accepted equity portfolio management theory-modem 
portfolio theory. Modem portfolio theory underpins an investment approach which 
Frooman. .. Socially Irresponsible and illegal behaviour and shareholder wealth: a meta-analysis of event 
studies'' (1997) 36(3) Business ana Society 221; Yaro~ supra note 198 at 308, 354-56. 
328 Tomassini,. supra note 246 at 324-25. 
329 Labors Capital, supra note 40 at 115. 
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requires those managing investment funds such as pensions to construct a portfolio with a 
range of investments types and risks: ''the theory combines speculative and "safe" 
. 
investments in an effort to generate consistent portfolio gains."330 .According to modem 
portfolio theory, the only accepted investment criteria are risk and return. 
The final part of this section provides an overview of modem portfolio theory and 
its limitations as a measurement of "true" rates of return, and examines approaches to rate 
of return criteria that arguably provide a more comprehensive picture of investment 
returns - both market and social. 
Modern Portfolio Theory331 
The assumptions of modem portfolio theory ••• prevent social investment and 
economic innovation. Conversely, investments with serious social risks cannot be 
opposed on social grounds.332 
Trustees must ensure that pension fund investments are adequately diversified and 
that their investment strategies reflect accepted portfolio management practice. In the 
area of equity investments, modem portfolio theory (MPT) underpins investment practice, 
and while it developed as a theory to guide stock market investing, it also appears to be 
applied to other types of assets held by investment funds.333 
MPT focuses on two types of risk, umarket" risk and uspecific'' risk. As the name 
suggests, market risk is associated with overall market conditions. This ''type of risk rises 
and falls in direct response to general economic conditions that affect the entire 
330 W .B. Phillips. Jr ... Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Prudent Investment Under the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts" (1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 335 at 348. . 
33 t This overview draws on the following: Ibid. at 347-53; Worker Control and Social Investment.,. supra 
note 176 at 36-57; and ''U.S. Pension Investment Policy". supra note 47. 
332 Worker Control and Social Investment.,. ibfd. at40. 
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market."334 This contrasts with the specific risk of an individual investment producing 
less than expected returns, and the effect of this risk on overall portfolio returns. Trustees 
can mitigate the effects of specific risks by building a diversified portfolio that resembles 
the overall market. This portfolio will be more vulnerable to market risk than specific 
risks, since a diversified portfolio will reduce the potential impact of more speculative 
investments on the overall portfolio while allowing trustees to potentially improve the 
overall rate of return with the purchase of such investments. Under this approach though, 
the only investment criteria that can be considered are market risk and return:335 ••an 
efficient portfolio offers the maximum return for a given average level of risk •.•• The 
risk is the variance of an asset's expected return around a norm in comparison to a low-
risk benchmark like cash or treasury bills."336 
fuvesbnent diversification makes intuitive sense in terms of"not putting all one's 
eggs in the same basket." But MPT and its focus on risk and return is built on perfect 
capital market theory which assumes that .. every invesbnent' s return compensates for its 
risk and the only way to reduce risk without sacrificing return is to diversify well."337 It 
also assumes that markets are inherently efficient and allocate resources to the most 
productive investments; that investments are priced to accurately reflect the value of a 
company based on freely available information about the investment and its risk; and that 
every investor has an equal effect on the capital markets. 
333 Barber&. Ghilarducci, supra note 61 at 292. 
334 Phillips, supra note 330 at 349. 
335 
.. U.S. Pension lnvestment Polic~, supra note 47 at 5. 
336 Worker Control anti Social Investment, supra note 176 at 39. 
337 Barber&. Ghilarducci.. supra note 61 at 304. 
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As numerous economists have shown, this is simply not the case. In the context 
of pension fund investment practices, commentators have identified a number of flaws in 
these assumptions. First, pension funds are simply too large to have a "neutral impact" 
on financial markets.ns Second, pension capital is flowing to speculative, short-term 
investments rather than long-term productive ones.339 Third, the existence of capital gaps, 
investment opportunities that have somehow been passed over by the market, undermines 
the notion of a perfectly efficient market.340 And fourth, capital markets are not free, 
unfettered entities, they are "creatures of comprehensive regulation designed to steer 
capital markets toward particular social needs."341 
Perfect capital market and modem portfolio theory present an approach to 
investment value which focuses on narrow financial criteria of risk and return and 
exclude other factors such as a corporation's human capital, research and development 
capabilities, or an investment's ability to create jobs or other social benefits such as 
housing. This approach also makes it difficult to invest in a new or innovative industry 
without a rate of return history.34i. In short, MPT's assumptions about the market and 
appropriate investment criteria mean common investment practice excludes criteria other 
than risk and return, and seriously limits the possibility that investment returns provide an 
accurate picture of both market and social rates of return. These assumptions also limit 
338 
"U.S. Pension Investment Policy''. supra note 47 at 8; Worker Control ancl Social Investment, supra note 
l 76 at 54; ••Institutional investors'\ supra note 22 at 103-104. 
339 
·v.s. Pension Investment Policy", ibicl; Hebb, supra note 60; ••fnstitutional investors, ibicl at l05-l06. 
340 
··u.s. Pension Investment Policy", ibicl at 6; Barber & Gbilarducci, supra note 61 at 286. 
341 
·v.s. Pension Investment Policy''~ ibid. at 5. 
342 Worker Control anti Social Investment, supra note 176 at 40 & 49. 
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the possibility that investment practice will always allocate capital to its most productive 
uses. 
Searching for the Truth: Alternative Approaches to Rate of Return Measurement 
Pension funds are not dead trusts that are passively sustained by investment 
income. They are dynamic organisms that feed on investment, income, and 
jobs.3u 
Critics ofMPT and its focus on rate and return suggest that investors need an 
evaluative approach that allows them to consider the social benefits of their investments 
in financial terms. Barber and Ghilarducci, for example, argue that although MPT can be 
used as part of the investment decision-making process, "it provides an insufficient 
framework from which to make investment decisions or to regulate pension funds' 
financial behaviour."344 They are interested in facilitating greater pension fund 
investment in economically targeted investment, which they argue can be undertaken 
without reducing investment returns. They propose a ''whole participant" approach to 
pension fund investment which takes into account the fact that plan members are both 
future recipients and current workers. Thus pension investments should look to 
sustaining a strong economy to keep plan members working and contributing to the fund, 
and ensure investment income continues to grow.34s 
They argue that current pension investment criteria put the interests of retirees 
ahead of other plan members.:w6 Instead they suggest that in addition to risk and return 
343 
'U.S. Pension Investment Policy'', supra note 47 at 10. 
344 Barber & Gbilarducci, supra note 61 at 309. 
34s Ibid. at287. 
346 Ibid. at 309; "U.S. Pension Investment Policy''. supra note 47 at 9. 
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criteria, trustees should broaden the range of investment considerations to include the 
effect of investment decisions on all plan members, both retirees and those currently 
employed, and on the economy generally. They argue that this is well within trustees' 
fiduciary duties ofloyalty and prudence and that "it should s•erve to broaden fiduciaries' 
range of tools to meet their duty."347 
Barber and Ghilarducci write in the United States where the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)348 governs the investment practices of 
private-sector pension plans, the vast majority of pension plans. They suggest that the 
Department of Labor (DOL), which enforces ERISA, should clarify that trustees can 
consider the effects ofinvestments on all plan members and the economy in general, and 
further, that DOL should develop regulations to assist trustees in evaluating, 
benchmarking and monitoring the performance of economically targeted investments. 
This process would incorporate the collateral benefits that are presumed to accrue to plan 
members and the economy in general, to achieve a prevailing rate of retum.349 
Ghilarducci and Barber however, offer few suggestions as to how to actually quantify 
these collateral benefits in financial terms. 
Isla Carmichael, a Canadian researcher, has sought to develop mechanisms to do 
this. Her doctoral dissertation, Union Pension Funds. Worker Control and Social 
Investment in Canada: Implications for Labour Education, assesses the returns, both 
347 Barber & Ghilarducc~ ibid. 
348 29 U.S.C. §§ lOO l et seq. (l988). Public sectorpfans are regulated by municipal, county and state 
legislation,. but have generally adopted ERISA prudent investment standards. /bid. at 292-93. 
349 Barber&Gbilarducci, ibid. at309. 
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market and social, on pension fund investments in Concert Properties and Mortgage Fund 
One, a real estate development company and mortgage trust company respectively, 
created through the pooling of a number of union pension fund investments. Concert 
employs only union labour, and Mortgage Fund One's loan conditions require the 
employment of union labour. 
Carmichael developed social accounting models designed to assess the social 
benefits in financial terms, and evaluate an investment's capacity for productive growth 
and long-term sustainability. Her model utilized an accounting approach known as value 
added accounting. Popular in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it 
defines income (or value) more broadly than traditional accounting to include income 
generated for all stakeholders, not just for shareholders.3so 
Value added accounting generates financial statements that indicate the net 
income or "total value" created by a company, and how it is distributed to all the parties 
who have an interest in the corporation's productivity and wealth creation such as: 
employees, through wage and benefits; governments, through taxes net of government 
grants; creditors and shareholders, through interest payments and dividends; and the 
corporation itself, through reinvestment in the business through depreciation costs and 
retained profits.351 The percentage change for each category can be measured on a yearly 
basis, allowing measurement of the long-term sustainability of the enterprise. In 
350 Gary Meek and Sidney Gray discuss the history of the development and use of the value added statement 
in the United Kingdom in "The Value Added Statement:: An Innovation for U.S. Companies'Z" Accounting 
Horizons (June 1988) 73. 
m For a sample of a value added statement see Ibid. at 76. 
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comparison, in traditional income statements, employee wages, benefits and training are 
subsumed into operating costs, and dividends and taxes are deducted from the 
corporation's total (gross) profits.352 
For pension funds, value added accounting provides a mechanism to value 
productive growth and to monitor the potential for company sustainability over the long-
term. Other factors that contribute to productive growth and sustainability such as worker 
training programs, research. and development initiatives or risk management plans can 
also be included as, for example, reinvestments in the business. They could also be 
depreciated over a number of years. This contrasts with traditional accounting practice 
which would deduct these costs from earnings in the year the expenses are incurred, thus 
setting them up as costs that reduce reported corporate earnings and ultimately reduce 
shareholder value.353 
Carmichael uses two social accounting models that adapt the value added 
accounting framework to calculate the benefits of investment by pension funds in Concert 
Properties and Mortgage Fund One. The first accounting model looks at the net benefits 
of the investment to pension fund stakeholders: plan members as workers through job 
creation, the fund itself: through increased contributions and dividends, and government 
352 Worker Control and Social Investment,. supra note 176at120-23. 
353 This raises an important point about the ways in which accounting is not a neutral, objective process but 
is in fact infused with biases,. social noons and political choices. Carmichael provides an overview of the 
''growing literature asserting that accounting not only descnees or reflects but also affects institutions in the 
social,. corporate,. financial and global arenas through its interpretative role in re-creating reality:• For 
example,. traditional accounting valuations of corporations cost capital investments such as equipment or 
buildings over a period of years,. while-other investments such as research and development or worker 
training are deducted from earnings in the year the cost is incurred. All of these investments are 
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through increased tax revenue net of foregone taxes on pension contributions. In essence, 
this model operationalizes Barber and Ghilarducci's ''whole participant approachn 
outlined above, except that it does not quantify the benefits or costs to the economy in 
general. 
Carmichael's second model is designed to measure the financial and social 
benefits or costs ofthe investment to thewidercommunity. It uses multipliers from an 
Input-Output Model developed by the Analysis and Evaluation Branch, Ministry of 
Finance, British Columbia with assistance from Statistics Canada designed to assess 
economic impacts, and looks at some of the same variables considered in the first social 
accounting method but in a different context.m 
The value of the jobs created is linked to the benefits which accrue from the type 
of work performed, in this case constructing rental and market housing, and the direct and 
indirect effects of job creation. Here for example, the social value of creating rental 
housing in Vancouver can be factored into the accounting, since it was highly unlikely 
that it would have been built by other real estate development companies.355 Multipliers 
are also used to calculate the indirect jobs created o~site from Concerts projects, and the 
projects' contributions to increased productivity in the community, and the taxes raised 
for all levels of govemment.356 These benefits can be compared with the total costs of 
Concerts projects to determine the social costs or benefits of the investment( s ). 
investments in the present and future value of a company, yet only the capital expenditures are depreciated 
over a period of years. Ibid. at 112; See generally 11 l-l8. 
354 Multipliers can be used to estimate economic interdependence. See discussion in/bid. at 241--43. 
lSS /bid. at 264. 
356 Ibid. at241-45;264-66. 
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This second social accounting model allows consideration to be given to the 
collateral benefits of an investment to the larger community, instead of restricting it to the 
collateral benefits to plan members alone. Yet, while the second social accounting model 
provides a technique for evaluating an investment and calculating its social costs or 
benefits to the larger community in financial terms, it seems unlikely that in the absence 
oflegislative protections, trustees could u~e such accounting alone in making their 
investments. Carmichael recognizes this, suggesting that a more politically palatable and 
incremental approach might have pension funds report on the social and economic 
benefits of their fund investments.357 This could be done voluntarily or instituted as a 
legal requirement. In Britain, recent amendments to the occupation pension plan 
regulations require all funds to disclose the extent to which they consider social, 
environmental or ethical criteria in the investment policy.35s While this is not a formal 
social accounting requirement, it does indicate that socially responsible pension 
investment practices can be supported by government action. 
Even Carmichael's first accounting model and the suggestions by Barber and 
Ghilarducci for operationalizing a '"whole participant approachn which combine 
traditional risk and return criteria with the evaluation of collateral benefits:t would be 
difficult to use on their own in the absence of regulatory changes:t unless they were used 
simply to compare investments with similar risk adjusted return expectations. 
Carmichael's classification of the government as a plan stakeholder also raises some 
357 lbitL at267. 
102 
questions. She justifies the classification of the government as a plan stakeholder because 
of the tax subsidies it gives to pension plan contributions and the regulatory role it has 
over pension plans. However, it appears that the government's interests would be more 
properly considered in the second accounting model as part of the benefits of investments 
to the wider community. It is worth pointing out that Barber and Ghilarducci' s proposal 
is made within the context of a number of proposals for legislative reform designed to 
regulate pension fund investment and to reform financial markets so that resources are 
better allocated to productive 1u:es. Carmichael also calls on the government to institute 
regulatory changes to encourage economically targeted pension fund investments. 
It seems clear then that the hopes of pension fund activists that their investment 
strategies could be used to challenge market rates of return as the exclusive measurement 
of value and to develop criteria that provide a more accurate picture of true rates of return 
-both market and social - are unlikely to be realized in the absence of regulatory reform. 
At best, these evaluative approaches allow for the comparison of investments with similar 
risk adjusted return expectations, a modest reform. I will return to the question of larger, 
more systemic and radical reforms to pension fund investment practices in the fifth 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
Current pension law theory and practice limit some of the ideas and ideals that 
underpin strategies of pension fund activism_ In particular the claims that pension funds 
358 The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment~ and Assignment. Forfeiture~ Bankruptcy etc..) 
Amendment Regulations, SJ_ 1999/1849. 
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are "workers' capital" representing their ndeferred" wages, and that greater worker or 
union involvement in investment decisions could allow for consideration of criteria other 
than market rate of return, are affected by pension law principles and practice. In the 
absence of regulatory reform, pension law theory and practice reduce the transformati ve 
potential of the investment strategies pursued by pension fund activists to moderate 
progressive reform proposals. Pension fund trustees can implement social and political 
investment screens, pursue shareholder activism or engage in economically targeted 
investing, so long as the rate of return to the fund is not negatively affected. They can 
also report on the economic and social costs of their investments, or require the 
corporations they invest in to do the same. 
The next chapter examines corporate law theory and practice and their 
implications for pension fund activists' strategies. In particular, it looks at the uncertainty 
in corporate law about the legal nature of the share, which mediates the relationship 
between the shareholder and the corporation, and the contradictions that exist within 
modem corporate law between separate corporate personality doctrine on the one hand 
and shareholder ownership "rights" on the other. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
CORPORATE LAW THEORY: THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER 
OWNERSIDP 
It used to be the left who emphasized the limits to capitalism and the right who 
told us of its adaptability. Now, however, it is the right, ... who candidly stress 
the incompatibility of workers rights and welfare states with the elementary laws 
of capital (presented, of course, as .. natural"), while the (erstwhile) left is reduced 
to insisting on the malleability and improvability ofboth capitalism and its 
corporations.359 
Introduction 
Strategies of pension fund activism rely heavily on assumptions about the power 
and influence of pension funds as shareholders of the corporations they invest in. Pension 
fund activists argue that pension funds can and should use their shareholding powers to 
influence the behaviour of these corporations. Whether they are advocating for greater 
shareholder activism, involvement in proxy voting, investment screening, or 
economically targeted investing, a central assumption about corporations that underpins 
pension fund activists' strategies is that shareholders ''own" the companies they invest in. 
A comprehensive guide to Canadian employee benefits, for example, states that 
shareholders have the right to vote on corporate governance matters ''because [they] are 
the corporation's owners."360 
This chapter argues that the uncertainties in corporate law about the legal nature 
of the share and shareholding, along with the contradictions between separate corporate 
personality doctrine on the one hand and shareholder ownership nrights" on the other 
create uncertain foundations for corporate governance reform proposals that rely on ideas 
359 "Citizenship"~ supra note 202 at 26. 
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of"shareholderownership." This raises questions about the potential of pension fund 
activist strategies to temper corporate behaviour and improve corporate governance, so 
long as these strategies are built on assumptions about the power of shareholder 
ownership. 
The Historical Development of the Modern Corporation 
The corporation and corporate law as we know it, in which the corporation has a 
separate corporate legal personality and a large number of shareholders, each with limited 
liability, have their origins in the ''joint stock company" and joint stock company law. 
originally a branch of partnership law}61 In the eighteenth century, "the formative period" 
of modem English partnership law,362 corporate law was essentially concerned with 
partnerships. Importantly, it distinguished between two types of corporate investor -
lenders who provided money to a corporation, and partners whose investments were tied 
up in, or used in the production process with no guarantee of return. 
The legal rights accorded each type of investor was determined by the nature of 
their investment returns rather than their involvement in the management of the company. 
Lenders, since they received a guaranteed return on their investment (the money capital 
plus interest), were understood to stand outside the corporation and its management. 
Partners, who received a share of the corporate profits, were dependent on the fortunes of 
the company for their returns and therefore had more risk attached to their investmen~ 
360 G.P. Dzuro et al., .. Pension Funds as Shareholders'' in Koskie et al .• supra note 205, 286 at286. 
361 P. Ireland, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" ( l999) 62 Mod. L. Rev. 32 at 38 
[hereinafter .. Shareholder Ownership'1-
362 /bid. at37. 
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were understood as insiders and were presumed by the law to be involved in the 
management of the company.363 At both common law and equity,364 partners had an 
interest in partnership assets and were liable for partnership debts.365 
This distinction reflected to a large extent the economic reality facing lenders and 
partners at the time, and in fact continues to make sense for modem day partnerships. 
However, its application to the development of the joint stock company shareholder and 
the joint stock company, the precursor of the modem corporation, has created a number of 
theoretical and practical difficulties within modem corporate law. 
Joint stock companies were originally considered a form of partnership, albeit a 
rather large one, and were referred to as ''extended" or "public" partnerships. What 
distinguished them from other forms of partnership was their larger than average number 
of shareholders, the relative inactivity of the shareholders in the management of the 
company,366 and the freely transferable nature of their shares. 
363 Ibid. 
3
.s. Conunon law is the body oflaw that develops over time through judicial decision making rather than by 
statute. Equity is a system of justice administered according to rules of fairness and natural justice in a 
particular situation, rather than the stricter rules of common law or statutes. Equity's object is to ''render the 
administration of justice more complete, by affording relief where the courts oflaw are incompetent to give 
i~ or to give it with effect." Black 's Law Dictionary, 6dt ed., s. v. ••equity". Decisions in equity supersede 
conflicting conunon law and statute-based decisions. In the eighteenth century, legal remedies could be 
sought in either courts of equity or courts of law. Today equitable and legal rights and remedies are 
available in the same court. Ibid. s.v • .. equity" and .. common law'". Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v • 
.. conunon law" and .. equity''. 
365 At common law they were understood to hold personal property of the partnership as tenants in common 
or joint tenants, and to hold partnership land as tenants in common. Partnership property was treated in. 
equity as ''though held by all the partners on trust to be used for the proper business purposes." 
"ShareholderOwnership," supranote36l at37-38. 
366 Ireland does comment though that"compared to their latter-day counterparts eighteenth and early 
nineteenth joint stock company shareholders took a much greater supervisory interest in. their in.vestments. 
Some companies even financially penalised proprietors who neglected to attend general meetings in person 
or by proxy." Ibid. at 4 l. 
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Like other forms of partnership they were understood to be aggregates of 
individuals rather than separate corporate entities.367 Even those joint stock companies 
that incorporated, an act which conferred some legal rights that other forms of 
partnerships did not have, including the creation of a separate legal entity, were not 
understood to be completely separated from their shareholders. ''There was, ..• no 
suggestion •.• that the separate corporate legal entity was an object completely emptied of 
people. On the contrary, incorporated companies were regularly conceptualised as their 
members merged into a legally distinct entity." Unlike many corporate law scholars, 
Paddy lreland, Ian Grigg-Spall and Dave Kelly argue that it was not the act of 
incorporation that ''was the source of complete separation"368 of the company and its 
shareholders, instead it was the development of the joint stock company share as a 
separate form ofproperty.369 Changes in the Companies Act in the nineteenth century 
simply reflected this development. 
The 'complete separation' of companies and their members, which emerged for 
the first time in the nineteenth century~ was reflected in the changed consequences 
attributed to incorporation9 but incorporation was not its source. This must be 
sought elsewhere, in the changing economic and legal nature of the joint stock 
company share.370 
Initially, despite the fact that joint stock company shares were understood to be 
freely transferable, they were linked to the company's assets and understood legally as 
367 lbicL at39. 
368 P. Ireland, "Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of the 
Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality" (1996) L Legal Hist.. 41 at 47 [hereinafter 
"Capitalism.'1-
369 P. Irelan~ L Grigg-Spall & D. Kelly, ''The Conceptual Foundations ofModem Company Law" (1987) 
14 J.L&Soc.149 atl5L See also/bid. 
370 Ireland, Grigg-Spall & Kelly;. ibitl.. 
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equitable interests in them, in the same way that shares in smaller partnerships were 
linked to partnership assets.371 Ireland points out that even at this early stage, the 
characterization of shareholders as both the company and the owners of its assets was 
somewhat tenuous.m At the time, though, the absence of well developed public share 
markets meant joint stock company shareholders were often unable to sell their shares. 
Thus there was originally a "material basis for the assertion of a property nexus between 
shareholders and the company's assets"373 since shareholders' capital could be tied up in 
the productive assets of the company for long periods oftime.374 
After 1825, though, the need for considerable amounts of capital for industrial 
enterprises such as the railway system led to an expansion in the size and number of joint 
stock companies, and in many industries they began to replace partnerships.375 The scale 
of investment, particularly in the railway system, also dramatically increased the number 
of joint stock company shares and shareholders.376 As a result, by mid-century a public 
market for joint stock company shares had developed, and the shares became assets that 
could easily be converted into money.377 
371 Ibid.. at 158. 
372
-"Shareholder Ownership". supra note 361 at 40. 
313 Ibid. 
314 lbid. 
375 Ibid.. at 41;- Rutherford. supra note 27, s.v-. "joint stock company''. 
376 At the time. commentators wrote of the increasing accesstl>ility of the stock market to the public in much 
the same way that the massive entry of individual investors and pension fundS (representing the average 
worker) into the stock market in the 1990s has been written about as a .. democratization''" of the stock 
market. For example, one commentator wrote that "[i]n. every street of every town, persons were to be 
found who were holders of railway shares. Elderly men. and women of small. realised fortunes. tradesmen 
of every order, pensioners, public functionaries. professional men. merchants. country gentlemen ••• the 
mania had affected a11:· T. Cooke & W. Newmarch.A History of Prices.- 183S-57, vol. v. at 234 quoted in 
"Capitalism'·. supra note 368 at65. 
377 Ireland. Grigg-Spall & Kelly, supra note 369 at 159. 
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By 1860, following a series of cases which considered the nature of shares in 
incorporated and unincorporated joint stock companies, shares were no longer understood 
to give the shareholder an equitable or legal interest in the company's assets_378 Instead 
they were understood to be themselves a form of property that could be freely sold and 
gave shareholders a right to a claim on the company's profits in the fonn of dividends. 
This evolving understanding served to separate joint stock company shares and 
shareholders from the company and its assets. Shareholders came to increasingly 
resemble money capitalists rather than industrial capitalists:379 
Their legal redefinition reflected not only the fact that they had become essentially 
rights to profit - in many instances, this had long been the case - but rights to 
profit with a value of their own which could be freely and easily bought and sold 
in the marketplace. With this, shareholders were no longer 'tied' to their shares, 
nor to the companies of which they were members or its assets.380 
This separation of joint stock company shareholder and company was further 
reinforced by a number of economic and legal developments which together "provided 
the foundations of the modem doctrine of separate personality."38 l Although many joint 
stock company shareholders bad not been particularly active participants in running the 
company (through attending general meetings, for example), the expansion of the public 
share market led to an even greater decline in these activities. For rather than owning 
378 The cases are reviewed in "Capitalfsm'', supra note 368 at 50-60. See also "Shareholder Ownership~, 
supra note 361at41,47 _ 
379 




directors, and in their actual powers. They were no longer understood to be directed and 
controlled by shareholders. Instead, they were understood to represent the company as an 
entity separate from the shareholders_ As this conceptual shift was occurring, the rights 
of shareholders to influence every day corporate management decisions diminished as 
powers exercisable by shareholders at a general meeting were transferred to corporate 
boards.38s 
Despite the intent oflegislators that they only apply to joint stock companies, the 
legislative changes between 1844 and 1862 compelling incorporation also permitted 
partnerships and sole proprietorships to incorporate and take advantage oflimited liability 
protections.389 This led to the emergence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries of the "private'' company, which is a company characterized by a small number 
of members/shareholders, limited share transferability, and the private raising of 
capital.390 In fact, Ireland argues that the significance of Sa/oman v. Salomon & Co.,391 
''was not so much its establishment, or confirmation, of the doctrine of separate 
personality, as modem texts often suggest, but its recognition of the validity under the 
Companies Acts of the 'private company' and the extension to them of the already 
established principle of 'complete separation' •392 
By century's end, the combination of joint stock company shareholders' limited 
liability, their more diversified share portfolios, their lack of involvement in management 
lSS fbjQ.. at43. 
389 
''Limited Liability''. supra note 383 at 24144_ 
390 lbicl. at244-55. 
391 (1897} A.C. 22 (H.L.). 
392 "Capitalism"~ supra note 368 at 45. 
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of the company, and the regular issuance of dividends had heightened the separation of 
shareholders from the company and its assets. These factors also meant that share 
purchases were no longer the highly speculative investments they had once been. Shares 
also began to have more mdebt-like features"'393 in that they increasingly provided a 
steady, predictable stream of income to the shareholder in the form. of dividends. 
These economic and legal changes set the stage for joint stock company law to 
develop from a branch of partnership law into its own separate bodyoflaw.394 And as the 
number of private companies increased, joint stock company law, designed to regulate 
''single entity, national companies whose shareholders had been relieved of any 
meaningful ownership function,"395 came to apply to most forms ofbusiness association 
from sole proprietorships and small private companies to large multinational companies. 
Effect on Modern Corporate Law 
The historical development of the joint stock company share from its origins as an 
equitable interest in corporate assets, to its emergence as a form. of property, and the 
corresponding shifts in the role of the shareholder from industrial capitalist to one more 
closely resembling the traditional money capitalist, explain a number of features of 
modem corporate law. First, it helps explain the corporate management responsibilities 
traditionally held by corporate directors, officers and shareholders. Directors manage the 
corporation, officers exercise management responsibilities delegated to them by the board 
of directors and, while shareholders are not directly involved in the management of the 
393 
.. Shareholder Ownership"~ supra note 361 at 45. 
394 Ibid. at43. 
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company, they elect the board of directors and vote on various proposals put before them 
at general meetings. "Under this breakdown, shareholders are essentially passive; they 
have no power to initiate action, to control management, or to act in relation to the 
ordinary business of the corporation except as specifically provided in the articles or by-
laws."396 
Second, while modem statute law in Canada has now abolished it,397 the doctrine 
of ultra vires, in prohlbiting acts outside the scope of the corporate memorandum and 
articles, even if approved by all shareholders, initially provided legal protection to the 
share and the shareholder, "stabilising the share •.• to enable more 'rational' decisions to 
be taken in the market by investors."398 In making some corporate decisions beyond even 
the unanimous consent of all shareholders, the doctrine also helped reinforce the 
corporation's separate legal personality.399 
And third, although the share as property removed the direct links between the 
shareholder and corporate assets, the shareholder (and the share) is still linked to the 
company's productive capital in ways that a lender, the traditional money capitalist, is 
not. The value of corporate shares is linked to the company's profits and, in theory, 
395 /bid. at 44. 
396 J.A. V anDuzer. The Law of Partnerships and Corporations (Concord: Irwin Law, 1997) at 183. 
397 A Canadian company is not required to descnl>e its activities in its articles of incorporation. Canada 
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, as am., s. 16(1) [hereinafter CBCA]. Moreovers. 16(3) 
provides that if a company does do somethfug that is contrary to its articles, the act is not invalid "by reason 
only that the act or transfer is contrary to its articles or tills Act." This protects third party interests. 
Shareholders can still use the oppression remedy provisions of the CBCA to seek relief from acts that are 
contrary to the articles ( s. 241 ). Alternatively, they can seek an order restraining the corporation from 
acting in contravention of the articles,. or directing that the corporation comply with the articles (s. 247). 
Ibid. at 72,. 126-27, 156 nl6. 
398 Ireland, Grigg-Spall & Kelly,. supra note 369 at 160. 
399 
"Shareholder Ownership'', supra note 361 at 43. 
should change with them. Incorporation memoranda provide mechanisms for the 
payment of share dividends and for the repayment of capital when the corporation is 
wound-up:'00 
At the same time though, this continuing connection between the share and the 
productive assets of the corporation, and the limited residual shareholder .. ownership" 
rights that are preserved or enhanced by corporate law statutes and case law, raise 
questions about whether corporate law doctrine has fully recognized the implications of 
the development of both the share as property and separate corporate personality, 
particularly in the case of public companies. 
As Ireland points out this may also help explain why courts and commentators 
have such difficulties conceptualizing shares and shareholding. For example, the law and 
economics literature views the corporation as a nexus of contracts and focuses on the 
contractual rights (contained in the company's memorandum and articles) and statutory 
rights that a shareholder has against the company."0 L Despite the fact that proponents do 
not characterize shares as a debt, this focus on the share's contractual qualities highlights 
both the separation of the shareholder from the company, and the similarities between 
shareholders and the ordinary lender."02 
400 Irelan~ Grigg-Spall & Kelly, supra note 369 at 160. 
401 See B..R. Cbeffins. Company law: Theory. Structure and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
For an overview and critique of this approach see W .H. Simon, "Contract Versus Politics in Corporation 
Doctrine'' in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics oflmv: A Progressive Critique .. rev. ed. (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1990) 387; M. Stokes, .. Company Law and Legal Theory" in W. Twining, ed., legal Theory and 
Common law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 155. 
402 
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Another approach understands shares as property in themselves and as 
representing some sort of proprietary interest in the company, but not an interest in its 
assets. While clinging to the idea that the shareholder is a "member'' of the corporation, 
this approach does not explain what it is about the share and shareholding that entitles the 
shareholder to this membership.403 As Ireland points out, neither approach can explain the 
widespread assumption in corporate law that shareholders own the corporation. Nor can 
they adequately justify corporate law's continued theoretical separation of shareholders 
and debt-holders, in the face of their practical similarities.404 
The theoretical differences between a creditor of the company and being a 
member are considerable from a legal point of view, but (at least in the case of a 
solvent and prosperous company) the practical consequences for investors, apart 
sometimes from tax considerations, are very similar ... an investment in 
debentures or debenture stock is very similar to an investment in shares: both are 
securities in the corporate sector of the economy offering different kinds of risk 
and different kinds of return."05 
Ireland argues that modem corporate law has in fact "fail[ ed] to take separate corporate 
personality seriously enough."406 It upholds the separation of the company from its 
shareholders through strict enforcement of separate corporate personality doctrine and 
limited shareholder "ownership'' rights, while at the same time continuing to characterize 
shareholders as corporate uowners" or "members" despite a number of factors, including: 
the very separation of shareholder and corporation and the limited shareholder ownership 
rights that are reinforced by separate corporate personality doctrine; the historical roots of 
403 lbi<L at 4 7. 
"
04 H. Hovenkamp, .. The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought" (1988) 76 Geo. LJ. 1593 at 
1656-58. 
405 L.S. Sealy, Cases ancf Materials in Company Law (London: Butterworths, 6dt ed., 1996) at 420-21 cited 
in ''ShareholderOwnership''",supra note 361 at47. 
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the joint stock company share as a form of property in itself; and the tenuous connection 
between shares and company assets. This failure to take corporate personality seriously, 
or to place the modem corporation and share in its historical context, has important 
implications for strategies of pension fund shareholder activism. 
Shareholder Activism 
Modem corporate law's continued perpetuation of the idea that shareholders 
''own" the corporation, along with the fact that shareholders are perceived to be the 
. 
constituency who will be most affected by corporate governance practices,. explains why 
shareholders continue to be at the centre of debates about corporate governance reform. 
Two types of proposals for corporate governance reform have been built on assumptions 
about shareholder ownership of the corporation. The first asserts that shareholders need 
to exert more control and supervision over the corporation through practices such as 
shareholder activism and greater attention to proxy voting.407 The second type, often 
associated with proposals for a stakeholding approach to corporate governance, asserts 
that in addition to greater shareholder control and supervision, maximization of 
"shareholder valuen should not be the only goal of corporate governance reforms.401 
Since both approaches are built on assumptions about shareholder ownership of 
the corporation, proponents are "placed in the position of asking shareholders to 
give up some of the ownership rights, or of trying to persuade them to exercise 
406 
.. Shareholder Ownership'', ibid. at47-48. 
407 See e.g. I.P. Hawley&. A.T. Williams, The Rise of Ficluciary Capitalism: How lnstitutional Investors 
Can Make Corporate America More Democratic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2000). 
401 
.. Shareholder Ownership'', supra note 36l at 32. For examples of this second type of proposal see R. W. 
Ba~ .. Liberalism and Canadian Corporate Law" in R.F. Dev~ ed.. Canadian Perspectives on Legal 
Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 199 l) 75; I. Parkinson, "Company Law and Stakeholder 
Governance" in G. Kelly, D. Kelly&. A .Gamble, eds., Stakeholder Capitalism (Houndmills: Macmillan 
Press, 1997) 142. 
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them in particular ('socially responsible') ways, either by arguing that it will be in 
their own best long-term interests to do so, or by appealing to their altruism_""09 
Not only does the history of the share and shareholding, the separation of 
shareholders from the company and its productive assets, and the emergence of the 
corporation as a separate legal entity raise questions about the legal basis for such an 
appeal to shareholder ownership rights, but given the fact that shareholders and shares, 
particularly of public companies, are difficult to distinguisll from lenders (money 
capitalists) and forms of money capital, it appears that governance reforms that advocate 
for consideration of factors other than shareholder value are not likely to be successful, 
particularly for institutional shareholders sucll as pension funds that must give primary 
consideration to fmancial retum:"0 Moreover, when called upon to decide between the 
interests of shareholders and others with an interest in corporate activity sticll as workers 
or the community in which a corporation operates, the courts, illustrating Ireland's 
contention that modem corporate law has failed to take separate corporate personality 
seriously enough, "have consistently treated the interests of the corporation as virtually 
coextensive with the interests of sharebolders_"4 ll Consideration of the concerns and 
interests of other stakeholders cannot interfere with running the corporation for the 
shareholders' benefit_ 
On a practical level, while traditional shareholder rights to elect directors and vote 
on proposals put before them have been somewhat enhanced by corporate legislation, 
409 
.. Shareholder Ownership~. ibid. ·at 33. 
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these ''ownership" rights are still relatively narrowly defined and provide limited 
opportunity for involvement in more direct management of the day to day affairs of the 
corporation. In Canada for example, the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA)"12 
has enhanced the matters about which shareholders can vote. Shareholders must approve 
fundamental changes to the corporation such as changes to the corporate articles and by-
laws; the sale, lease or exchange of significant corporate property unless in the ordinary 
course ofbusiness; mergers; and the dissolution of the company.413 Shareholders can call 
meetings, make proposals to be discussed at shareholder meetings. and they can, by 
unanimous shareholder agreement, assume the powers of the board of directors.414 
Shareholders can also apply to the courts for a number of remedies in instances when 
directors abuse their powers. These actions include derivative actions, in which 
shareholders can bring an action on behalf of the corporation;us and an action seeking 
relief from the ''oppression" of shareholder interests by the directors' actions.416 
While these rights are designed to allow shareholders more influence, or the 
potential to influence, corporate management decisions, their focus on directors' 
management activities tends to ignore the reality that in public corporations unless the 
directors themselves hold senior management positions, they are not generally involved in 
"high-level management activities such as setting business objectives and policy, 
412 Supra note 397. Most provincial corporate statutes are very similar to the CBCA model. Ibid. at 71. 
413 CBCA, ibid.., ss. 173, 103,. 189(3),. 183, 21 l respectively. 
414 Ibid., s 106. 
415 Ibid.,. s. 239_ 
416 Ibid..,. s. 241. 
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choosing the senior management personnel, and closely supervising their activities,"417 
thus directors have little involvement in management decisions, particularly since 
shareholder proposals are unlikely to be binding on management:08 
ln addition, particularly in the context oflarge public corporations these enhanced 
"ownership" rights often provide little in the way of practical effect. Shareholder actions 
against directors are expensive and time-consuming. Shareholders may not have the 
expertise or the funds to hire professional advice to evaluate management's performance 
through measures other than share price. In addition, as was mentioned earlier, 
significant time and energy is needed to put together shareholder proposals, or to organize 
shareholders to take a position on a particular proposal or to elect a new board of 
directors:u9 
In 2001 for example, only40 shareholder proposals were submitted to Canadian 
public corporations:uo While this likely represents an increase in the number of 
shareholder proposals when compared to the early 1990s,421 it is worth noting that they 
were submitted by only eight shareholders. Of the 40 proposals, only the two which 
sought to make Sears Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company improve their codes of 
conduct, purchase contracts and monitoring with respect to labour standards addressed 
417 V anDuzer, supra note 396 at 187. 
418 Ba~ supra note 408 at 79-8 L 
419 VanDuzer, supra note 396 at 186. 
420 Shareholder Association for Research.and Education, Year 200 I slrareholder proposals submitted to 
Canadian corporations, online: Shareholder Association for Research and Education 
<http=l/www.share.ca/prox:y votingfseason_calendar.htm> [hereinafter Year 200 I slrarelrolder proposals]. 
m For example, a 1993 study or shareholder proposals submitted to 480 Canadian corporations found that 
only one proposal had been submitted in 1990, and none in 1991 and 1992. C. McCall & R. Wilson, 
"Shareholder Proposals: Why Not in Canada'?" (1993) 5:1 Corp. Governance. Rev. 12 at 12-13. 
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questions of socially responsible corporate management practices. As well, these two 
proposals were submitted by four of the eight shareholders. The other proposals 
submitted .by the remaining four focused on more traditional matters such as auditor 
independence, cumulative voting or disclosure of information about directors."22 
Not surprisingly, most pension fund proxy voting guidelines tend to focus on 
these traditional corporate governance matters}23 Even those pension funds that have 
adopted ethical investment guidelines as part oftheirproxyvoting guidelines have tended 
to frame these in terms of information disclosure rather than the prohibition or mandating 
of particular policies or practices. Tellingly, this is looked on favourably because it does 
not inappropriately limit corporate management behaviour: "disclosure requirements may 
highlight the importance of ethical considerations •.• and minimize the possibility of 
reputation damaging cover-ups. On the other hand, disclosure obligations themselves do 
not tend to be expensive to implement nor to rigidly constrain corporate activity."424 
Until recently, corporations did not have to circulate shareholder proposals that 
had as their primary purpose, upromoting general economic, political, racial, religious, 
social, or similar causes."425 This placed constraints on the matters that pension fund 
shareholder activists could bring forward for discussion at shareholder meetings, and the 
exclusion clause was used a number of times by corporations to prevent shareholders 
from circulating shareholder proposals related to corporate social and environmental 
422 Year 200 I shareholcler proposals, supra note 420. 
4"'..J Dzuro et aL. supra note 360 at 288. 
424 lbicl. at 295. 
425 CBCA, supra note 397, s. 137(5)(b). 
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practices:'26 The definition of'"solicitation" in the CBCA also made it difficult for 
shareholders to communicate with one another to coordinate shareholder proposals.427 
Organizations such as the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate 
Responsibility, Democracy Watch, and the Shareholder Investment Organization, have 
lobbied for changes to these provisions with some success. Recent amendments to the 
CBCA have, to some extent, relaxed these restrictions on shareholder proposals and 
communications. Under the amended legislation corporations can no longer refuse to 
circulate proposals whose primary purpose is "promoting general economic, political, 
racial, religious, social, or similar causes.'"'28 Instead they can only refuse to circulate a 
proposal if it ''does not relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of the 
corporation.'"'29 This wording is based on the language used in the United States. The 
definition of'"solicitation" has also been changed, making it easier for shareholders to 
communicate with each other about proposals (management and shareholder) without 
preparing a formal proxy circular.430 It remains to be seen how these changes will affect 
future shareholder proposals and activism. 
If the experience in the United States is any indication though, commentators 
point out that prominent public pension funds such as the California Public Employees 
Retirement System (CALPERS) which are advocates of increased shareholder activism, 
have tended to focus on traditional corporate governance issues such as increasing the 
426 Social lnvestment Review 2000, supra note 320 at 13. 
421 CBCA, supra note 397, s. 147. 
428 lbicl, s. 137(5}(b). 
429 An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Canada Cooperatives Act and to 
amend other Acts in consequence, S.C. 200 l .. c. 14 .. s. 59(3). 
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Fiduciary Capitalism 
For a number of reasons, many commentators have greeted the emergence of 
institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds as significant players in 
equity markets as heralding a positive change in terms of their potential to improve 
corporate governance, corporate behaviour and the economy generally:'34 For a number 
of reasons, pension funds in particular are seen to be at the forefront of this change. First, 
they are understood to represent long-term patient investment capital, with an interest in 
productive investment and long ratherthan short-term gains. Second, an increasing 
number of pension funds invest in pooled index funds, funds that hold all the securities in 
a major stock market price index such as the TSE 300.435 Both the pooled and indexed 
nature of the funds mean that investors cannot sell their shares in a particular corporation 
in the fund in order to object to management behaviour."'36 And third, particularly in 
Canada, the fact that pension funds hold significant blocks of shares in most of the 
country's corporations means they cannot easily sell their shares to protest management 
behaviour without risking a drop in share prices and the potential of significant 
433 T. Ghilarducc~ J.P. Hawley&. A.T. Williams, .. Labour's Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of 
Corporate Governance" (1997) 24 L L. &. Soc. 26 at 27-29; Henwood, ibicl; .. Shareholder Ownership, 
supra note 361 at SL 
434 See e.g. Hawley&. Williams, supra note 407; R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Watching tire Watchers: 
Corporate Governance for tire 2is' Century(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) at 156-57. 
435 Dzuro et al, supra note 360 at 286. 
436 Some larger pension funds have been able to negotiate investment management contracts in which their 
proxies are segregated from the rest of the fund and voted according to the pension funds' instructions. 
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investment loss.437 Nor are they always able to find an appropriate alternative investment 
in Canada's relatively small capital market. 
Commentators such as James Hawley and Andrew Williams characterize this shift 
in the nature and character of equity ownership as "fiduciary capitalism" because 
institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds act as fiduciaries for pension 
plan members and individual mutual fund investors.43g They suggest that institutional 
investors are ''universal owners" with an interest not only in ensuring that the 
corporations they invest in are well managed, but in ensuring that the economy as a whole 
is healthy and productive.439 This universal interest stems in part, they argue, from the 
fact that institutional investors as shareholders uown portfolios of equity and not 
individual firms.',,...0 This argument could also be made for individual investors, since 
they frequently hold a portfolio of mutual funds, or a portfolio of other market 
instruments. In light of this, it is difficult to see how institutional investors have a greater 
interest in a healthy productive economy than individual investors. 
Hawley and Williams argue that this universal ownership status allows 
institutional investors to capture both the positive and negative externalities created by 
individual firm behaviour. Positive externalities such as the benefits of workplace 
437 Dzuro et al.,. supra note 360 at 286; Hawley&. Williams, supra note 407 at xiv. It remains to be seen 
whether the introduction of new systems of trading designed to help institutional investors sell large blocks 
of shares will help reduce the effect of institutional investor trading. These new systems include an 
.. iceberg-order option" which breaks large orders into smaller blocks that are "automaticaliy fed into the 
order book one at a time," and the "call market" which allows trading oflarge blocks of stock without 
having a significant effect on market price. "TSE offering iceberg trade option" The Globe and Mail (12 
April 2002) B2. 
43s Hawley & Williams,. ibid. at xii. 
439 Ibid. at xv. 
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training and education programs are captured within the diversified portfolios of 
institutional investors even if employees change jobs, and, while negative externalities 
such as pollution may not be a cost to one firm, they will ultimately be a cost to another in 
its portfolio.441 "[I]t is in the economic interest of a universal owner to attempt to 
minimize the environmental damage of eacll of its firms since it will capture the long-
term and society-wide benefits, although specific firms in its portfolio will bear the costs 
of cleanup or restructuring to produce in more environmental-friendly modes.''442 
Moreover, they argue that universal owner status gives institutional investors an interest 
in public policy issues in areas outside traditional macroeconomic issues such as the 
environment, health, education, and other programs to build human and physical capital. 
They suggest that institutional investors have to recognize this interest and develop 
programs and policies that recognize the implications of their status as universal 
owners.443 
Their prescriptions for ways in which institutional investors can do this tend to 
focus on targeting the practices of individual corporations through strategies such as 
shareholder activism and proxy voting. They argue however, that in implementing these 
practices, universal owners have a duty to promote policies that encourage positive 
externalities which benefit the general economy such as the promotion of environmental 
standards or education and training programs, and to discourage those activities that 
""
0 Ibid. at 98. 
441 Although they acknowledge that the costs of the negative externalities may be imposed on other sectors 
of the economy such as individual citizens, their arguments tend to assume that the costs of the externalities 
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produce negative externalities, which they argue will ultimately become a cost to the 
universal owner. For "the size and the breath (sic) of their portfolio exposes them to 
economy-wide risks as well as positions them to receive economy-wide rewards.""""' 
Hawley and Williams state that institutional investors must ''begin a process of 
extending the definition of prudential fiduciary duty to include attention to the universal 
aspects of their portfolios."445 As they acknowledge, though, it appears unlikely that in 
the absence of government regulatory sanction, institutional investors, particularly 
pension funds, will be able to shift to a portfolio-wide approach to shareholder activism. 
If their actions as shareholders reduce a corporation's share value and hence reduce the 
investment return, institutional investors are unlikely to be comfortable that they are 
acting within the scope of their fiduciary duties, even if their actions may provide benefits 
to the larger economy and their overall investment portfolio:"'6 
More promising perhaps is Hawley and Williams' suggestion that institutional 
investors should become more involved in public policy issues such as education, health, 
communications infrastructure and the environment, with a goal to promote long-term 
sustainable growth and productivity: "a universal owner that really wants to maximize the 
shareholder value ofits portfolio would need to develop public policy-like positions and 
monitor regulatory developments and legislation on a number of key issues to the 
economy as a whole.'""'7 Indicating that every institutional investor does not have to 
443 Ibid. at xvi-xv. 
"""' Ibid. at 99 • 
.ws Ibid. at xvii. 
446 lbid. 
""
7 Ibid. at 170, xv-xvi, 98. 
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lobby the government, although they should not be precluded from doing so, they suggest 
that organizations representing institutional investors such as the Council of Institutional 
Investors"'"'8 in the United States should monitor and develop policy positions about these 
issues. 449 
This recognition that individual firm and economy-wide productivity are affected 
by wider public policy issues which cannot be addressed through the market echoes 
similar calls within the environmental and women's movement for greater attention to be 
paid to long-term environmental sustainability, or the relationship between unpaid social 
reproductive work and paid productive work. For example, there have been calls for 
measures of wealth such as a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to include 
measurements of unpaid social reproductive work and environmental wealth in addition 
to paid productive work."50 In Canada, the federal MinistryofFinance has indicated that 
it will work to develop environmental indicators to use in making economic and 
environmental policy.451 Proponents argue that inclusion of these factors and others could 
448 A Canadian equivalent might be the Pensions Investment Association of Canada. 
449 Hawley & Williams, supra note 407 at 170. 
450 J .A. Nelson, Feminism. Objectivity ancl Economics (London: Routledge, 1996) at l l9-20; Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation, The North American Mosaic: A State of the Environment Report 
(Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 200 l) at 7-8; A. Mitchell, .. GDP value must reflect 
eco-wealth, report says" The Globe ancl Mail (1 January 2002) AI. 
451 Department of Finance, News Release 2001-054, ••Development of Environmental Indicators a Priority, 
Says Finance Minister" (25 May 2001). In a speech to the National Roundtable on the Environment and the 
Economy, Finance Minister Paul Martin indicated that eventually the government hoped to develop social 
indicators as well, but had chosen to develop environmental indicators firs~ because it seemed likely that it 
would be easier to reach agreement about the appropriate environmental indicators than about social ones. 
Department ofFinance ••speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister ofFinance,. at a Breakfast 
Organized by the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy" (Toronto: May 25,. 200 l), 
online: Department ofFinance <http:Hwww .fin.gc.ca>. The federal Department ofFinance is providing 
funding to the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) to develop these 
indicators. The NRTEE is working with Environment Canada and Statistics Canada to develop indicators 
in six areas: .. human capital; non-renewable natural resources; renewable natural resources; land and soils; 
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provide a more thorough understanding of the relationship between these factors and 
national human capital and production, and ultimately lead to macroeconomic policies 
which more effectively encourage long-term sustainability and real productivity.452 
A varietyofsocialmovementgroups such as environmental, women's and labour 
organizations have a long history of involvement in public policy issues such as 
education~ health, workplace health and safety and the environment with goals broadly 
speaking, of encouraging long-term sustainable growth and real productivity. Hawley 
and Williams do not present compelling evidence that institutional investor involvement 
will necessarily augment these efforts, nor do they appear to consider whether 
institutional investors have, or how they will acquire the requisite expertise, to develop 
larger public policy positions. 
Their proposal also raises a more general question: namely whether institutional 
investors' interest in long-term shareholder value justifies greater involvement in and 
influence on public policy issues. Is there something that they can add that is not 
addressed by the present involvement in public policy issues of social movement 
organizations, the labour movement and the business community'? At present, given their 
fiduciary duty constraints and the constraints of global finance discussed in the first 
air quality and abnospberic conditions; and, water resources." A. Bo~ C. Simard, & R.. Smi~ National 
Roundtable on the Environment ancl Sustainable Development Indicators Initiative: Technical Guidelines 
for Indicator Selection (Ottawa: National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, 2001) at [. See 
also National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, NTREE Indicators Overview Paper-
Stakeholder Workshop (Ottawa: National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, 2001) • 
.isz. For example Nelson and AntonellaPicchio argue tbat a more thorough understanding of the 
contributions of unpaid social reproduction work would lead to macroeconomic policies that would be less 




chapter, it seems unlikely that institutional investors such as pension funds are well 
positioned to promote public policy decisions that encourage long-term sustainability and 
real productivity. 
On the other hand, perhaps it is a way to combine the labour movement's interests 
in productivity and job creation with the power and prestige that attaches to fmancial 
wealth in Canada. It may be that, through their involvement in pension fund investment 
decision-making, labour movement pension fund activists will incrementally change 
institutional investment culture (both within their individual pension funds, and outside 
through their work with external investment managers), to focus on more socially 
responsible corporate practices and management, and long-term sustainability and real 
productivity. 
Leaving aside the more practical obstacles to the emergence of institutional 
investors as "universal owners" with an interest in long-term sustainability and real 
productivity outlined above, there are more fundamental objections to the potential for 
institutional investors to reform or regulate capitalism. These are objections that are 
rooted in the historical development of the corporati?n as a separate legal personality and 
the personification of industrial capital, the emergence of the share as a form of property 
and the shift in the nature of the shareholder from industrial to money capitalist. This is a 
shift which effectively pushes the shareholder and the share outside the corporation and 
its assets. 
Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,. 
1992) at 110-11. 
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Critics argue that attempts to re-assert shareholder ownership of the corporation in 
fact limit the possibilities for recognition of the corporation as a social institution which 
should be democratically and socially regulated. Ireland points out that the separation of 
the share and the shareholder from the corporation and its assets creates difficulties for 
those who, through strategies built on the "myths" of the shareholder as risk-taker, capital 
provider and corporate owner, seek to change and regulate corporate behaviour in more 
socially responsible ways, or to recognize it as a social institution.453 This is because 
these strategies fail to recognize that a central implication of the emergence of the 
corporation as a separate personality is that the means of production are no longer 
"private property to which notions of'ownership", with their connotations of exclusivity 
and exclusion, are applicable."454 
In essence, these strategies attempt to recreate and "repersonify'' the modem 
corporation to resemble the original joint stock company, a large "partnership" of 
investors who supply capital, a strategy which simply does not recognize the realities of 
the modem corporation. Ireland suggests that a more effective strategy would be to 
complete the separation of shareholders from the corporation, and recognize the 
corporation as a social institution that cannot be "owned" as private property, or itselfbe 
an ''owner". Instead he suggests that recognizing the corporation as a '"network of social 
and productive relationships,"455 would create space to reconceive both the corporation 
and corporate assets and to think about ways to create democratic and social systems of 
453 
"Capitalism .... supra note 368 at 69; "Shareholder Ownership'', supra note 361 at 52-57. 
454 
"Shareholder Ownership", ibid. at 55. 
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corporate regulation. This proposal has similarities with Mary Stokes' argument that 
corporate law should recognize that ·~a whole web of relationships of interdependence 
exists around and within the company"456 and that this web of relationships is captured in 
the corporatist/communitarian model of the company which also recognizes the 
separation of shareholder from the corporation and its property, although Stokes places 
great reliance on corporate management to determine community interests, rather than 
seeking a more democratic and socialized system of corporate regulation and control. 
While Henwood does not ground his critique in the historical development of the 
modem public corporation, his critique of strategies of shareholder activism lead to 
similar conclusions. He argues that shareholder-centred governance reforms, with their 
focus on improving shareholder value, cannot provide the type of corporate regulation 
that many labour movement shareholders activists seek since "the point of the governance 
agenda, after all, is to increase shareholder wealth by increasing shareholder control."457 
This in tum raises larger political questions about who should be governing corporations. 
He points out that the very existence of the corporate governance debate implies: ucapital 
is admitting that corporations must be subject to some kind of oversight. If that's the 
case, then the question becomes oversight by whom, in what form, and in whose 
interest.''4ss 
455 /bid. at 56. 
456 Stokes,supranote40l at l78. 
457 Henwood,. supra note 23 at 290. 
458 Ibid. at 247. 
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The uncertainties of corporate law suggest then that the more appropriate political 
project for pension fund activists may be to think about ways to complete the separation 
of the corporation from the shareholder, reconceive both the corporation and corporate 
assets, and create democratic and social systems of corporate regulation. 
As mentioned earlier the historical development of the joint stock company and 
the share explain a number of features of modern corporate law. So far most of the 
discussion in this chapter has looked at the effects of this history on the modem public 
corporation and pension fund activist strategies as they affect these corporations. 
However, although both private and public companies have the same legal form, private 
company shares do not trade on the public markets. Thus private company shareholders 
continue to be more closely connected to the productive capital of the company, and more 
closely resemble industrial capitalists: "[w]hateverthe established legal consequences of 
incorporation, the shareholders of private companies can never 'completely separate' 
themselves from their companies in the same way as shareholders in public, joint stock 
companies.'7459 The final section of this chapter looks at the question of whether pension 
fund investment in private corporations through economically targeted investment 
strategies leads to greater involvement in corporate management and direction, and 
whether by aiming to fill gaps in capital markets, the strategy can improve corporate 
behaviour and practice and lead to long-term sustainability and productivity. 
459 Irelan~ Grigg-Spall & Kelly~ supra note 369 at 161. 
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There has been considerable commentary about the potential for economically 
targeted investment to promote long-term sustainability and real productivity and to 
improve corporate behaviour and practice.''64 ETI activity is more prevalent in the United 
States where the Department ofLabour has explicitly validated ETI programs as 
legitimate investment vehicles for ERISA pension plans, provided of course that the risk-
adjusted return is similar to or better than a comparable investment."65 Many ETI 
programs have been studied by the American government, policy organizations, 
academics and researchers. They have documented ETI' s ability to generate "both 
collateral benefits and risk-adjusted retums.""66 
Pension plan participation in these ETis has been structured in a variety of ways. 
The State of Wisconsin Investment Board's (SWIB) "Invest in Wisconsin" Program 
which provides loans to state-based companies is run directly in-house by SWIB.467 The 
Public Employees Retirement Association of Colorado's partnership with the Colorado 
Housing and Finance Authority partners the pension plan with a government agency that 
does the actual investing by providing loans to small businesses in Colorado to purchase 
capital assets or update their facilities. The Massachusetts Technology Development 
Corporation and the Bureau of Asset Management, Office of the Comptroller, New York 
464 See e.g. Worker Control and Social Investment, supra note 176; Canadian Labour and Business Centre, 
supra note 460; Barber&. Ghilarducci, supra note 61; Falconer, ibid.; Fung, Hebb &. Rogers,_ eds., supra 
note30. 
"
65 Department of Labour Interpretative Bulletin 94-l on Economically Targeted lnvestments 
29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1994) • 
• 
466 Canadian Labour and Business Centre, supra note 460 at 6. 
467 !bid. at l l. SWIB invests the funds of the following: the Wisconsin Retirement System, the pension plan 
for-most employees of state agencies and most local government; the State Investment Fund; and several 
smaller state trust funds. 
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City's Targeted Investment Programs are investment vehicles that pool the funds of a 
number of pension plans.468 Others such as the KPS Special Situations Fund469 are limited 
partnerships between pension funds and other institutional investors, and a private 
company which acts as general partner and oversees the investment decision-making."70 
Investors can "opt out of individual investments.'04n The California Public Employees 
Retirement System's (CalPERS) California Emerging Ventures Program is a fund 
managed by an external investment advisor that selects venture partnership or secondary 
veIJture capital fund opportunities for investment using CalPERS • s investment criteria . .m. 
The AFL-CIO's Housing and Business Investment Trusts provide opportunities for a 
number of pension plans to pool their funds in investment vehicles that are managed on 
behalf of the AFL-CIO in accordance with its investment criteria."73 
In Canada there are currently fewer opportunities for pension fund involvement in 
economically targeted investment programs. Several ofthe more prominent ETI 
initiatives are linked to both the labourmovement, particularly public sector pension 
funds, and government initiatives. Concert Properties and Mortgage Fund One, both 
private companies created with pooled pension fund investments, have their roots in 
partnerships between the labour movement, the City ofV ancouver and the province of 
British Columbia. In New Brunswick and British Columbia. the investment corporations 
"68 Ibid. at 13-14, 21-22, 31-32. 
"69 Sponsored by KPS General Partners and Managers. 
47° Canadian Labour and Business Centre, supra note 460 at 17-18. 
471 M. Calabrese, ''Building on Success: Labor-Friendly Invesbnent Vehicles and the Power-of Private 
Equity" in Fung, Hebb & Rogers, eds., supra note 30, 93 at 105. 
472 Canadian Labour and Business Centre, supra note 460 at 19-20 • 
. m lbicf. at 27-28. 
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created by provincial legislation to invest public sector pension funds have each allocated 
a portion of these funds to private placement investments in the province and the region. 
The New Brunswick Investment Management Corporation (NBIMC) targets 2 percent of 
its assets to private investments in the province and the rest of Atlantic Canada, while the 
British Columbia Investment Management Corporation began to participate in venture 
financing and other private placements in 1995 and tries to invest in a manner that 
promotes economic growth in British Columbia."7" Its investment in the Western 
Technology Seed Investment Fund (WTSIF), a private pooled fund which provides seed 
capital to developing companies in the technology industry in Western Canada, is an 
example ofthis."75 
The Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec (the "Caisse'') is the largest and 
most developed example of economically targeted investing in Canada. The Caisse 
invests the funds of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) and a number of other pension plans. 
It is a creature of statute with an explicit mandate to promote economic development in 
the province and eighty percent of its asset allocations are in Quebec.476 As the Canadian 
Labour and Business Centre comments, it "initiated the earliest and most sustained 
engagement of Canadian pension funds in term lending, venture capital and other markets 
474 Ibid. at26, 35. 
475 Ibid. at 25. 
476 An Act Respecting the Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec,. R.S.Q. c. C-2; Falconer,. supra note 14 
at 14. The desire to promote economic development in Quebec is one of the reasons that the QPP has been 
a partially funded pension system since its inception. Deaton, supra note 44 at 62; R. Brown, .. Canada 
Pension Plan: Fmancing" in Roundtable on Canada's Aging Society and Retirement Income System, supra 
note 138,. 59 at 63; M. Lizee,. Canadian Pension Funds and Active Ownership -An Overview .. Center for 
Working Capital Working Paper No. 6 (Washington: Center for Working Capital,. 2002) at 8. 
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for privately-placed debt and equity.''477 The Caisse has a number of investment 
subsidiaries including the Acces Capital network of regional development funds, Capital 
D' Amerique CDPQ, which invests in companies in various industries, and Sofinov a 
biotechnology venture capital company:178 It is also involved in joint venture initiatives 
with the provincial government and labour sponsored investment funds.479 
Many of the Canadian ETI programs have not been in operation long enough to 
assess the extent oftheir collateral benefits, or studies have not yet been undertaken, 
although the Caisse' s investment activities are widely acknowledged to have contributed 
to the Canadian venture capital market and to the economic development of Quebec. 
Carmichael, however, has documented the collateral benefits of pension fund investments 
in Concert Properties and Mortgage Fund One in terms of increased plan member 
employment and contributions,. increased government revenue (net of foregone taxes on 
pension contnoutions), and the financial and social benefits of the investments to the 
wider community. She found that over a ten year period Concert "more than doubled its 
direct, attributable on-site employment in work for the community .•.. [I]ts benefits in 
terms of productivity outweighed its total project costs, •.• [and] the federal government 
had a net gain of $8.7 million in its investment of foregone tax revenues on contnoutions 
and investment retums.'0480 
477 Canadian Labour and Business Centre,_ supra note 460 at 23. 
478 For an overview ofSofinov's activities see lbitL at 23-24. 
479 Worker Control and Social Investment,_ supra note l 76 at 155; Falconer, supra note 14 at 13. 
480 Worker Control and Social Investment,_ ibid. at iii-
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ETis generally take the form of debt financing to private companies in the form of 
loans and mezzanine financing;'81 and equity financing. With the exception of secured 
loans, the other types of investments would appear to link the investment and the investor 
more closely with the company and its success or failure. Such a link more closely 
resembles that of the industrial capitalist in eighteenth century partnerships, and one to 
which modem corporate law theory about shareholders as owners, and ideas about the 
greater risks of equity investments are perhaps more readily applied. This suggests that 
ETis may provide greater opportunity for involvement ofinvestors in the management of 
the companies that they invest in. 
However, while there is some evidence of greater involvement in the management 
of companies by investors engaged in ETI, the practice does not appear to be widespread. 
Some ETis provide opportunities for funds to become company directors. The Board of 
Directors of Concert Properties, for example, in which pension funds are the only 
shareholders, is composed of representatives of the larger fimds and the President of the 
British Columbia Federation ofLabour."u 
In other cases, such as those in which a number of pension plans pool their funds 
in an investment vehicle with specific ETI goals, there may be union or pension plan 
representation on the investment vehicle's board, although individual pension plans are 
not represented on the Boards of the individual companies invested in. The Caisse does 
"
81 This is debt-like financing. generally in the form of an unsecured loan. that bas some equity features, 
such as linked equity. It is often used to finance a management buyout. These loans rank after secured 
loans and before equity in the event the company is liquidated. Thus this type of financing is riskier than 
debt financing. although it generally bas higher financial rewards. Falconer. supra note 14 at 36-37; 
Rutherfor~ supra note 27. s.v • .. mezzanine finance". 
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have union representation on its Board of Directors, although individual pension plan 
trustees do not normally participate in its investment decision-making processes. 
However, individual pension plan. investors or union representation is not required on the 
Boards of its subsidiaries:113 
The investment vehicle may become directly involved in compan.ymanagement 
through means other than board directorship. In Canada, both the Caisse and the WTSIF 
provide the companies they invest in with advice and other support services which is 
particularly important for start-up companies. In the United States, KPS Special 
Situations Fund (KPS Fund) focuses on companies that are .. undergoing financial distress 
or threat of closure, but which .. _ can. be recovered with adequate financing and 
management.'"'si The KPS Fund becomes directly involved in advising and acting as an. 
intermediary in companies. Of particular interest to pension fund activists is its focus on 
improving labour-management relations and its active consultation with workers. It has 
facilitated worker investment in corporations including worker buyouts in a number of 
cases. Thus in this case, pension fund investments lead to greater worker involvement 
and representation in the companies KPS Fund invests in and works with. Although 
pension funds themselves are not directly involved in the companies, KPS' current 
portfolio includes companies that employ more than 6,000 workers and "most of these 
482 Worker Control anti Social Investment, supra note 176 at 194-95. 
483 Survey of Trustees, supra note 172 at 6. 
484 Canadian Labour and Business Centre; supra note 460 at 17. 
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jobs have been maintained due to investment by KPS ... , and a high proportion protected 
from all-but-certain company shutdown.""85 
It appears then that direct pension fund involvement in companies through ETI 
such as that found in Concert and Mortgage One Fund is unusual. The more common 
practice is for pension funds to invest in an intermediary ETI vehicle which has the 
requisite expertise to find and work with companies. It is important to note that investing 
through an intermediary also helps to diversify the pension fund's investment, and it 
spreads the risk associated with ETI among a number of investors and a number of 
investments within the vehicle. 
While ETI provides only limited opportunities for direct involvement in company 
management and direction, the fact that ETI is a strategy directed towards the creation of 
companies and projects, suggests that pension fund wealth could be used to invest in a 
manner that addresses gaps in the market and encourages real productivity, local or 
regional investment, or provides socially beneficial services or products. This may not be 
as straightforward as it appears though. It is not clear, for example, that pension funds 
engaged in ETI through investments in the Caisse, the WTSIF and the NBIMC are 
assisting in the creation of the type of jobs and social benefits that pension plan activists 
aspire to help create. There do not appear to be investment criteria such as labour or 
environmental standards which address these concerns, nor have their investments been 
evaluated based on this criteria. 
485 Ibid. at 18. 
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This is not to say that stimulating business in particular sectors of the economy or 
regions of the country is not important But as Stanford points out in his critique of 
labour-sponsored investment funds that finance the start-up and expansion of small 
businesses, "small businesses, on average, pay lower wages, offer fewer employment 
benefits, are more resistant to unionization, are less productive, and invest less in real 
capital than larger businesses.'"'86 Pension funds therefore, need to identify the goals of 
their ETI program, be attentive to the types of collateral benefits they wish to achieve and 
design measures to assess the success of their investments in doing so. 
There are also a number of practical barriers in Canada which discourage greater 
ETI involvement by pension funds and other institutional investors, and limit the 
transformative powerofETI as an investment strategy. Falconer's Prudence.. Patience 
and Jobs: Pension Investment in a Changing Economy documents the results of a survey 
of the membership of the Pension Investment Association of Canada (PIAC) in 1998-99 
about the barriers to private investment activity. Key barriers identified by pension 
managers were as follows: the management-intensive nature and extra costs to the 
pension fund of the "private" investment process; the limited number of investment 
managers with expertise in the area; a lack of information about the market and long-term 
investment returns, and the difficulties in creating benchmarks to measure investment 
performance;487 a perception that the risk-adjusted returns are inadequate or unreliable; a 
486 Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 369-70. 
487 Federal pension regulations recognize this difficulty and require that all pension fund statements of 
investment policies and procedures outline ''the method of,. and basiS for, the valuation of investments that 
are not regularly traded at a public exchange". Pension Benefits Stanclards Regulations 1985. S.O.RJ87-l9,.. 
s. 7.l(l)(g). 
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concern that these types of investment have the potential to be significant failures which 
will result in liabilities for pension funds; and a lack of knowledge generally about these 
types of investments by pension funds trustees and a consequent lack of support for 
them.488 
Based on the survey responses and examples from the United States, Falconer 
suggests a number of mechanisms that could be created to address these barriers. These 
include: the development of ''best practices" for limited partnerships and other investment 
vehicles in areas such as fees, performance incentives; databases of private investment 
returns; tools for assessing investment performance; education programs for managers 
and trustees; more investment vehicles that pool pension fund investments and spread 
both the costs associated with private market investments and the risks; more private 
market specialists who can advise pension funds, manage investments and negotiations, 
or work for investment intermediaries; and greater government involvement in facilitating 
partnerships, cost-sharing and the development of many of these mechanisms.''89 
It is important to realize that the barriers to private market investment activity 
identified in the survey and the mechanisms suggested to address them apply to all private 
market investment activity, much of which may not be designed to produce the type of 
collateral benefits desired by pension fund activists. Thus, within the private capital 
market investment arena there is a need for all the mechanisms above with an ETI focus. 
That is, there is a need for investment intermediaries that focus on ETI investing, 
488 Falconer,supranote 14at28-31- . 
489 lbicL at 27-32; Canadian Labour and Business Centre, supra note 460 at 3. 
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benchmarks and evaluative tools to assess collateral benefits and ETI specialists to assist 
pension funds and the investment intermediaries. 
The barriers and the recommendations point to poorly developed infrastructure for 
ETI and other forms of private market investment in Canada. And as with the other 
pension fund activist investment strategies reviewed~ it appears that government 
regulatory and policy intervention is needed to help create a more favourable environment 
for ETI. A recent change related to venture capital announced in the federal budget is an 
example of the role that the government can play in promoting investment in private 
capital markets. Until the budget change, institutional investments in all limited 
partnerships, one of the main vehicles for venture capital and ETI initiatives~ had 
generally been treated as foreign property and subject to the 30 percent foreign content 
limit on pension funds under the Income Tax Act.''90 This tended to discourage private 
market investment through limited partnerships since most institutional investors 
preferred to fully utilize the 30 percent allotment for actual foreign investments.491 The 
federal budget proposed amending the legislation so that investments in limited 
partnerships are no longer treated as foreign property. 492 
490 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985,_ c. 1 (51h Supp.). as am.,_ Part XI; Department of Finance,_ Budget Plan 
2001 (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada,. 2001) at 226 [hereinafter Budget Plan 200 £]. If the 
investor's stake in the partnership was less than 30 percent. the partnership was not considered foreign 
property. 
491 W. Stuec~ ''New rules expected to boost amount of venture capital" The Globe and Mail (1 January 
2002) B l; Budget Plan 2001,_ ibid. The size of the foreign content limit and its effect on investment activity 
in Canada is an issue itself,. but one that will not be addressed here. 
492 Draft Regulations Amending Section 5000(1.1)( c) of the lncome Tax Regulations,_ C.R.C ... c. 945,_ as 
am.,_ have been prepared and can be fuund in P. Martin,_ E:cplanatory Notes Relating to the Air TraveUers 
Security Charge and to Income Tar(Ottawa: DepartmentofFinance Canad~ 2002) at Appendix C. These 
regulations are not yet in force but will apply after 2001. 
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Even with government regulatory and practical assistance, investing in private 
capital markets through ETI may not be as transformative a strategy as it first appears. 
Despite the fact that ETis invest in private companies, few pension funds appear to be 
directly involved in corporate management or direction, particularly since funds often 
participate in ETI through intermediary investment pooling vehicles which may or may 
not provide for pension fund or worker participation in investment decision-making. 
Although ETI strategies aim to produce collateral benefits, it is difficult to measure these 
benefits, and pension fund members may disagree about the kind of collateral benefits 
they want the fund to pursue. In addition, some of the more prominent Canadian ETI 
investment vehicles for institutional investors do not appear to impose social and 
environmental criteria on the kinds of jobs and social benefits that their investments 
create. 
As well, the lack of a well developed ETI infrastructure in Canada, particularly 
the fact that there are few investment managers with ETI expertise, or ETI specialists to 
help facilitate ETI investments, along with the fact that ETI is a management-intensive 
form of investment which often has additional costs for a pension fund when compared 
with other forms of investment, can make ETI simply impractical for many pension 
funds. Pension fund investments in private placements such as ETI generally make up a 
small percentage of pension fund investments (although they are not insignificant 
investments in themselves). 
Clearly an ETI infrastructure is needed if pension funds are going to be able to use 
ETI as an effective strategy for creating real productivity, and respond to social and 
145 
economic needs not properly address by capital markets. But pension funds are unlikely 
to be able to create such an infrastructure on their own, in part because ofits costs. It will 
need to be developed by the venture capital industry, the labour movement or 
government, alone or in partnership. The mixed history oflabour sponsored investment 
funds (LSIFs), which pool generously tax subsidized investments, and invest them in 
small and medium-sized Canadian businesses, suggests that such an infrastructure will 
have to be carefully developed, with attention paid to investment criteria and 
management.'193 
Conclusion 
The uncertainty in corporate law about the legal nature of the share, which 
mediates the relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, the nature of 
shareholding, and the contradictions that exist within modem corporate law between 
separate corporate personality doctrine on the one hand and shareholder ownership 
"rights" on the other raise a number of questions about the potential of pension fund 
activist strategies to temper corporate behaviour and improve corporate governance that 
are built on assumptions about shareholder ownership. Shareholder activism and proxy 
voting in particular appear to be significantly affected by the limits of corporate law. 
Investment screening is also affected by these limitations since the strategy aims not only 
to influence asset allocation to companies exluoiting more favoured practices, but to seek 
493 For a detailed critique ofLSIFs, see Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 355-70. Tessa Hebb and David 
Mackenzie respond to some of this critique and provide a generally more positive assessment ofLSIFs in 
"Canadian Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds: A Model for U.S. Economically Targeted Investments" in 
Fung, Hebb & Rogers, eds., supra note 30, 128. 
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to improve the behaviour ofthe selected corporations through shareholder activism. and 
proxy voting practices. And, while economically targeted investing at first seemed to link 
the investor more closely to the company invested in, and to provide pension funds with 
greateropportunities to directly target their investments to address gaps in the market and 
encourage real productivity, local or regional investment, or the provision of socially 
beneficial services or products,. in the absence of government regulatory assistance, the 
strategy does not appear to be as transformative as it first seemed. 
The next chapter considers whether these pension fund activist strategies taken 
together and in the absence of government regulatory changes result in anything more 
than modest reforms. Is pension fund activism. the most effective strategy to create real 
productivity, long-term sustainability and transform corporate management and practice? 
It also considers the directions that government regulatory reform should take in this area. 
And finally, it turns to the question raised earlier in this chapter of whether the 
uncertainties of corporate law,. along with the limitations of pension law, make the 
reconception of both the corporation and corporate assets, and the creation of democratic 
and social systems of corporate regulation, a more appropriate and effective project for 
pension fund activists. It looks at some proposals for using pension funds to do this. 
147 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
ASSESSING THE STRATEGIES 
Introduction 
The potential for the strategies that pension funds activists are pursuing to lead to 
significant or transformative shifts in corporate and market regulation appear limited by 
pension and corporate law, as well as practical or logistical limitations. At best, the 
strategies appear to be moderate reform proposals, a tempering rather than a socializing of 
capital and corporations. The first section of this chapter provides a brief summary of the 
limitations, in the absence of government intervention or judicial interpretive shifts, of 
the main strategies pursued by pension fund activists that I have discussed: shareholder 
activism including proxy voting, investment screening and economically targeted 
investment. The second section considers the question of government regulatory 
intervention in greater depth. Government regulatory intervention would certainly 
improve the transformative potential of these pension fund investment strategies. 
However, I argue that it will faI1 to bring about the dramatic changes hoped for by labour 
movement pension fund activists particularly if the regulatory activity is limited only to 
pension funds' investment practices. 
More importantly, a focus on facilitating these pension fund activist strategies, 
even if they are extended to other types of individual and institutional investors, is not 
likely to lead to more democratic and social systems of corporate regulation, which seems 
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to be the implicit goal of at least some of the proponents of pension fund activism:'94 The 
last section of this chapter considers some alternative reform proposals that attempt to do 
this. Of particular importance to the labour movement is the emphasis that many of these 
strategies place on expanding or utilizing public pension systems, one of the original 
focuses oflabour movement pension activism in Canada. 
Reviewing the Limitations 
The most important gains made by these pension strategies may ••• be political 
rather than economic. Labors pension activism helps create a hospitable climate 
for regulating and directing financial markets; these tactics do lay bare the central 
fact that tabor creates capital (not only from the sweat of workers' brows, but, as 
noted earlier, through deductions from their pay) and that capital is not always 
invested to advance worker interests.495 
The last decade has seen an increasing interest by members of the labour 
movement in using their pension fund investment activities to influence corporate 
management and practice, encourage productivity, local and regional development and 
encourage long-term growth and sustainability. This interest is a result of a number of 
factors. The exponential growth of pension funds has meant they have become 
increasingly important influences on financial markets and have significant effects on 
local, national and global economies. Pension funds and their investment practices have 
been linked to the problems discussed in the first chapter: an emphasis by institutional 
investors on maximizing share returns over the short-term which reduces the ability of 
corporations to focus on long-term development in the form of, for example, capital 
494 See e.g. ''New Collectivism'', supra note 11; Labors Capital, supra note 40 at c. 6 & 8; Deato~ supra 
note 44 at 343-51; Worker Control anti Socia[ Fnvestment, supra note L 76 at c. 6. 
495 Labor's Capital, ibid. at 13 L 
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investments, research and development, and worker training; the "herd mentality" of 
investment managers associated with the concentration of pension funds management; 
and the failure of market investment activities to generate productive activities in terms of 
job creation and capital investment. 
Members of the labour movement have also objected to their pension funds being 
invested in corporations that use non-union labour, or have poor labour-management 
relations, violate environmental, labour or human rights, lay off unionized labour, or 
move production to another region or country. At the same time they found that they had 
little or no ability to affect these decisions, or to advocate for investment decisions with 
collateral benefits such as job creation or the provision of social services or other 
economic benefits. 
Strategies that labour movement pension fund activists have utilized include 
advocating or negotiating for greater representation on pension plan boards of trustees 
through either joint or sole trusteeship, or they have worked to create advisory bodies to 
the boards. In tenns of investment practices, they have focused on three in particular: 
shareholder activism including proxy voting, investment screening and economically 
targeted or community investing. They have sought to use these practices to influence 
individual corporate decisions, to encourage particular corporate practices such as 
adherence to labour or social standards, and to encourage investments that are 
sustainable, create jobs, or address social or economic needs that are not being adequately 
addressed by regular market allocations. 
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Although not always stated, some pension fund activists have hoped to create new 
conceptions of "value" through this work. These might be conceptions that would 
include factors other than monetary return, such as for example job creation, and social 
and environmental benefits. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, the 
transformative power of these strategies has been limited by both pension and corporate 
law, and in particular by the assumptions about pension fund and corporate ownership 
that underpin them. 
In terms of pension law, two arguments underpin pension fund activist strategies. 
The first is that pension funds are workers' deferred wages which belong to them, and 
they should therefore have more control over how their pension funds are invested. The 
second is that if workers' or their representatives had more say about how "their" funds 
were invested, they would and could consider criteria other than or in addition to 
monetary rate of return in making investment decisions. That is, they would create new 
conceptions of value to be applied to the decision-making process. Pension law, which 
combines a number of fields, including contract and trust law, does not clearly support 
these assumptions. It is unclear in law whether pensions are deferred wages, who owns 
funds in the pension trust, and when they own it.496 
On a more theoretical and strategic level, this focus on pension fund ownership 
tends to obscure the real issue, namely that pension fund activists want to change the way 
pension funds are invested. Moreover by arguing about who uowns" pension funds and 
attaching investment decision-making "rights" to this ownership, pension fund activists 
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fail to explore the theoretical and political possibilities that flow from the fact that 
pension funds have many uowners" and "beneficiaries" - legal or otherwise. This is one 
of the very reasons that pension funds appear to be attractive to those interested in using 
investment practices to try to control or moderate the beha~our of capital, or to socialize 
it. 
Trust law principles and case law to date have made it clear that while investment 
criteria other than market rate of return can be considered by pension fund trustees, 
market rates of return must be the paramount or primary investment consideration. 
Investment practices such as shareholder activism, proxy voting, screening and 
economically targeted investing can be pursued so long as returns to the pension fund are 
not negatively affected. Alternative ways to measure the costs and benefits of 
investments such as value-added accounting methods outlined in the third chapter can be 
used to assess investments, but at the end of the day, it is market rates of return that must 
remain the primary investment criteria. Thus an investment with wider social and 
economic benefits such as affordable housing or job creation cannot be made if its risk 
adjusted monetary return expectation is less than a similar investment without the 
collateral benefits. 
The constraints placed on pension plan investment decision-making, particularly 
in the context of economically targeted investing, reveal a limitation of the application of 
trust law principles to pension fund regulation. This is that trust law standards of 
prudence were created to regulate the investment of income derived from an initial 
496 See generally .. Pension Plans'•,. supra note 149,. and the discussion in c. 3 above. 
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allocation of capital to a trust, and do not properly account for the fact that pension trust 
funds receive two streams of income: ongoing income from contnoutions by employers 
and/or employees, and the income from fund investments. 
In terms of corporate law, pension fund activist strategies are built on assumptions 
about corporate "ownership", and the powers that their position as shareholders brings to 
pension funds and other institutional investors. Yet as we saw in chapter four, the 
uncertainty in corporate law about the legal nature of the share, which. mediates the 
relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, the nature of shareholding, and 
the contradictions that exist within modem corporate law between separate corporate 
personality doctrine on the one hand and shareholder ownership "rights" on the other all 
raise questions about the transformative potential of pension fund activist strategies that 
are built on these assumptions. 
On a practical level, as outlined in chapter four, strategies of shareholder activism 
and proxy voting regarding corporate governance reform have limited scope, and are 
unlikely to move away from traditional corporate governance matters to become more 
directive in terms of corporate management practice. They are also unlikely to consider 
factors such as the interests of others affected by corporate decisions, if such 
considerations could reduce shareholder value. Nor does the strategyofETI seem to be 
as promising as it first appeared. It does not appear to link the investor more closely to 
the company invested in, or to currentlyprovide Canadian pension funds with greater 
opportunities to target their funding more directly to address gaps in the market, or 
provide particular economic or social benefits. This is because a number of practical 
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barriers limit the ability of pension plans to participate in ETI programs,. or invest directly 
in such projects. 
Thus these investment strategies appear to be moderate reform proposals which 
aim to temper corporate behaviour and the allocation ofinvestment capital through the 
market rather than to socialize or democratize decision-making about corporations and 
the production process. In saying this I do not want to understate the need for and 
importance of even moderate reform proposals which address concerns about corporate 
governance and behaviour, and long-term productivity and sustainability. Some 
commentators such as Aglietta. in supporting a greater role for trade unions and 
employees in the governance of pension fund investment, see it as a regulatory 
mechanism to curb the excesses of the new regime of capitalist accumulation. He argues, 
for example, that if workers had more control ofinvestments they could push for a shift 
from short-termism back to an investment focus on the longer-term, thus creating more 
stable corporate ownership, job stability and a link between real wages and 
productivity:'97 These commentators would see pension fund activist strategies as a 
mediative mechanism to regulate and restrain capitalism, rather than to replace it with 
other systems of production. 
497 
.. Capitalism at the Tum of the Century''. supra note 22 at 8 L It is not clear what evidence Aglietta relies 
on to assert that workers or their representatives would necessarily be inclined to push for such longer-term 
investment horizons, other than an assertion that the history of the trade union movemen~ at least in 
Continental Europe, ''calls on them to transcend the corporate interests of individual trades and to voice the 
needs of the entire labour force."( at 81) As noted earlier, Aglietta suggests in a later article that regulators 
should impose longer time horizons for measuring profit on institutional investors and the in.vestment 
management industry. "Shareholder value and corporate governance". supra note 95 at 158-59. 
154 
Greater representation of workers on pension plan boards of trustees or 
investment advisory bodies, and the development of union-designed and union-run trustee 
education programs;'98 along with greater use of the various pension fund activist 
strategies reviewed in the previous chapters, may incrementally change institutional 
investment culture within individual pension funds and influence the practices of external 
investment man~gers. It may for example, lead to an increased focus on more socially 
responsible corporate practices and management, and long-term sustainability and 
productivity. This in tum may have an incremental effect on corporate management and 
practice. 
And it may be that labour movement activism in the pension fund investment 
arena, combined with other local, national and global activities it pursues on its own or in 
concert with other social movement actors, such as consumer boycott or purchasing 
campaigns, the development of corporate codes of conduct, and campaigns to bring 
attention to exploitative working conditions, human rights violations or environmental 
degradation, will lead to a "[political] ••• fencing-in [ ot] markets'0499 and a curbing of the 
new regime of capitalist accumulation.500 At the very least, some suggest, it will help 
raise these issues in the public domain: "[t]he new labor campaign on investment can be a 
498 For a larger discussion of these programs see Worker Control and Social Investment. supra note 176 at 
c.15. 
499 J. Habermas, "The European Nation-States and the Pressures ofGiobalizatio~ (1999) 235 New Left 
Rev. 46 at 46. 
soo For more discussion oflabour movement activities in such campaigns, and work in coalition with other 
social movement groups see O'Brien, supra note 18. 
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success, whatever else it does, if it brings [these] •.. ideas about reforming corporations 
into the mainstream."sot 
However, these actions and reforms all take place within the market arena and 
although this suggests "a slight shift in the locus of political struggle to the market (or at 
least an effort to do so) ..• the potential for success in this arena is profoundly limited by 
the very foundational claim of the market as beyond the realm ofpolitics."s02 Thus at best 
pension fund investment strategies appear to be moderate reform proposals, a tempering 
rather than a socializing of capital and corporations. 
In a number of places in the previous chapters I have mentioned the potential or 
need for government regulatory action to permit or encourage the pension investment 
strategies promoted by pension fund activists, particularly their hopes that the strategies 
could be used to challenge market rates of return as the exclusive measurement of value 
and to develop criteria that provide a more accurate picture of true rates of return- both 
market and social. The next section considers the question of government regulatory 
intervention in greater depth. 
Government Regulation 
..• while pension fund pressures can discipline individual companies, real changes 
in corporate behavior will require laws that make all corporations more 
democratically accountable as well as new rules and incentives to encourage 
responsible business and investment practices.503 
sot Moberg. supra note 432 at 20. 
502 Fudge&. Cos~ supra note 9 at 29. 
503 Moberg, supra note 432 at 20. 
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A common theme in the assessment of the various pension fund strategies has 
been the potential of government regulatory intervention to strengthen the strategies' 
impact on investment practices and corporate management and practice. A variety of 
reforms have been suggested. Greater worker involvement in pension fund management 
through a range of means including bargaining for increased representation on boards of 
trustees or advisory committees, or joint or sole trusteeship, have been advocated by 
labour movement pension fund activists, along with representative bodies such as the 
CLC and NUPGE.504 In addition to increasing the opportunities for worker involvement 
in pension fund investment decision-making, Ghilarducci argues that worker 
representation in pension plan management ensures greater retirement security, regardless 
of the type of pension plan (defined benefit or contdbution}, or whether it is a single or 
multi-employer plan. "Worker representatives, namely unions, use their positions to 
ensure that pension fund growth translates into pension improvements and ultimately 
greater retirement income security."505 
Quebec's legislative requirement that all pension plans establish a pension 
committee separate from the employer to administer the plan, with at least one member 
elected by plan participants, and anotherbyretirees and former plan members, is one 
model that could be followed. 506 Such a model, in separating the plan administration 
from the plan sponsor, helps democratize decision-making about pension plan 
504 Survey of Trustees, supra note 172 at 4; Worker_ Control ancl Social Investment, supra note 176 at 273-
76. 
sos .. Small Benefits", supra note 30 at 16L 
506 Supplemental Pension Plans Act, supra note 180. s. 147. 
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administration and investment decision-making, without grounding this involvement in 
legally uncertain claims about worker ownership of pension plans. The legislative 
schemes mandating the joint trusteeship of a number of provincial public sector pension 
plans such as British Columbia's Public Sector Pension Plans Acf07 and the Ontario 
Public Service Employees • Union Pension Act, J 994sos provide other legislative models. 
In other countries ''with advanced and funded pension systems"509 worker representation 
is required on all pension plan boards. Switzerland, for example, makes joint governance 
mandatory.s10 
Other legislative changes can help legitimize or lend support to pension fund 
activists advocating within their pension plans and within the investment community 
generally, for consideration of factors besides risk and rate of return in investment 
decision-making. Britain's Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment. 
Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations I 99~u require all occupational 
pension plans to disclose the extent to which their investment policies consider social, 
environmental or ethical criteria in the investment decision-making process.s12 
In Canada, Bill C-394, a private members bill introduced by Bloc Quebecois MP 
Stephan Tremblay in September 2001, proposes an amendment to the PBSA that is 
similar to the British regulation. The amendment would require federally regulated 
soT S.B.C. l999, c. 44, as am. 
SOS S.Q. [994, C. (7, as am. 
509 
••small Benefits", supra note 30 at 178. 
sio For a discussion of the Swiss model see A..T. Maxwell. Pension Plan Governance: The. Employers 
Conflicting Roles as Sponsor and Administrator(LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, l999) [unpublished] at [58-64. 
sn Supra note 358. 
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pension plan administrators to report annually on "the social, ethical and environmental 
factors that have been considered, during that period, in the selection, retention and 
liquidation of investments under the administrator's responsibility and in the exercise of 
any rights related to those investments, including voting rights."513 Although it is not 
expected to pass, the bill has helped raise the issue within Parliament and is supported by 
Canadian social investment advocates such as SHARE and the Social Investment 
Organization.m 
None of these amendments require consideration of factors other than rate of 
return, but the room they create for doing so could be valuable. While the case law 
appears to support consideration of these factors in investment decision-making, provided 
there are alternative investments available with similar risk and return profiles and the 
pension fund can remain appropriately diversified, decisions such as Scargi//515 discussed 
earlier have been widely interpreted as restricting consideration to financial criteria alone. 
Those advocating practices such as shareholder activism, proxy voting, screening and 
economically targeted investment often face difficulty convincing other investment 
committee members, investment managers and others that they are acting within the 
scope of their fiduciary duty.516 In fact, the British regulation has been credited with 
512 Ibid., s. 2(4). 
m Bill C-394, An Act to amend the Pension Benefits Standards Act. 1985 (investment criteria),. lst Sess.,. 
37lll ParL,. 200 I,. cLl (I st Reading 20 September 200 l). 
514 Social Investment Organization. Pension SRI Bill lntroduced to House of Commons online:. 
<bttp1/www.Socialinvestment.ca> [hereinafter Pension SRI Billj; Shareholder Association for Research 
and Education,. Private Members' Bill Calls for SRI Disclosure by Pension Plans (7 September 2001). 
515 Supra note 255. 
516 Y aron,. supra note 198 at 2; Canadian Union of Public Employees,. The Fiduciary Duty of Pension Fund 
Trustees and Administrators (Ottawa:: Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2000) at 1-2. 
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having ua tremendous impact on the socially responsible investment industry in the UK, 
and ... spurr[ing] a large number of pension funds to adopt SRI policies."517 
One legislative intervention that did permit consideration of factors other than, or 
ahead of, rate of return was Ontario's South African Trust Investments Act518 which 
protected trustees from liability for investment losses related to decisions to divest its 
investments related to South Africa or to stop making such investments. provided the 
trustees had determined sufficient member support for the plan. Certainly legislation 
could codify or enhance the common law protections provided to trustees who implement 
investment policies which consider factors other than rate of return with the demonstrated 
support of plan members. This is particularly the case if members support the plan in full 
recognition that, in the event ofless than expected returns, contribution levels may need 
to increase, benefits may have to be reduced, or the policy will have to be revisited. This 
is not to say that these policies will necessarily lead to returns that are less than average 
returns for similar investments assessed only on rates of return. It simply recognizes that 
this is one of the primary concerns for trustees considering adopting these investment 
strategies. 
None of these potential regulatory changes, though, address the hopes of many 
pension fund activists that their strategies could be used to challenge market rates of 
return as the only measure of value and to develop a conception of value that incorporated 
517 Pension SRI Bill, supra note 514. 59 percent of pension funds responding to a survey by the U.K.'s 
Social Investment Forum indicated that they bad adopted socially responstble investment into their 
investment policies. E. Mathie~ Response of UK Pension FundS to the SRI Disclosure Regulation, UKSIF 
Report: 2000 (London: UK. Social Investment Fo~ 2000) at 33. 
sis Supra note 321. 
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both social and market "investment returns." One suggestion for expanding traditional 
conceptions of value would be regulatory measures requiring the adoption of value added 
accounting practices which. measure the net benefits of investments to all those affected 
by corporate activities, such as those discussed in chapter three. In addition to or instead 
of requiring pension funds to report on the extent to which they consider social, 
environmental or ethical criteria, they could be required to provide a value added 
accounting of their investments in terms of their social and economic benefits to plan 
stakeholders: plan members as workers through job creation, and the fund itself, through 
increased contributions and investment income. They could also be required to measure 
the economic and social benefits of their investments to the wider community. 
Pension funds could also choose to adopt these accounting practices voluntarily as 
suggested by Carmichael,519 or funds could require firms they invest in to provide such 
accountings. The current controversy over accepted accounting industry standards, and 
investor interest in more transparency in accounting may provide an opportunity for 
pension funds activists to advocate for this type of accounting.520 
Proposals to develop alternative or expanded conceptions of value in the context 
of investment decision-making illustrate the need that both Gillese, writing in the 
Canadian context, and Ghilarducci, in the American, have identified for a more coherent 
pension law and policy framework. Gillese suggests that a central barrier to developing 
519 Worker Control and Social Investment, supra note 176 at 267. 
52° For an overview of investor concerns see J. McFarland,. "Companies putting on a squeaky clean face~ 
The Globe and Mail ( 14 February 2002) B L 
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an analytical framework is that ''the nature of a pension trust has not been settled,"52t 
while Ghilarducci points out that trust law principles as applied to pension funds do not 
adequately account for the fact that unlike traditional trusts, pension funds receive 
ongoing income from two sources, employer/employee contributions and the return on 
fund investments.522 
Barber and Ghilarducci's ''whole participant" approach to investment decision-
making recognizes this unique feature of the pension fund as a trust. They suggest that 
trustees' fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence should be legislatively expanded to 
include consideration of the effect ofinvestment decisions on all plan members, both 
retirees and those currently employed, and on the economy generally.m Indeed, a 
precedent for such a legislative expansion can be seen in Ontario's Loan ancl Trust 
Corporations Act.52" Under the Act, the standard of care that directors and officers must 
meet is that of the "reasonably prudent director or officer ... under comparable 
circumstances."s25 This is a higher standard than that of directors and officers of non-
deposit taking corporations.526 In addition,. subsection 108(3) requires that directors and 
officers consider the interests ofboth shareholders and other parties: 
In considering whether a particular transaction or course of action is in the best 
interests of the provincial corporation as a whole, a director or officer shall have 
due regard to the interests of the depositors, as well as the shareholders of the 
521 
"Pension Plans'', supra note 149 at236. 
522 
"U.S. Pension Investment Policy'', supra note 47 at 10. 
523 Barber & Ghilarduc~ supra note 61 at 309. 
524 R.S.O. 1990, c. L-25. 
525 lbitl.,. s. I 08(2)(b ). 
s->..6 Re Standard Trustco Ltd. et al [1992} 15 O.S.C.B. 4322 at4364-65. 
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corporation and, in the case of a trust corporation, shall also have due regard to the 
interests of the persons for whom it acts in a fiduciary capacity.527 
It seems unlikely, though, that fiduciary duties could be legislatively expanded to 
the extent of asking trustees' to consider the impact of their investments on the whole 
economy, in part because it seems unlikely that trustees would have the requisite 
expertise to consider these factors. It is arguable that monitoring the economy and 
considering the impact of investment practices and regulatory changes to these practices 
should be a government rather than a pension fund responsibility. Finally, pension fund 
activists should not lose sight of the fact that pension funds exist to deliver pensions. It 
would be difficult for trustees to adopt investment strategies that benefited the economy, 
but negatively affected their pension funds. As Ghilarducci points out, "although pension 
funds play vital roles in financial markets and long-term employment contracts, they 
should ultimately be judged according to whether they deliver secure retirements."m 
Ghilarducci and Barber's recommendations recognize a larger regulatory role for 
government in the economy, for their suggestion that fiduciary duties ofloyalty and 
prudence be expanded is part of a larger program to regulate pension fund investment and 
reform financial markets so that resources are better allocated to productive uses. They 
propose the following mechanisms: workerrepresentation on pension plan boards of 
trustees; tax incentives which encourage longer-term investing through taxes on short-
term speculative investing and credits for long-range investing; the creation of investment 
vehicles and intermediaries for long-term investments such as ufederal infrastructure 
m Loan and Trust Corporations Act, supra note 524, s. 108(3). 
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bonds, secondary markets for ETis and community development loan funds,s29 [and] well-
staffed broker units to help structure viable investment projects for pension funds."530 
Implementation of these proposals would certainly encourage greater long-term 
productive investment by pension funds, and provide many of the mechanisms needed to 
encourage ETI and community investing in Canada. 
Why Only Pension Funds? 
Barber and Ghilarducci as well as Carmichael justify their calls for greater 
government regulatory involvement in pension fund investment activities in large 
measure because of the significant tax subsidies provided to pension contnbutions: "[t]his 
money could be returned to communities through investment that provides wealth by job 
creation and spill-over effects, rather than being used for the largely private gains of 
individual and institutional shareholders."531 While this is certainly a compelling 
argument, it does raise a larger question about whether occupational pension funds alone 
should be singled out for this type of regulatory involvement. For occupational pension 
fund contnbutions are not the only retirement income contnbutions to receive significant 
tax subsidies. Moreover, they also appear to represent a declining proportion of tax 
subsidized retirement income. The Canadian federal government's 2001 tax expenditure 
estimates for example, show tax. expenditures for individual RRSP contributions at 
$5,940 million in 1996 with a projected increase to $7,265 million in 2002. In contras~ 
528 
"Small Benefits'\. supra note 30 at 158. 
5'..9 Intermediary investment vehicles,. similar to mutual funds, that pool funds from pensions and invest them 
in a number ofETI projects, or provide community development loans. 
530 Barber & Ghilacducci, supra note 61at291-92. 
531 Worker Control and Social Investment, supra note 176 at 137, 88. See also lbid. at 288-89. 
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the net tax expenditure estimates for occupational pension plan contributions were 
estimated at $4,930 million in 1996, with a projected decrease to $4,055 in 2002.532 
The tax benefits given to pension plan contributions have also led to criticism of 
investment approaches such as economically targeted investing that seek to encourage 
collateral benefits to plan members in that they perpetuate the inequities that exist 
between those who are covered by occupational pension plans and those who are not. 
Deaton, for example, argues that the tax exempt status of pension contributions and 
income results in those without pension coverage supporting those who have the benefits 
of occupational pension plan coverage. This inequity is increased by investment 
strategies that focus on benefits such as job creation and service provision to plan 
members.533 
As well, as Harrnes and others have pointed out, despite their size, pension funds 
pale in comparison to the size of institutional investors such as mutual funds and hedge 
funds.534 Thus if the larger goal of pension fund activists is to encourage real 
productivity, job creation, and long-term sustainability as well as to influence corporate 
management and practice, it might be more effective to tum their efforts to lobbying for 
regulatory change that affects all investors and market actors. Why not press for 
regulatory changes that require investors and corporations to account for the social, 
environmental and ethical impacts of their activities; that tax short-term speculative 
investment; that create tax incentives for long-term productive investment with collateral 
532 Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 200 l ~supra note 7. 
m Oeato~ supra note 44 at 339-40. 
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social and economic benefits; and create intermediaries and investment vehicles for such 
investment? 
Neither an approach that focuses on pension fund investment practices nor an 
approach that applies these practices and associated regulatory reforms to the larger 
investment community is likely to lead to more democratic and social systems of 
corporate regulation, which seems to be the implicit goal of at least some of the 
proponents of pension fund activism. The last section of this chapter therefore considers 
some more far-reaching reform proposals that attempt to do this. Of particular 
importance to the labour movement is the emphasis that these strategies place on 
expanding or utilizing a public pension system,. one of the original focuses oflabour 
movement pension activism in Canada as outlined in the second chapter in its efforts to 
gain greater control over the production process. 
Imagining More Transformative Strategies 
... it is not merely new forms of industrial organization that we need, but a "new 
driving mechanism, a new rationality, a new economic logic" to replace the 
capitalist market, however difficult that might be to imagine let alone achieve. 
Without addressing the question of the growing dominance of material and social 
life by the capitalist market and its imperatives, reconceptualizing corporations or 
insisting on good corporate citizenship are doomed to failure.535 
Labor needs a coalition to demand socialized capital investment within a coherent 
industrial policy framework so that ownership-based rights claims do not result in 
competition with other pension fund uowners."536 
534 
.. Institutional investors"~ supra note 22 at 101-102; Paper Boom, supra note 20 at 377. 
535 
"Citizenship", supra note 202 at 27. 
536 Labors Capital, supra note 40 at 13 L 
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One of the central criticisms of the moderate reformist nature of strategies of 
pension fund investment activism is that they fail to fully confront the corporation as a 
social institution. Greater worker participation, and investment practices which consider 
social, environmental and ethical factors and attempt to regulate corporate behaviour and 
practice, do not ''democratize" decisions in the corporate and economic sphere. Although 
they increase access to decision-making and influence to some who have not traditionally 
been involved in the management oflarge pools of money, access still depends on 
"ownership" claims to wealth. And the investment rules, in the absence of regulatory 
intervention, have changed little, if at all. 
Pension fund activists have not fully explored the possibilities created by the fact 
that pension funds have many "owners" and "beneficiaries" - legal or otherwise. Nor 
have their strategies adequately considered the suggestion that the uncertainties of 
corporate law make completing the separation of the corporation from the shareholder, 
and creating democratic and social systems of corporate regulation, a more appropriate 
and meaningful political project. In short, they have not challenged the limitations of 
pension law and corporate law with strategies that recognize the corporation and markets 
as social institutions that should be democratically and socially regulated. There are a 
number of analysts who have proposed investment strategies that incorporate pension 
funds, both private and public, along with other investors and aim to encourage 
productive investment which encourages Iong-tenn. productivity and sustainability along 
with more public and democratic direction and accountability. 
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One approach is Roberto Unger's proposal for pension reform outlined in 
Democracy Realized: The Progressive Altemative.531 Unger proposes unifying all 
pension plans - public, private,. and social insurance schemes. Middle-income employees 
and their employers would continue to contnbute to their funds, while high income 
workers would have a portion of their contributions re-distributed to low-income 
workers' social-insurance accounts.53' Part of the money from these plans would be 
channeled into ''social investment funds" which invest in public venture-capital 
operations, that in tum enhance production within the nation-state.539 Thus social savings 
would be used to create productive capacity within a nation-state. Unger does not set out 
any parameters for the types of productive operations that would be encouraged,. nor does 
he define "public venture-capital operations." He focuses on the fact that by building 
productive capacity through savings internal to it, the state would be able to reduce its 
reliance on foreign capital and investment. He states that the "social investment funds" 
would create increased opportunities to finance "the small and the new" by opening 
"additional channels between saving and production."s.co It is not clear though, how these 
investment funds,. in the absence of investment parameters,. would open new channels of 
investment. While Ungermayultimatelyrelytoo heavily on traditional market forces of 
investment, production and profit to create his system,. it represents an alternative vision, 
and one which aims to channel pension funds savings into productive investments. 
537 Supra note 34. 
53
' lbicL at 149. 
539 Ibid. at 149-50. 
s.co Ibid. at 161. 
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Ghilarducci suggests that strategies that focus on private pension fund provision 
alone are unlikely to lead to changes in conceptions of investment ''value" that actually 
incorporate factors other than market rates of return into the decision-making, rather than 
considering them when evaluating investments of similar market rates of return. Nor are 
they likely to significantly change investment practices that encourage short-term 
speculative investing with few productive retums.s.n She argues that the labour 
movement has to work in coalition with other social movement actors to press for 
changes in investment criteria and practices that "secure jobs, communities, and 
retirement income."541 Ghilarducci suggests that a universal pension plan in which 
investments are managed by a public board ''could create sucll criteria by providing 
adequate pensions and by incorporating employment and community effects when 
calculating the rate of return of a particular investment."543 She provides few details 
about the mechanisms for selecting the board, or how sucll a universal system would be 
structured. 
Stanford suggests a more comprehensive set of financial and regulatory reforms 
and programs designed to encourage investment in real productivity, and to encourage 
more democratic and social management of capital,544 including capping the foreign 
content investment limit for RRSPs and RPPs at 20 percent.545 Of interest in terms of 
institutional investors' activities, particularly for those interested in promoting 
541 Labors Capital. supra note 40at132. 
S4l fbic/. 
543 Ibid. 
544 See generally Paper Boom .. supra note 20 at c. 14 & 16. 
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economically targeted investing, is his proposal for a more public system of venture 
capital investing "in which the need of the broader community for capital accumulation 
and job-creation explicitly motivated the chain of economic activity which culminates in 
a new investment in some real venture."S46 Private financial institutions including 
registered pension funds would be required to deposit a percentage of their assets in a 
"public venture investment bank." Stanford suggests that this percentage could be a 
relatively small share of their total assets - "perhaps up to one-half of one percent, ... 
phased in over several years."5u He estimates that this would create an initial capital fund 
of$12 - 15 billion.548 The Bank of Canada could provide additional credit which would 
fluctuate with the economy. Governments, pension funds (private and public) and 
individuals could all invest in the bank.549 
The investment bank would allocate investments through two types of 
development council, community and sectoral, which would identify economic and social 
needs as well as the resources available in the area, and then work to develop ventures 
that would utilize these resources in meeting the identified needs. The investment bank 
would be run on a non-profit basis. However, projects that are invested in would have to 
meet a basic rate of return threshold to cover the interest paid to the investment bank's 
545 Ibid.. at 334-36. Paper Boom was published before the federal government's 2000 budget when the limit 
was increased to 30 percent. 
546 Ibid.. at 397. 
547 Ibid. at 398. 
S4S Ibid. 
549 Stanford suggests that they receive interest on their deposits that is two or three percentage points above 
the rate of inflation.. As he points out,. this would be less than what would be received on deposits at other 
financial institutions. Ibid. at 399. It might be difficult for pension plans. in the absence of changes to 
fiduciary duties ofloyalty and prudence~ to make such investments. 
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investors. They would also have to provide social returns such as jobs, taxes, utilization 
of materials from local or national suppliers, or meet social needs such as affordable 
. housing or environmental protection. sso Stanford argues that the public investment 
system will not only result in increases in real productivity that meet needs not adequately 
addressed by private investors, but over time it would build local and national capacities 
for citizens to exercise greater control over the economy: 
One morning the citizens of a community or even a whole country would wake up 
and realize they were in charge of their own economic destiny: they now 
possessed the institutional strength, the financial resources, and the 
entrepreneurial experience and capabilities with which to oversee the continued 
accumulation of real capital and the continued qualitative and quantitative 
development of the economy.ssL 
While Stanford does not focus only on pension funds in his proposals, both 
Deaton and Blackbum suggest that expansion of the public pension system is an 
important means to establishing social control over corporations and capital. Deaton 
suggests that the expansion of the public pension system and the implementation of an 
investment strategy that focuses on investing pension funds in the public interest in a 
socially productive manner could be part of a process that socializes capital and 
contributes to a transition from socialism to capitalism. "Because the pension system bas 
increasingly organized and socialized the flow of savings and investment at a macro-
economic level in modem capitalist economies, it bas become a potential instrument for 
the accumulation and direction of capital under public control at the state leveL"ssz. 
sso Ibid. at400. 
SSL /bid. at41 l-12. 
ssz. Deaton,. supra note 44 at 349. See generally c. 10. 
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Blackbum. argues that control over pension funds "joins up with other, even 
larger, questions concerning the shape and direction of society as a whole,"553 and he 
provides a detailed pension reform proposal that is part of a larger strategy to socialize 
production by socializing investment mechanisms in ''The New Collectivism: Pension 
Reform, Grey Capitalism and Complex Socialism."554 He advocates for the gradual 
creation of a radical pension fund regime through the socialization of the private pension 
fund system by means of a variety of measures including: increased beneficiary and other 
stakeholder group representation on pension fund boards of trustees; government 
regulatory changes clarifying pension surplus ownership; clarification of pension plan 
trustees' fiduciary duties to include consideration of"long-term, collective and inter-
generational benefit-holder interest;"555 increases in the minimum level of retirement 
income guaranteed by the state; universal membership in private pension funds with the 
state contributing for those not employed in waged labour or able to contnbute; 
legislative requirements that standards of ethical and social responsibility be incorporated 
into pension investment decisions; and tax, and other incentives applied only to 
contnbutions to pension plans which use sociallyresponSible investment criteria in 
making their investments.556 
The ultimate goal of these measures is the creation of a new pension regime -a 
public system funded through pension funds controlled by a number of social and 
553 
'"New Collectivism' .. , supra note 11 at4--5. 
55
" Ibid. 
555 Ibid. at 23. 
556 /bid. at 32-33. 
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regional organizations and regulated by the state. For example, an individual's 
contnbutions, whether from the state, employer or him or herself would be deposited in a 
"social accountn and invested in three to five registered pension funds ofhis or her 
choice. The registered pension funds would have to meet government established ethical 
and social criteria. 
Blackbum does not really articulate why his pension fund regime is built on a 
range of registered pension funds, rather than one centralized public fund. Presumably 
the range of funds allows for greater citizen involvement in investment decision-making 
at a more local or regional level, and ultimately greater socialization of production. It 
may also be a strategic approach given the proliferation and popularity of mutual funds in 
recent years. 
On retirement the individual would receive the state guaranteed pension through 
the social account. Blackburn suggests that the pension be set at no less than 50 percent 
of average earnings.557 Any shortfall from the investments in the registered pension funds 
would be provided by the government through a redistributive levy on the funds that 
perform well.558 This is a rough sketch of how such a system could function, and 
Blackburn acknowledges that the administration, as well as the types of progressive 
551 CPP pensions are 25 percent of average earnings to a cunent maximum of$9,465 per year. Given that 
Blackbum proposes that the state contribute to the social account on behalf of those not employed in waged 
labour or who are unable to contnoute, one assumes that be also enviSions an equitable calculation of 
''average earnings" for these individuals. 
sss '"New Collectivism", supra note ll at42-45. 
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changes needed would vary from state to state depending on the structure of their social 
systems.559 
While this too may appear to be simply another method of regulating capitalism, 
with more input from government and social organizations such as unions, Blackburn 
argues that he is proposing something more radical - a way out of ''grey capitalism."560 
He argues that while his proposals take grey capitalism as their starting point and are 
designed to address the problems discussed above by making use of pension funds as "a 
tool of macroeconomic regulation that is peculiarly adapted to conditions of 
globalization,"561 his proposals also provide an incremental means to socialize private 
pension provision by"creating a funded public and mutual sector which can act as [a] 
powerful influence within the economy as a whole'' and together with the public and co-
operative sector establish a new form of political economy.562 He suggests that these 
measures will create an "economically active citizenry'' who, once they are collectively 
involved in holding, investing and controlling capital property through their retirement 
investments, will start to explore or question the "limits of capitalism as a social 
regime."563 
Both Sweden's recent reforms to its public pay-as-you-go pension system, and 
Australia's mandatory occupational pension scheme have some similarities with 
559 lbitf. at 43-44. Ungers proposals for example are targeted to developing countries and are designed to 
reduce nation-states• reliance on foreign capital and in.vesbnent.. 
560 As noted earlier. Blackbum defines 'grey capitalism' as .. a new financial regime of accumulation based 
on the salience of pension funds in Britain and the United States, a model now spreading to many other 
countries." lbitf. at 5. 561 R. Blackbum, .. Reply to Henri Jacot" (2000) l New Left Rev. 130 at 132 [hereinafter •"Reply to Jacotj. 
562 
'"New Collectivism", supra note l l at 48. 
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Blackburn's proposals. They also illustrate some of the difficulties that will be 
encountered in moving towards the "new collectivism" envisioned by Blackbum. 
Reforms in Sweden included the allocation of two percent of pension contnbutions into 
government-ad.ministered, personal retirement accounts.564 These are defined 
contnbution accounts and the funds are invested in a variety of market instruments.565 
Individuals can ''invest in up to five domestic or international funds that are registered to 
do business in Sweden."566 While a government agency acts "as a clearinghouse to direct 
the contnoutions to the participating funds,"567 the individual chooses the funds. The 
state's role in regulating the funds is limited to ensuring that "they operate within the 
limits of good practice."568 There do not appear to be any limits on foreign investment, or 
the imposition ofinvestment criteria such as economically targeted investing. 
These reforms have moved the Swedish public pension system from a defined 
benefit system to a hybrid one with elements of defined benefit and defined contribution 
systems.569 Overtime, people's pension entitlement will become more individualized. 
First, because under the reforms to the public system, an individual's pension benefit will 
be based on average lifetime earnings. Prior to the reforms, pension benefits were based 
563 
.. Reply to Jacot",. supra note 561at132. 
564 I. Myles & P. Pierson, ''The Comparative Political EconomyofPensionRefonn,. inP. Pierson, ed.,. The 
New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 305 at 319. 
565 Ibid. at 319. See also A. Sunden, ''How Will Sweden .. s New Pension System Work" (2000) No. 3 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Issues in Brief.. 
566 Sunden, ibid. at 9. 
567 L. Fox & E. Palmer, Pension Reform in Europe in the 90 sand Lessons for Latin America (Santiago: 
United Nations,. 200 l) at 26. 
568 lbfcf_ at25. 
569 For-a detailed overview of the changes to the Swedish system see Sunden, supra note 565; Workfug 
Group on Pensions, Pension Reform in Sweden: A Short Summary (Stockholm: Ministry of Health and 
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on the best fifteen years of earnings out of a minimum thirty years of employment_ And 
secondly, some people's contributions to the personal retirement accounts will be more 
successful in the market than others. As a former Director of Sweden's National Social 
Insurance Board commented: "[t]he risk for an inadequate benefit level stemming from 
an uneven flow of incomes over a lifetime will be switched from the state to the 
individuaL"570 Some commentators have suggested that rather than moving towards a 
new collectivism for investment decision-making, these reforms "[open] the door to 
much larger individuation of benefits in the future."m 
It is important to place these reforms within the context of the larger debate in 
Sweden over the social control of corporations which has its roots in proposals introduced 
by RudolfMeidner in 1975-76. These proposals were designed to "change the ownership 
structure of the Swedish economy through collective profit-sharing byway of wage-
earner funds"572 and would have ultimately socialized corporations. Meidner proposed 
that corporations issue new shares equal to about 20 percent of profits. The shares would 
be held by wage-earner funds controlled by workers through their unions, and the 
corporations would use the working capital to increase investment. Over time, the 
growth of the funds would increase workers' influence on corporate decision-making, and 
part of the earnings of the funds would be distnouted to the public pension system. The 
Social Affairs, 1994); 0. Settergren,. "The Automatic Balance Mechanism. of the Swedish Pension System .. 
(May 2001) [unpublished preliminary draft,. on file with the author}. 
57° K.G. Scherman, ''The Future of Social Security for this Generation and the Ne~ .. Prepared Testimony 
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Social Security Subcommittee at 5. 
m Myles & Pierson,. supra note 564 at 320. 
572 Minns, supra note 11 at 44. 
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wage-earner funds were predicted to accumulate approximately 49 percent of the equity 
in Swedish corporations over a five-year period.m 
The Meidner Plan generated intense opposition from employers who lobbied 
strenuously against its adoption. The system ultimately introduced through legislation in 
1984 was significantly less radical than that envisioned by Meidner. Five funds were 
established which could purchase existing shares (rather than new ones) or provide loans 
to start new businesses with the funds raised from a 0.2 percent payroll tax and a 20 
percent profits tax.574 Interest on the investments would be transferred to the public 
pension system.575 While worker representatives made up the majority on the board of 
directors of each fund, the boards were prob.toited from active involvement in corporate 
management, and could only hold 8 percent of the equity shares in any company ... By the 
end of 1990, the accumulated funds amounted to only 3.5 percent of the total value of 
Swedish company shares quoted on the Stockholm stock exchange."576 
As Minns points out, the fate of the Meidner Plan "reveals the political difficulty 
of increasing social ownership for explicitly •socialist' ends."577 In terms of the recent 
reforms to the public pension system in Sweden, John Myles and Paul Pierson argue that 
the introduction of individual accounts was a concession by the Social Democrats to the 
conservative oppositions parties in order to ••reach an all-party agreement."578 
573 Ibid. at45. 
574 Deato~ supra note 44 at 318; Ibid. 
515 Deato~ ibid. 
576 Minns, supra note 11 at 45. 
577 Ibid. at 53. 
S78 Myles & Pierso~ supra note 564 at 320. 
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In Australi~ employers are required to contnbute to employee's individual 
defined contribution pension accounts which are invested in mutual funds chosen by the 
employer.579 Created in 1992, this system was the outcome of negotiations between the 
labour movement and the government in which labour agreed to wage reductions in 
exchange for mandatory occupational pension plans composed of fully portable defined 
contribution accounts.580 While the labour movement has some involvement in the 
administration and regulation of the occupational pension schemes, including equal 
representation on the Boards Directors of industry funds, they do not appear to have 
significant involvement in investment decision-making, since during the negotiations, the 
labour movement agreed to: 
the delegation of control to private financial institutions, .~. who have amassed an 
army of'"service providers' - ~asset consultants', administrators, custodians, and 
investment managers - to share in the fees. . .. [T]he unions did set up their own 
financial consultancy company, ••• their own trustee advisory and educational 
structure, and have agreed deals with the largest insurance companies to bring 
down the price of administration, and held an annual Conference ofMajor 
Superannuation Funds which bas now become an Australian institution.sat 
Recent statistics indicate that industry funds cover approximately 30 percent of 
Australian workers, while the vast majority ( 49 percent) are covered by retail 
superannuation funds.582 Although industry funds are not-for-profit, facilitate fund 
579 If the fund manager bas more than one fund. the employee can choose which of these funds his or her 
money will be invested in. Fox & Palmer, supra note 567 at 27. 
580 Myles & Pierson, supra note 564 at 316. See also Minns, supra note I 1 at 48-49. Australian Council of 
Trade Unions, •"Fact Sheet on Superannuation'' (2002) online: Australian Council ofTrade Unions 
<http://www.actu.asn.au>. 
m Minns, ibid. at49. See also Myles&Pierson,ibicf at317. 
582 Productivity Commission, Superannuation lnaustry (Supervision) Act 1993 ana Certain Other 
Superannuation legislation, Draft Report (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001) at Table l, p. 
XIV. 
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portability from employer to employer, and work to reduce fund administration fees, they 
do not appear have investment policies that differ from other superannuation funds in 
terms of. for example, real investment, job creation or economically targeted 
investment.583 
As the Australian Council of Trade Unions' (ACTU) states: 
The ACTU' s interest is in ensuring that superannuation funds fulfill their 
prudential responsibilities,. including by seeking high returns balanced by 
appropriate risk, and by ensuring that administration and investment costs are 
brought to as low levels as possible consistent with providing adequate levels of 
service.584 
Australian workers bear all the risks inherent in defined contribution pension 
plans, and there is no redistnoution between funds or between workers as envisioned by 
Blackburn's scheme. 
Analysis of the reforms in Sweden and Australia points to the need to examine the 
vision underlying pension fund reform proposals in order to critically assess their 
transformative possibilities. While the proposals discussed in this section may appear to 
merely take the moderate reforms proposed by pension fund activists a step further, they 
all have a vision of more public, democratic and social systems of regulating corporations 
and the allocation of capital. They also address the criticism that proposals aimed at 
corporate and market reform should target all investors, not just occupational pension 
plans. As well, Unger, Ghilarducci and Blackburn's proposals all illustrate the potential 
583 Australian Council ofTrade Unions, ''Industry Funds Forum'? Super~,. (2002) online: Australian Council 
ofTrade Unions <http:/fwww.actu.asn.au>. 
584 Australian Council ofTrade Unions, ·~Acru SubmissiorLto the Superannuation Working Group 
(February 2002) at 2, online: Australian Council of Trade Unions <http://www.actu.asn.au>. 
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importance of merging the private and public pension systems into a universal system in 
order to better effect social control of corporations and capital allocation. 
This emphasis on the creation of a universal pension system is particularly 
interesting in light of the labour movement's initial opposition to the development of 
occupationally based pension plans in favour of a universal system. Moreover a universal 
public system addresses Deaton's concern identified earlier about the stratification 
created within the labour movement between those with occupational pension plans, and 
those workers who must rely on their own savings and the residual public pension 
system.585 This suggests that pension fund activists might want to focus renewed 
attention on the possibilities for corporate and market regulation that a universal public 
system creates. 
Recent changes to Canada's public pension system indicate that this too may not 
be without its challenges. In 1997, with the passage of the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board Act, the federal government created an arms-length board, the Canada 
Pension Plan Investment Board (the "Board), to oversee the investment in the market of 
surplus CPP assets that are transferred to it.586 The Board has allocated management of 
these assets to investment managers at private financial institutions and there are few 
investment parameters. For the first three years investment had to be passive and a 
maximum of 30 percent of the fund could be invested outside ofCanada.587 fn 1999 
585 See also Labor's Capital, supra note 40 at l6L 
586 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, S.C. 1997, c. 40. 
587 At the moment all of the fund is invested in equities because of the funds already invested in provincial 
government loans. Pensions Under Attack,. supra note 3 at 199. 
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active management ofhalf of the fund was permitted.sss Active investment of the entire 
fund will likely be permitted in 2003.589 
Eventually the CPP Fund is predicted to be the largest pension fund in Canada. 
Although some suggest that the creation of the fund and its investment in the market 
represents "creeping socialization,"590 the governance and management of the fund by the 
private sector and the limited restrictions on its investments suggest this is not the case. 
The Board's directors are appointed by federal Minister of Finance in consultation with 
the participating provinces and the Board's own nominating committee. The legislation 
does not require that there be representation from other groups such as the labour 
movement, current retirees, or other social movement actors.591 The Board's recently 
published Investment Statement,59i. a consolidation of a number of its investment policies 
and guidelines, does not contain any investment criteria related to social, political, or 
economically targeted investing. Moreover, in its Social Investing Policy,593 the Board 
indicates that it will "not give preference to or consider as ineligible for investment the 
securities of any issuer based on non-investment criteria."594 
Mary Condon argues that in choosing to rely on market returns rather than other 
workers for pension provision "a move away :from a commitment to collective 
588 Condon,. supra note 3at100 nl3. 
589 Pensions Under Attack, supra note 3 at 199. 
590 Myles & Pierson,. supra note 564 at 320. 
591 Canada Pension Plan Investment Boar<l. Act, supra note 586, s. 10( 4). 
59i. Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Investment Statement (Toronto: 10 April 2002), online: Canada 
Pension Plan Investment Board <http://www.cppib.ca>. 
593 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Social Investing Policy (Toronto: 6 March 2002), online: 
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board <http://www.cppib.ca>. 
594 Ibid. at 2. 
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responsibility for pension provision has definitely taken place."595 And Townson points 
out that the creation of the investment board and the shift to investing funds in the market 
represented a compromise to those who advocated private savings accounts or opting out 
of the public plan.596 She suggests this compromise may ultimately lead to renewed 
pressure for the abolition of the CPP and the creation of a system of individual savings 
accounts in its place.597 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the possibilities for the investment strategies pursued 
by pension fund activists to lead to significant or transformative shifts in corporate and 
market regulation. For a variety of reasons, legal and practical, it does not appear that 
strategies such as shareholder activism including proxy voting, investment screening, and 
economically targeted investing, will lead to significant changes, particularly if they are 
pursued by individual pension funds, acting on their own. 
Government regulatory intervention could certainly help facilitate the 
implementation of these strategies, but many of the interventions proposed by pension 
fund activists such as mandatoryworkerrepresentation on various pension fund 
investment decision-making bodies; requiring pension funds to report on the extent to 
which their investment policies consider social, environmental and ethical criteria, or to 
595 Condon, supra note 3 at 94. 
596 Pension Under Attac~ supra note 3 at 200-20 L Myles and Pierson argue that major cuts to CPP benefits 
were only prevented through the opposition of the Quebec government working with the social democratic 
governments in power in British Columbia and Saskatchewan.. Myles &. Pierson, supra note 564 at 320. 
While Condon suggests that although some of the more radical and regressive proposals were not 
implemented, '"the price that was paid for maintaining benefits and access to benefits was ..• the 
•marketization' of the CPP :• Ibid. at 92. 
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implement value-added accounting procedures; or the creation of an ETI infrastructure, 
are ultimately modest reform proposals that will temper rather than transform capital and 
corporate management. 
The more radical regulatory changes suggested such as legislatively expanding 
fiduciary duties ofloyalty and prudence to include consideration of the effect of 
investment decisions on all plan members and the economy generally, raise questions 
about why pension funds should be the only institutional.investors singled out for such 
regulatory intervention. As well, a focus on facilitating these pension fund activist 
strategies, even if they are extended to other types ofindividual and institutional 
investors, is not likely to lead to more democratic and social systems of corporate 
regulation as the strategies fail to fully confront the corporation as a social institution. 
The last section of this chapter considered some alternative reform proposals that 
attempt to do this. Of particular importance to the labour movement is the emphasis that 
many of these strategies place on expanding or utilizing public pension systems to invest 
capital in the broad public interest, and to gradually turn corporations and markets into 
democratically and socially regulated institutions, the goal of many labour movement 
pension fund activists. The experiences in Sweden, Australia, and with recent creation of 
the Canada Pension Plan Investment Fund suggest that this may be politically difficult to 
do. On the other hand, a number of factors including the limited potential of current 
pension fund activist strategies; the relatively positive experience of the Caisse, which 
invests Quebec's public pension funds; and the labour movement's historical support for 
597 Pensions Uncler Attac~ ibicl. 
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... pension arrangements ... incorporate the key elements of political economy: 
power, capital accumulation, industrial relations, politics and social 
transformation. The pension issue is volatile because it represents the historical 
conjuncture where the interest of capital, labour and the state collide and 
simultaneously affect the interest of all key segments and institutions of society: 
the elderly, workers, unions, the industrial and finance sectors, and the state.598 
Property rights and the legitimacy of market rates of return are the foundations of 
a capitalist economy. If the pension fund system, the system of capital 
accumulation by means of workers' forced savings, continues to be governed by 
these rules, the system will function on terms favorable to the most powerful 
interests in the economy.599 
Pension funds, the funds held in trust to support occupational pension plans, 
represent significant funds of capital. Together with other institutional investors such as 
mutual funds and hedge funds they have become important actors in financial markets -
nationally and internationally. They have significant holdings in national and 
transnational corporations. They are also deeply implicated in the financial instability of 
global financial markets, and free market globalization. 
Pension funds are generated from two sources: the contributions of, or on behalf 
ot: workers; and the investment returns from the pooled contributions. They provide 
retirement pensions to workers who are generally unionized members of the labour 
movement. This movement has a history of working to limit many of the excesses of 
capitalist accumulation through collective bargaining, and participation in the political 
process to promote a broad range of state regulatory programs such as worker health and 
safety, unemployment insurance, and universal public pension programs. It has also been 
598 Deaton. supra note 44 at 2. 
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an active force in the emerging global civil society as part of a coalition of social 
movement actors working to re-orient or temper the effects of global capitalism and 
neoliberalism. 
Yet, pension fund members have watched as the pension funds from which they 
will receive retirement income have been invested in corporations that use non-union 
labour, or have poor labour-management relations, violate environmental, labour or 
human rights, lay off unionized labour, or move production to another region or country. 
And they found they had little or no ability to affect these decisions, or to advocate for 
investment decisions with collateral benefits such as job creation, the provision of social 
services or the creation of other economic benefits. 
In response, there has been renewed interest in the past decade on the part of some 
members of the labour movement in more active involvement in pension fund investment 
decision-making as a strategy to achieve a number of goals including: influencing 
corporate management and practice; encouraging productivity, local and regional 
development and long-term growth and sustainability; creating new conceptions of 
'"value" that include factors other than monetary return; and transforming capital by 
gaining greater social and democratic control over it. Labour movement pension fund 
activists have pursued four main strategies to do this: greater representation on pension 
plan boards of trustees, investment committees and pension fund advisory bodies; 
shareholder activism including proxy voting, investment screening and economically 
targeted investing. This thesis has sought to examine the transformative potential of these 
s99 Labor"s Capital, supra note40 at 132_ 
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strategies in light of pension law and corporate law principles and practice. It has also 
looked at some of the more practical limitations of the strategies. 
In terms of pension law, pension fund activists have argued that pension funds are 
owned by workers because theyrepresent their deferred wages, and these ownership 
rights entitle them to a greater involvement in pension fund investment decision-making. 
Pension law however, is unclear about whether pensions are deferred wages, who owns 
the funds, and when they own it. Justifying pension fund activism on the basis of 
''ownership rights" also means that pension fund activists fail to explore the possioilities 
that flow from the facts that pension funds have many "owners" and "beneficiaries" -
legal or otherwise. 
While pension fund activists have sought to use pension fund investment 
strategies to challenge traditional monetary conceptions of value, trust law fiduciary duty 
principles make it clear that while investment criteria other than market rate of return can 
be considered when making investment decisions, market rates of return must be the 
paramount investment criteria. This reveals an important limitation of the application of 
traditional trust law principles to pension fund regulation. This is that trust law standards 
of prudence were created to regulate the investment of income derived from an initial 
allocation of capital to a trust, and do not properly account for the fact that pension trust 
funds receive two streams of income: ongoing income from contributions by employers 
and/or employees, and the income from fund investments. 
In terms of corporate law, pension fund activist strategies are built on assumptions 
about corporate "ownership", and the powers that their position as shareholders brings to 
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pension funds and other institutional investors. Yet as we saw in chapter four, the 
uncertainty in corporate law about the legal nature of the share, which mediates the 
relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, the nature of shareholding, and 
the contradictions that exist within modem corporate law between separate corporate 
personality doctrine on the one hand and shareholder ownership "rights" on the other all 
raise questions about the transformative potential of pension fund activist strategies that 
are built on these assumptions. 
In the absence of government regulatory action that encourages these investment 
strategies, or expands fiduciary duties ofloyalty and prudence to permit consideration of 
factors other than rate of return when making investment decisions, pension fund activist 
strategies are at best moderate reform strategies, particularly as it appears that a relatively 
small number of pension funds with more politically active members are currently 
pursuing these strategies. And, while these strategies may be more effective on a larger 
scale if more pension funds pursue them, particularly if combined with other local, 
national and global activities such as consumer boycotts, purchasing campaigns, the 
development of meaningful corporate codes of conduct, and political campaigns against 
exploitative working conditions,. human rights violations and environmental degradation, 
together they will only achieve incremental change. They will not fundamentally 
democratize or socialize the ownership and control of capital. 
Pension fund activists have not fully explored the possibilities created by the fact 
that pension funds have manyuowners" and "'beneficiaries" - legal or otherwise. Nor 
have their strategies adequately considered the suggestion that the uncertainties of 
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corporate law make completing the separation of the corporation from the shareholder, 
and creating democratic and social systems of corporate regulation, a more appropriate 
and meaningful political project. In short, they have not challenged the limitations of 
pension law and corporate law with strategies that recognize the corporation and markets 
as social institutions that should be democratically and socially regulated. 
One strategy for doing this appears to be utilizing the public pension system, 
particularly by expanding a funded public pension system, and democratizing the fund 
investment decision-making process. The labour movement historically opposed the 
expansion of an occupationally based pension system, and favoured an expanded, 
universal public pension system. The recent creation of the Canada Pension Plan Fund 
means that the CPP Fund will eventually be the largest pension fund in the country. This 
development, coupled with the fact that a declining percentage of workers are covered by 
occupational pension plans, particularly defined benefit plans,600 suggests that the labour 
movement may want to focus greater attention on expanding the public pension system 
and gaining greater influence and control over the CPP Fund's investment practices as a 
means to encourage long-term productivity and sustainability and to socialize capital and 
corporations, while also improving the retirement income prospects for all Canadian 
workers. 
600 Between 199 l and 1999. '"the percentage of paid workers belonging to RPPs ••• slipped from 45% to 
41 %." Pension Plans in Canada, supra note 6 at 5. 
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